The Gold Standard And The International Monetary System 1900 1939

This paper examines some popular explanations for the smooth operation of the pre-1914 gold standard. We find that the rapid adjustment of economies to underlying disturbances played an important role in stabilizing output and employment under the gold standard system, but no evidence that this success also reflected relatively small underlying disturbances. Finally, the paper also suggests an explanation for the evolution of the international monetary system based on growing nominal inertia over time.

Since the first edition, published in 1985, much new research has been completed. This updated version includes five new essays, including a new introduction by Eichengreen and a discussion of the gold standard and the EU monetary debate.

Widely considered the crowning achievement in the history of international monetary relations, the classical gold standard (1880-1914) has long been treated like a holy relic. Its veneration, however, has done more to obscure than to reveal the actual nature of the era's monetary system. In The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime, Giulio M. Gallarotti addresses the nature of the classical gold standard in its international context, offering the first comprehensive and systematic treatment of the subject. Three fundamental questions are essential to the discussion: How did the regime originate? How did it work? Why did it persist? Gallarotti uses an interdisciplinary approach that draws upon politics, economics, and ideology to explain the answers. He challenges traditional assumptions about the period, arguing that cooperation among nations or central banks was not a principal factor in either the origin or stability of the system, and that neither the British state nor the Bank of England were the leaders or managers of the gold standard. Rather, a decentralized process involving the status of gold, industrialization and economic development, the politics of gold, and liberal economic ideology provided converging incentives for starting and maintaining the system. Gallarotti's study presents the most comprehensive and interdisciplinary examination available of the nature of monetary relations in the four decades before World War I. His important, revisionist view will alter the way we think about a crucial period in the growth of the international monetary system. It will be essential reading for scholars and students of economic history and policy.

In 1871-73, newly unified Germany adopted the gold standard, replacing the silver-based currencies that had been prevalent in most German states until then. The reform sparked a series of steps in other countries that ultimately ended global bimetallism, i.e., a near-universal fixed exchange rate system in which (mostly) France stabilized the exchange value between gold and silver currencies. As a result, silver currencies depreciated sharply, and severe deflation ensued in the gold block. Why did Germany switch to gold and set the train of destructive events in motion? Both a review of the contemporaneous debate and statistical evidence suggest that it acted preemptively: the Australian and Californian gold discoveries of around 1850 had greatly increased the global supply of gold. By the mid-1860s, gold threatened to crowd out silver money in France, which would have severed the link between gold and silver currencies. Without reform, Germany would thus have risked exclusion from the fixed exchange rate system that tied together the major industrial economies. Reform required French accommodation, however. Victory in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/71 allowed Germany to force accommodation, but only until France settled the war indemnity and regained sovereignty in late 1873. In this situation, switching to gold was superior to adopting bimetallism, as it prevented France from derailing Germany’s reform ex-post.

This book offers a reassessment of the international monetary problems that led to the global economic crisis of the 1930s. It explores the connections between the gold standard--the framework regulating international monetary affairs until 1931--and the Great Depression that broke out in 1929. Eichengreen shows how economic policies, in conjunction with the imbalances created by World War I, gave rise to the global crisis of the 1930s. He demonstrates that the gold standard fundamentally constrained the economic policies that were pursued and that it was largely responsible for creating the unstable economic environment on which those policies acted. The book also provides a valuable perspective on the economic policies of the post-World War II period and their consequences.

This book studies the so far unexplored operation of the international monetary system that prevailed before the emergence of the international gold standard in 1873. Conventional wisdom has it that the emergence of gold as a global anchor was both an inescapable and desirable evolution, given the exchange rate stability it provided and Britain's economic predominance.This study draws on a wealth of archival sources and abundant new statistical evidence (fully detailed in the appendix) to demonstrate that global exchange rate stability always prevailed before the making of the gold standard. This was despite the heterogeneity among national monetary regimes, based on gold, silver, or both.The reason for the stability before the establishment of the gold standard is France's bimetallic system. France, by being in a position to trade gold for silver, and vice versa, effectively pegged the exchange rate between gold and silver at its legal ratio of 15.5. Part I of the book studies exactly how this mechanism worked. Part II focuses on the respective behaviour of private concerns and arbitrageurs on the one hand, and authorities such as the Bank of France on the other hand, in orderto underline the constraints and opportunities that were associated with bimetallism as an international regime. Finally, Part III provides a new view on the collapse of bimetallism and its replacement by a gold standard. It is argued that bimetallism might well have survived, and that the emergenceof the gold standard was by no means inescapable. Rather, it resulted from a massive coordination failure at both national and international levels - a failure that was a preview of the interwar collapse of the gold standard.

"Selected bibliography" at end of each chapter.