The Interaction Of Monetary And Macroprudential Policies Background Paper

This paper provides background material to support the Board paper on the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies. It analyzes the scope for and evidence on interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies. It first reviews a recent conceptual literature on interactive effects that arise when both macroprudential and monetary policy are employed. It goes on to explore the “side effects” of monetary policy on financial stability and their implications for macroprudential policy. It finally addresses the strength of possible effects of macroprudential policies on output and price stability, and draws out implications for the conduct of monetary policy.

The recent crisis showed that price stability does not guarantee macroeconomic stability. In several countries, dangerous financial imbalances developed under low inflation and small output gaps. To ensure macroeconomic stability, policy has to include financial stability as an additional objective. But a new objective demands new tools: macroprudential tools that can target specific sources of financial imbalances (something monetary policy is not well suited to do). Effective macroprudential policies (which include a range of constraints on leverage and the composition of balance sheets) could then contain risks ex ante and help build buffers to absorb shocks ex post.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

The crisis has underscored the costs of systemic instability at both the national and the global levels and highlighted the need for dedicated macroprudential policies to achieve financial stability. Building on recent advances, this paper provides a framework to inform the IMF’s country-specific advice on macroprudential policy. It recognizes that developing macroprudential policy is a work in progress, and addresses key issues to help ensure its effectiveness.

Macroprudential policies – caps on loan to value ratios, limits on credit growth and other balance sheets restrictions, (countercyclical) capital and reserve requirements and surcharges, and Pigouvian levies – have become part of the policy paradigm in emerging markets and advanced countries alike. But knowledge is still limited on these tools. Macroprudential policies ought to be motivated by market failures and externalities, but these can be hard to identify. They can also interact with various other policies, such as monetary and microprudential, raising coordination issues. Some countries, especially emerging markets, have used these tools and analyses suggest that some can reduce procyclicality and crisis risks. Yet, much remains to be studied, including tools’ costs ? by adversely affecting resource allocations; how to best adapt tools to country circumstances; and preferred institutional designs, including how to address political economy risks. As such, policy makers should move carefully in adopting tools.

The Global Financial Crisis has reopened discussions on the role of the monetary policy in preserving financial stability. Determining whether monetary policy affects financial variables domestically—especially compared to the effects of macroprudential policies— and across borders, is crucial in this context. This paper looks into these issues using U.S. exogenous monetary policy shocks and macroprudential policy measures. Estimates indicate that monetary policy shocks have significant and persistent effects on financial conditions and can attenuate long-term financial instability. In contrast, the impact of macroprudential policy measures is generally more immediate but shorter-lasting. Also, while an exogenous increase in U.S. monetary policy rates tends to reduce credit and house prices in other countries—with the effects varying with country-specific characteristics—an increase driven by improved U.S. economic conditions tends to have the opposite effect. Finally, we do not find evidence of cross-border spillover effects associated with U.S. macroprudential policies.

We explore optimal monetary and macroprudential policy rules for a small open economy. Delegating 'lean against the wind' squarely to macroprudential policy provides a more robust policy mix to shock uncertainty—(i) if macroprudential measures exist, there are no significant welfare gains from monetary policy reacting to credit growth under a financial shock; and (ii) monetary responses to financial markets could generate bigger welfare losses than macroprudential responses under different shocks. The source of outstanding liabilities also plays a role in the choice of policy instrument— macroprudential policies are particularly effective for emerging markets where foreign borrowing is sizeable.

The paper proposes a simple, new, analytical framework for assessing the cost and benefits of macroprudential policies. It proposes a measure of net benefits in terms of parameters that can be estimated: the probability of crisis, the loss in output given crisis, policy effectiveness in bringing down both the probability and damage during crisis, and the output-cost of a policy decision. It discusses three types of policy leakages and identifies instruments that could best minimize the leakages. Some rules of thumb for policymakers are provided.