The Journal Of Unified Science Erkenntnis

Vols. 1-2 include Bericht über die Tagung für Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften, 1929-1930; v. 5-7 include addresses given at the International Congress for the Unity of Science, 1934-1938.

Vols. 1-2 include Bericht über die Tagung für Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften, 1929-1930; v. 5-7 include addresses given at the International Congress for the Unity of Science, 1934-1938.

a priori, and what is more, to a rejection based ultimately on a posteriori findings; in other words, the "pure" science of nature in Kant's sense of the term had proved to be, not only not pure, but even false. As for logic and mathematics, the decisive works of Frege, Russell, and White head suggested two conclusions: first, that it was possible to construct mathematics on the basis of logic (logicism), and secondly, that logical propositions had an irrevocably analytic status. But within the frame work of logicism, the status of logical propositions is passed on to mathematical ones, and mathematical propositions are therefore also conceived of as analytic. All this creates a situation where the existential presupposition contained in the Kantian question about the possibility of judgements that are both synthetic and a priori must, it seems, be rejected as false. But to drop this presupposition is, at the same time, to strike at the very core of Kant's programme of putting the natural sciences on a philosophical foundation. The failure of the modern attempt to do so suggests at the same time a reversal of the relationship between philosophy and the individual sciences: it is not the task of philosophy to meddle with the foundations of the individual sciences; being the less successful discipline, its task is rather to seek guidance from the principles of rationality operative in the individual sciences.

This abridged and revised edition of the original book (Springer-Wien-New York: 2001) offers the only comprehensive history and documentation of the Vienna Circle based on new sources with an innovative historiographical approach to the study of science. With reference to previously unpublished archival material and more recent literature, it refutes a number of widespread clichés about "neo-positivism" or "logical positivism". Following some insights on the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of science, the book offers an accessible introduction to the complex subject of "the rise of scientific philosophy” in its socio-cultural background and European philosophical networks till the forced migration in the Anglo-Saxon world. The first part of the book focuses on the origins of Logical Empiricism before World War I and the development of the Vienna Circle in "Red Vienna" (with the "Verein Ernst Mach"), its fate during Austro-Fascism (Schlick's murder 1936) and its final expulsion by National-Socialism beginning with the "Anschluß" in 1938. It analyses the dynamics of the Schlick-Circle in the intellectual context of "late enlightenment" including the minutes of the meetings from 1930 on for the first time published and presents an extensive description of the meetings and international Unity of Science conferences between 1929 and 1941. The chapters introduce the leading philosophers of the Schlick Circle (e.g., Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Felix Kaufmann, Edgar Zilsel) and describe the conflicting interaction between Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath, the long term communication between Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann and Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as between the Vienna Circle with Heinrich Gomperz and Karl Popper. In addition, Karl Menger's "Mathematical Colloquium" with Kurt Gödel is presented as a parallel movement. The final chapter of this section describes the demise of the Vienna Circle and the forced exodus of scientists and intellectuals from Austria. The second part of the book includes a bio-bibliographical documentation of the Vienna Circle members and for the first time of the assassination of Moritz Schlick in 1936, followed by an appendix comprising an extensive list of sources and literature.

It is not inacurate to say that from 1928 to 1936 Carnap was a member of the Vienna Circle, even though during this period he was not always present in Vienna. During this years, which spanned roughly the period from the Aufbau to Testability and Meaning, he worked or at least discussed frequently with the members of the group. However, traditionally it has been difficult to form a proper view of the development of Carnap's ideas throughout this period, mainly because of three errors which have persisted in the commonly accepted historical interpretation of Carnap and the Vienna Circle: emphasis on the Circle as a unit rather than a collective of individuals; insistence on verificationism as the defining characteristic of Logical Positivism; and the systematic abstraction of the work of the Circle from its historical context. As against this historically distorted image, this book argues for an alternative reading, evaluating the different influences on Carnap of Schlick, Wittgenstein, Neurath and Popper, and making sense of Carnap's evolution from physicalism to phenomenalism and the syntactic point of view.

What is good science? What goal--if any--is the proper end of scientific activity? Is there a legitimating authority that scientists mayclaim? Howserious athreat are the anti-science movements? These questions have long been debated but, as Gerald Holton points out, every era must offer its own responses. This book examines these questions not in the abstract but shows their historic roots and the answers emerging from the scientific and political controversies of this century. Employing the case-study method and the concept of scientific thematathat he has pioneered, Holton displays the broad scope of his insight into the workings of science: from the influence of Ernst Mach on twentiethcentury physicists, biologists, psychologists, and other thinkers to the rhetorical strategies used in the work of Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, and others; from the bickering between Thomas Jefferson and the U.S. Congress over the proper form of federal sponsorship of scientific research to philosophical debates since Oswald Spengier over whether our scientific knowledge will ever be "complete." In a masterful final chapter, Holton scrutinizes the "anti-science phenomenon," the increasingly common opposition to science as practiced today. He approaches this contentious issue by examining the world views and political ambitions of the proponents of science as well as those of its opponents-the critics of "establishment science" (including even those who fear that science threatens to overwhelm the individual in the postmodern world) and the adherents of "alternative science" (Creationists, New Age "healers," astrologers). Through it all runs the thread of the author's deep historical knowledge and his humanistic understanding of science in modern culture. Science and Anti-Science will be of great interest not only to scientists and scholars in the field of science studies but also to educators, policymalcers, and all those who wish to gain a fuller understanding of challenges to and doubts about the role of science in our lives today.