The Global Strategy For Prevention And Control Of H5n1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

This publication contains a revised global strategy for dealing with H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) developed by the FAO and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), in collaboration with WHO, and drawing on experiences and lessons learned since the panzootic started in late 2003. This third revision sets out a long-term vision and goals, identifies priorities and strategic approaches, and proposes actions at national, regional and global levels to control and ultimately eradicate the disease.

"H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) continues to be a major concern, including the risk of human infection. In six countries, the disease is entrenched in poultry populations (Bangladesh, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Indonesia, Viet Nam and parts of India) and elimination remains a long-term goal. During 2010, other major animal diseases also continued to spread in different regions of the world, disrupting livestock production, rural economies and people's livelihoods and food security. This has been largely due to the limited capacity of veterinary services to prevent incursion of diseases of high impact or contain them, and to disease drivers such as poor production hygiene, high intensification of animal production, increased trade of animal and animal products and intensified contact between animal, human and wildlife populations. FAO's HPAI Global Programme addresses the continuing threats from HPAI, and other high-impact animal diseases, through an approach which is moving away from disease specific interventions to a more integrated, multidisciplinary focus on developing sustainable animal health systems at country, regional and global levels. The approach builds upon lessons learned from the responses to H5N1 HPAI and applies them to other transboundary animal and emerging infectious diseases. FAO has been working towards this approach, including with its new Animal Health Strategic Action Plan (2011-2015) in line with the "One Health" agenda."--P. [4] of cover.

When, in late 2011, it became public knowledge that two research groups had submitted for publication manuscripts that reported on their work on mammalian transmissibility of a lethal H5N1 avian influenza strain, the information caused an international debate about the appropriateness and communication of the researchers' work, the risks associated with the work, partial or complete censorship of scientific publications, and dual-use research of concern in general. Recognizing that the H5N1 research is only the most recent scientific activity subject to widespread attention due to safety and security concerns, on May 1, 2012, the National Research Council's Committee on Science, Technology and Law, in conjunction with the Board on Life Sciences and the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Microbial Threats, convened a one-day public workshop for the purposes of 1) discussing the H5N1 controversy; 2) considering responses by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which had funded this research, the World Health Organization, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), scientific publishers, and members of the international research community; and 3) providing a forum wherein the concerns and interests of the broader community of stakeholders, including policy makers, biosafety and biosecurity experts, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the general public might be articulated. Perspectives on Research with H5N1 Avian Influenza: Scientific Enquiry, Communication, Controversy summarizes the proceedings of the workshop.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) represents a threat to poultry industries worldwide and to people's livelihoods, and a potential threat to human health. The international community has vested interest in minimising the spread of this disease. Countries may be under threat of introduction of avian influenza through exposure of poultry to wild birds, especially waterfowl. They may also be at risk from introduction of infected or contaminated poultry, poultry products or fomites. FAO and the World Organisation for Animal Health have prepared this manual to help national animal authorities and other stakeholders prepare for a possible incursion of HPAI, detect diseases as soon as possible and respond as rapidly as possible to contain the disease. The manual offers practical advice on disease identification, pathology and diagnosis; detection, response and control strategies; and biosecurity measures to prevent outbreaks. It is an invaluable source of useful information for anyone involved in poultry-keeping and animal health practices.

Avian Influenza provides the first comprehensive guide covering the full spectrum of this complex and increasingly high-profile disease, its history and its treatment and control. All aspects of avian influenza are dealt with in depth, systematically covering biology, virology, diagnostics, ecology, epidemiology, clinical medicine, and the control. The book fuses coverage of the latest discoveries in the basic sciences with a practical approach to dealing with the disease in a clinical setting, and providing instruction and guidance for veterinarians and government animal health officials encountering this disease in the field. Avian Influenza provides the reader with a global perspective, bringing together chapters written by leading animal health researchers and veterinarians with significant experience working with this disease. Providing a summary and synthesis of important data and research on this virus, its impact on both wild and domesticated birds, and approaches to controlling the spread of the disease, Avian Influenza will be an invaluable resource for all veterinarians, scientists, animal health professionals, and public health officials dealing with this virus. * Covers full range of topics within avian influenza in one comprehensive and authoritative text * Provides a summarization of peer-reviewed and empirical data on avian influenza viruses, the infection and diseases they cause * Discusses strategies used in control of the disease * Leading experts are drawn together to provide an international and multi-disciplinary perspective * Fuses latest developments in basic scientific research with practical guidance on management of the disease

Some avian influenza viruses can infect humans, cause disease, and even result in deaths. This book comprehensively and systematically presents the theory, diagnosis and clinical treatment of typical avian influenza viruses in human. The first chapters introduce the ethiology, epidemiology, clinical diagnosis and treatment of human avian influenza and complications. The following chapters include overview, extensive images, differential diagnosis and clinical cases of H7N9, H5N1, H5N6, H10N8, H9N2 and H7N4 avian influenza. Written by practitioners directly involved in the prevention and clinical treatment of human avian influenza, it will be an invaluable aid for practitioners in centers for infectious disease control and prevention, hospitals, and academic institutions to improve prevention, diagnosis and treatment of avian influenza in human.

Over the past decade, substantial resources have been spent on tackling avian influenza and building a global capacity for a pandemic response. The catastrophic costs of the 1918 influenza pandemic are well documented, and the swine flu pandemic of 2009-10 has raised the alarm yet again. Across the world, surveillance systems have been upgraded, stockpiles of antiviral drugs and influenza vaccines have been created, veterinary and public health systems have been improved and poultry production and marketing has been dramatically restructured. What are the lessons from this experience? And what does this suggest for the future? This book explores how virus genetics, ecology and epidemiology intersect with economic, political and policy processes in a variety of places - from Bangkok to Washington, to Jakarta, Cairo, Rome and London. It focuses on the interaction of the international and national responses - and in particular the experiences of Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand. It asks how effective is the disease surveillance and response system - can it respond to a new pandemic threat? The comparative analysis reveals the challenges and limitations of a technocratic, centralised response, and the need to take seriously local contexts. Drawing from these experiences, the book concludes with a discussion of future prospects and challenges, examining in particular what a 'One World, One Health' approach - where approaches to animal, human and ecosystem health are integrated - would look like in practice. Published in association with the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)

This book is the first study of its kind that reveals the social justice linkages between three unique characteristics of the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus: namely, veterinary scourge, public health contagion fear, and potential bioterrorist weapon. With its extensive referencing, it will be invaluable for scholars of security studies, global public health, and international relations, as well as for professionals, diplomats, and practitioners with an interest in the relationship between global health security and social justice. Comprised of two major sections, the book examines the various representations of knowledge about the H5N1 virus. The first part explores the three major narratives that were used to describe the virus during its 20-year journey from 1996 to 2016. During this time, the virus multiplied its ontological status through narratives that described a localized animal virus, a global public health crisis, and finally an irrational contagion fear. The text’s second section describes in detail a unique aspect of the H5N1 virus’s journey as an emerging infectious disease—its representation as a potential weapon for bioterrorists. As a result, the US government attempted to secure knowledge about the H5N1 virus. This attempt produced a global debate between scientists and policy makers over how to balance the nation-state’s desire for security with the life sciences’ tradition of openly shared research. Known as the dual-use dilemma, this debate set up binaries of impossible reconciliation between the scientific and security communities. This book argues that the H5N1 dual-use dilemma obscures larger questions of justice, and proposes a new concept of justice, knowledge justice, as an alternate, more globally inclusive framework for exploring a socially just way out of the dilemma.