The Grand Strategy Of The United Estates In Latin America

In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on such issues as right and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this fascinating manner, focusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin America since the end of World War II. One central conviction is that changes in regimes rarely have objective significance for U.S. strategic interests properly conceived. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America (he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. He argues that America has over the years maneuvered itself into political, legal and moral dilemmas by disregarding or misunderstanding the internal dynamics of Latin American countries and their implications for U.S. interests and by seeing dangerous and irremedial hostility in all revolutionary movements. Against this tradition in U.S. policy, Farer advocates tactics and strategies he deems more consonant with the proper goals of U.S. policy and with Latin American needs and aspirations. His essays combine a sophisticated analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.

A healthy Latin America is of critical value to the United States as a global power. It is besieged by a powerful force of resentment engendered by a combination of weak states, social exclusion, criminal violence, and corruption. In the context of attack by radical populism against democratic values, the United States needs a new grand strategy that addresses the causes rather than the symptoms of the malaise. The author argues that such a strategy must strengthen the effectiveness of the democratic state in providing security, justice, and governance, as well as effectively engender a linkage of the 40 percent of the population presently excluded from the social and economic benefits of democracy to the national and international economy. Unless current trends reverse, Latin American countries will be poor security partners and a continuing menace for international security. The author recommends imaginative courses of action for the grand strategy.

The fear that extra-hemispheric powers would strategically deny Latin America as a friend of the United States has animated American statesmen since the 19th century. Such fear certainly pervaded the Cold war competition. Today, the challenge to the security and well-being of Latin America is neither ideological, military, nor external. Strategic denial is more likely to come about from a highly combustible blend of poverty, crime, despair, corruption, resentment, and antidemocratic sentiments that promise a vague 21st century socialism under new authoritarian clothing. The sentiments are sinking deep roots in the sociopolitical landscape, and they are profoundly anti-American. This witch's brew is presently best understood in the case of the Andean countries, particularly Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. They, along with Peru, are experiencing a crisis of democratic legitimacy, authority, and governance. The crisis in the Andean countries applies to much of Latin America. The problem is compounded by the prevalence of weak state systems that are incapable of providing security, justice, and the benefits of democratic governance to the maximum number of people. The roots of the weak state syndrome are to be found in the persisting dualism of the formal state populated by the "haves" and the informal state populated by the "have nots." The two states are socio-spatially separated from each other. The 40 percent of the population that inhabits the informal state must be productively integrated into the formal state and into the global economy, or Latin America will continue to face crises of authority, governance, and legitimacy. The United States is the only power that can move Latin America in the right direction. Accordingly, a new American grand strategy for Latin America is imperative. It must address simultaneously two challenges: strengthening the effectiveness of the democratic state, and enhancing the security and dignity of the socially excluded.

The role of third world countries in the grand strategies of great countries has always been uncertain. Having a low GNP, and consequently little real or latent military power, third world nations were considered unimportant from a military point of view. Yet great powers have traditionally been deeply involved in the periphery. Political scientist Michael Desch resolves this paradox, arguing that such areas can be of key importance for a variety of reasons. His discussion of the role third world nations can play in strategic matters is of particular relevance to developments in the post-Cold War world. When the Third World Matters examines U.S. strategy relating to Latin America at four critical points in history: World War I, World War II, the Cuban missile crisis, and the later Cold War. Desch shows how areas that appeared to have no inherent strategic interests nonetheless proved significant, either as a stopping point or entry way to some other, strategically important, area or as a foil to direct a rival power's attention from the main theater of action. The lessons learned from these cases, he argues, are of particular relevance to the making of U.S. post-Cold War strategy elsewhere in the third world - in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia.

In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on such issues as right and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this fascinating manner, focusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin America since the end of World War II. One central conviction is that changes in regimes rarely have objective significance for U.S. strategic interests properly conceived. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America (he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. He argues that America has over the years maneuvered itself into political, legal and moral dilemmas by disregarding or misunderstanding the internal dynamics of Latin American countries and their implications for U.S. interests and by seeing dangerous and irremedial hostility in all revolutionary movements. Against this tradition in U.S. policy, Farer advocates tactics and strategies he deems more consonant with the proper goals of U.S. policy and with Latin American needs and aspirations. His essays combine a sophisticated analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.

Some of the nation's most respected scholars of international affairs examine the debates over U.S. grand strategy in light of U.S. security policies and interests in tactical regions around the world. The contributors begin by describing the four grand strategies currently competing for dominance of U.S. foreign policy: neo-isolationism argues that the United States should not become involved in conflicts outside specifically defined national interests selective engagement proposes that the United States, despite its position as the world's only remaining superpower, should limit its involvement in foreign affairs cooperative security advocates that the United States is not and should not act as an imperial country primacy asserts that the United States is an empire and therefore it should conduct an expansive foreign policy. Focusing on regions that present new challenges to U.S. grand strategy, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, the contributors offer the most current examinations of U.S. policies and assess the effectiveness of competing strategies in each region. The Obligation of Empire offers an innovative set of foreign policy initiatives that explore the tensions between global agendas and regionalist approaches. Contributors: Andrew J. Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Dale Davis, Thomas Donnelly, James J. Hentz, Clifford Kiracofe, Charles Kupchan, Jeffrey Stark, S. Frederick Starr, and Brantley Womack. James J. Hentz, associate professor of international studies at the Virginia Military Institute, is the coeditor of New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State.

What is grand strategy ? What does it aim to achieve? And what differentiates it from normal strategic thought--what, in other words, makes it "grand"? In answering these questions, most scholars have focused on diplomacy and warfare, so much so that "grand"? In answering these questions, most scholars have focused on diplomacy and warfare, so much so that "grand strategy" has become almost an equivalent of "military history." The traditional attention paid to military affairs is understandable, but in today's world it leaves out much else that could be considered political, and therefore strategic. Just as contemporary world politics is driven by a wide range of non-military issues, the most thorough considerations of grand strategy must consider the bases of peace and security--including gender, race, the environment, and a wide range of cultural, social, political, and economic issues. Rethinking American Grand Strategy assembles a roster of leading historians to examine America's place in the world. Its innovative chapters re-examine familiar figures, such as John Quincy Adams, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger, while also revealing the forgotten episodes and hidden voices of American grand strategy. They expand the scope of diplomatic and military history by placing the grand strategies of public health, race, gender, humanitarianism, and the law alongside military and diplomatic affairs to reveal hidden strategists as well as strategies. --

David C. Kang tells an often overlooked story about East Asia's 'comprehensive security', arguing that American policy towards Asia should be based on economic and diplomatic initiatives rather than military strength.