The Imagination Box

There is a box. Anything you imagine will appear inside. You have one go, one chance to create anything you want. What would you pick?" That's exactly the question ten-year-old Timothy Hart gets to answer after discovering The Imagination Box. The greatest toy on earth. The top-secret contraption transforms his life but when the box's inventor, Professor Eisenstone, goes missing, Tim knows he has to investigate. With the help of a talking finger monkey called Phil, he sets out to find the professor. In order to rescue his friend, he must face his darkest fears and discover the true potential of his own mind. This stunning debut is first in an exciting new trilogy for readers aged 9+.

Timothy Hart is getting used to the good life with his new imagination box. Anything he can imagine, he can create! There's only one rule - the box mustn't leave Tim's room. But Tim has never been good at following rules - especially when there's the opportunity to 'imagine' his homework into being without actually having to do it. Tim is feeling rather pleased with himself... Until he notices the strange people following him, and then chasing him, and then his beloved imagination box being ripped from his hands. He'll need the help of a top secret scientific institution if he's going to save the imagination box from corruption of the worst possible kind. Sequel to the critically acclaimed debut, The Imagination Box.

There was a sabre-toothed tiger in the playground. Wandering thoughts, Tim had come to realise, were extremely dangerous things.Nearly a year has passed since Tim, Dee and Phil the finger monkey (with the help of some fire-breathing bear-sharks) defeated Wilde Tech Inc and destroyed the imagination space. But since then, it's become increasingly clear that there's something wrong with Tim. His imagination seems limitless - anything he imagines immediately appears in front of him, with no need for the imagination box. Which has both good and bad consequences.Then, in the blink of an eye, everything changes. Tim wakes up and discovers he's in his old orphanage. No one, not even Dee, knows who he is. He's completely alone - his worst nightmare. But soon he realises who is to blame. His old enemy, Clarice Crowfield, has hijacked a new, all-powerful machine and created a reality where she is in charge! Tim must find Professor Eisenstone, convince Dee that they really are best friends (and, of course, recreate Phil) - then literally put their world to rights.

Imagination occupies a central place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, following a period of relative neglect there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in the past two decades as philosophers examine the role of imagination in debates about the mind and cognition, aesthetics and ethics, as well as epistemology, science and mathematics. This outstanding Handbook contains over thirty specially commissioned chapters by leading philosophers organised into six clear sections examining the most important aspects of the philosophy of imagination, including: Imagination in historical context: Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Husserl, and Sartre What is imagination? The relation between imagination and mental imagery; imagination contrasted with perception, memory, and dreaming Imagination in aesthetics: imagination and our engagement with music, art, and fiction; the problems of fictional emotions and ‘imaginative resistance’ Imagination in philosophy of mind and cognitive science: imagination and creativity, the self, action, child development, and animal cognition Imagination in ethics and political philosophy, including the concept of 'moral imagination' and empathy Imagination in epistemology and philosophy of science, including learning, thought experiments, scientific modelling, and mathematics. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind and psychology, aesthetics, and ethics. It will also be a valuable resource for those in related disciplines such as psychology and art.

This volume presents new essays on the propositional imagination by leading researchers. The propositional imagination—-the mental capacity we exploit when we imagine that everyone is colour-blind or that Hamlet is a procrastinator—-plays an essential role in philosophical theorizing, engaging with fiction, and indeed in everyday life. Yet only recently has there been a systematic attempt to give a cognitive account of the propositional imagination. These thirteen essays, specially written for the volume, capitalize on this recent work, extending the theoretical picture of the imagination and exploring the philosophical implications of cognitive accounts of the imagination. The book also investigates broader philosophical issues surrounding the propositional imagination. The first section addresses the nature of the imagination, its role in emotion production, and its sophistication manifestation in childhood. The essays in the second section focus on the nature of pretence and how pretence is implicated in adult communication. The third section addresses the problem of 'imaginative resistance', the striking fact that when we encounter morally repugnant assertions in fiction, we seem to resist imagining them and accepting them as fictionally true. In the final section, contributors explore the relation between imagining, conceiving, and judgements of possibility and impossibility. The Architecture of the Imagination will be an essential resource for the growing number of philosophers and psychologists studying the nature of the imagination and on its role in philosophy, aesthetics, and everyday life.

Anthony Everett defends the commonsense view that there are no such things as fictional people, places, and things. More precisely he develops and defends a pretense theoretic account on which there are no such things as fictional objects and our talk and thought that purports to be about them takes place within the scope of a pretense. Nevertheless we may mistakenly suppose there are fictional objects because we mistake the fact that certain utterances count as true within the pretense, and convey veridical information about the real world, for the genuine truth of those utterances. In the first half of The Nonexistent an account of this form is motivated, developed in detail, and defended from objections. The second half of the book then argues against fictional realism, the view that we should accept fictional objects into our ontology. First it is argued that the standard arguments offered for fictional realism all fail. Then a series of problems are raised for fictional realism. The upshot of these is that fictional realism provides an inadequate account of a significant range of talk and thought that purports to concern fictional objects. In contrast the pretense theoretic account developed earlier provides a very straightforward and attractive account of these cases and of fictional character discourse in general. Overall, Everett argues that we gain little but lose much by accepting fictional realism.

Young children will love to join Orin and his Mum as they're drawn into the wonderful world of imagination. Follow Orin as he transforms a game with a seemingly ordinary box into a fantastic journey the whole family will relate to and enjoy. The Imagination Box gives parents the opportunity to be theatrical in their retelling. Aimed at children from toddlers through to school age, it's a perfect gift for an early reader or a great addition to your child's bedtime story collection.

This book explores a topic that has recently become the subject of increased philosophical interest: how can imagination be put to epistemic use? Though imagination has long been invoked in contexts of modal knowledge, in recent years philosophers have begun to explore its capacity to play an epistemic role in a variety of other contexts as well. In this collection, the contributors address an assortment of issues relating to epistemic uses of imagination, and in particular, they take up the ways in which our imaginings must be constrained so as to justify beliefs and give rise to knowledge. These constraints are explored across several different contexts in which imagination is appealed to for justification, namely reasoning, modality and modal knowledge, thought experiments, and knowledge of self and others. Taken as a whole, the contributions in this volume break new ground in explicating when and how imagination can be epistemically useful. Epistemic Uses of Imagination will be of interest to scholars and advanced students who are working on imagination, as well as those working more broadly in epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind. Chapters 6 and 12 of this book are freely available as downloadable Open Access PDFs at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.