The Judiciary And American Democracy

Examines recent debates in constitutional theory in light of the work of Alexander Bickel.

The role courts should play in American democracy has long been contested, fueling debates among citizens who take an active interest in politics. Alexander Bickel made a significant contribution to these debates with his seminal publication, The Least Dangerous Branch, which framed the problem of defending legitimate judicial authority. This book addresses whether or not the countermajoritarian difficulty outlined in Bickel's work continues to have significance for constitutional theory almost a half-century later. The contributors illustrate how the countermajoritarian difficulty and Bickel's response to it engage prominent theories: the proceduralisms of John Hart Ely and Jeremy Waldron; the republicanisms of Bruce Ackerman and Cass Sunstein; and the originalisms of Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, and Keith Whittington. In so doing, this book provides a useful introduction to recent debates in constitutional theory and also contributes to the broader discussion about the proper role of the courts.

In recent years the Supreme Court has been at the center of such political issues as abortion rights, the administration of police procedures, and the determination of the 2000 presidential election. The checks and balances provided by the three branches of federal government are essential to nurturing and maintaining American democracy. With the guidance of coeditors Kermit L. Hall and Kevin T. McGuire, this volume of essays examines the role of the Judicial Branch in American democracy and the dynamic between the other branches of government, compares international models, and discusses possible measures for reform. The Judicial Branch considers the impact of courts on American life and addresses such central questions as: Is the Supreme Court an institution of social justice? Is there a case for judicially created and protected social rights? Have the courts become sovereign when interpreting the Constitution? Essays examine topics that include the judiciary in the founding of the nation; turning points in the history of the American judicial system; the separation of powers between the other branches of government; how the Supreme Court resolves political conflicts through legal means; what Americans know about the judiciary and its functions; and whether the American scheme of courts is the best way to support democracy.

Presents a collection of essays examining the American judiciary, including such topics as judicial review and interpretation, judicial activism, the judiciary and the political process, and selecting Supreme Court justices.

Many critics attack federal judges as anti-democratic elitists, activists out of step with the mainstream of American thought. But others argue that judges should stand alone as the ultimate guardians of American values, placing principle before the views of the people. In The Most Democratic Branch, Jeffrey Rosen disagrees with both assertions. Contrary to what interest groups may claim, he contends that, from the days of John Marshall right up to the present, the federal courts by and large have reflected the opinions of the mainstream. More important, he argues that the Supreme Court is most successful when it defers to the constitutional views of the American people, as represented most notably by Congress and the Presidency. And on the rare occasion when they departed from the consensus, the result has often been a disaster. To illustrate, Rosen provides a penetrating look at some of the most important Supreme Court cases in American history--cases involving racial equality, affirmative action, abortion, gay rights and gay marriage, the right to die, electoral disputes, and civil liberties in wartime. Rosen shows that the most notorious constitutional decisions in American history--the ones that have been most strenuously criticized, such as Dred Scott or Roe v. Wade--have gone against mainstream opinion. By contrast, the most successful decisions--from Marbury v. Madison to Brown v. Board of Education--have avoided imposing constitutional principles over the wishes of the people. Rosen concludes that the judiciary works best when it identifies the constitutional principles accepted by a majority of Americans, and enforces them unequivocally as fundamental law. Jeffrey Rosen is one of the most respected legal experts writing today, a regular contributor to The New York Times Magazine and the Legal Affairs Editor of The New Republic. The provocative arguments that he puts forth here are bound to fuel heated debate at a time when the federal judiciary is already the focus of fierce criticism.

In this work, Anna Harvey reports evidence showing that the Supreme Court is in fact extraordinarily deferential to congressional preferences in its constitutional rulings.

In The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy John Agresto traces the development of American judicial power, paying close attention to what he views as the very real threat of judicial supremacy. Agresto examines the role of the judiciary in a democratic society and discusses the proper place of congressional power in constitutional issues. Agresto argues that while the separation of congressional and judicial functions is a fundamental tenet of American government, the present system is not effective in maintaining an appropriate balance of power. He shows that continued judicial expansion, especially into the realm of public policy, might have severe consequences for America's national life and direction, and offers practical recommendations for safeguarding against an increasingly powerful Supreme Court. John Agresto's controversial argument, set in the context of a historical and theoretical inquiry, will be of great interest to scholars and students in political science and law, especially American constitutional law and political theory.