The Impact Of China On Global Commodity Prices

Drawing on a large number of diverse sources, How China Disrupted Global Commodities comprehensively and systematically evidences the trends in the prices of different sets of commodities, analyses the drivers of China’s demand for commodities the factors constraining global supply and in the role which the financialisation of commodities is playing in constraining commodity production. It also documents and the growing role of China as a foreign investor in the commodities sectors. All of these trends are woven together to explore the fabric of strategic choices confronting public and private sector decision-makers.

This note assesses empirically the role Chinese activity plays in global commodities markets, showing that the strength of China’s economic activity has a significant bearing on commodity prices, but that the impact differs across commodity markets, with industrial production shocks having a substantial impact on metals and crude oil prices and less so on food prices. The size of the impact on the prices of specific commodities varies with China’s footprint in the market for those commodities; the empirical estimates indicate that, over a one-year horizon, a 1 percent increase in industrial production leads to a 5–7 percent rise in metals and fuel prices. The surprise component in Chinese industrial production announcements has a bearing on commodity prices that is comparable in magnitude to that of industrial production surprises in the United States, and this impact is much larger when global risk aversion is high.

China's prosperity is at the core of the emerging Platinum Age of global economic growth. Rapid economic growth has been underpinned by expansion in its domestic markets, and the integration of domestic and international markets in goods, services, capital, labour and foreign exchange. Global commodity prices have reached historic highs, while Chinas capital outflows have helped to hold down interest rates worldwide. Linking markets, both domestic and international, has been key to Chinas success. In sustaining its strong economic growth, China has become one of the worlds most voracious consumers of energy. The challenge now facing the government and people of China is in achieving cooperation with the international community to avert the costs - both economic and environmental - of accelerating energy consumption. CHINA: LINKING MARKETS FOR GROWTH gathers together leading scholars on Chinas economic success and its effect on the world economy into the next few decades.

Major mining commodity prices are inherently volatile and cyclical. High levels of investment in China have been a key driver in the strong world demand for minerals and metals over the past decade. The urbanization and industrialization of China has been an important factor behind the increase in domestic demand and high investment growth, while its export sector is also an important source of growth and plays a critical role as a catalyst. Activity in infrastructure, construction, real estate, and automobile manufacturing all contribute to the strong demand for minerals. Over the next five years, the Chinese demand is expected to remain strong, supported by investment and gradually rising consumption rates. However, in the second part of this decade economic growth in China could slow down. For Latin American countries, export receipts should remain strong over the next five years and beyond, given the continued strong demand from China.

We extend the Global Projection Model (GPM) to include a separate block for China. China plays an important role in shaping global economic outcomes, given its sheer size and trade integration with other key economies, its demand for commodities, and its policies. Also, the Chinese economy has several unique features which differentiate it from the rest of emerging Asia. These features (the use of multiple monetary-policy instruments and a managed-floating exchange-rate policy) mean that a separate treatment of China allows for a better consideration of China, as well as how the rest of emerging Asia behaves.

In the early 2000s, Chinese demand for imported commodities ballooned as the country continued its breakneck economic growth. Simultaneously, global markets in metals and fuels experienced a boom of unprecedented extent and duration. Meanwhile, resource-rich states in the Global South from Argentina to Angola began to advance a range of new development strategies, breaking away from the economic orthodoxies to which they had long appeared tied. In China’s Wake reveals the surprising connections among these three phenomena. Nicholas Jepson shows how Chinese demand not only transformed commodity markets but also provided resource-rich states with the financial leeway to set their own policy agendas, insulated from the constraints and pressures of capital markets and multilateral creditors such as the International Monetary Fund. He combines analysis of China-led structural change with fine-grained detail on how the boom played out across fifteen different resource-rich countries. Jepson identifies five types of response to boom conditions among resource exporters, each one corresponding to a particular pattern of domestic social and political dynamics. Three of these represent fundamental breaks with dominant liberal orthodoxy—and would have been infeasible without spiraling Chinese demand. Jepson also examines the end of the boom and its consequences, as well as the possible implications of future China-driven upheavals. Combining a novel theoretical approach with detailed empirical analysis at national and global scales, In China’s Wake is an important contribution to global political economy and international development studies.

Shocks to aggregate activity in China have a significant and persistent short-run impact on the price of oil and some base metals. In contrast, shocks to apparent commodity-specific consumption (in part reflecting inventory demand) have no effect on commodity prices. China's impact on world commodity markets is rising but, perhaps surprisingly, remains smaller than that of the United States. This is mainly due to the dynamics of real activity growth shocks in the U.S, which tend to be more persistent and have larger effects on the rest of the world.