The Supreme Court And Constitutional Democracy

In The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy John Agresto traces the development of American judicial power, paying close attention to what he views as the very real threat of judicial supremacy. Agresto examines the role of the judiciary in a democratic society and discusses the proper place of congressional power in constitutional issues. Agresto argues that while the separation of congressional and judicial functions is a fundamental tenet of American government, the present system is not effective in maintaining an appropriate balance of power. He shows that continued judicial expansion, especially into the realm of public policy, might have severe consequences for America's national life and direction, and offers practical recommendations for safeguarding against an increasingly powerful Supreme Court. John Agresto's controversial argument, set in the context of a historical and theoretical inquiry, will be of great interest to scholars and students in political science and law, especially American constitutional law and political theory.

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Democracies are in danger. Around the world, a rising wave of populist leaders threatens to erode the core structures of democratic self-rule. In the United States, the tenure of Donald Trump has seemed decisive turning point for many. What kind of president intimidates jurors, calls the news media the “enemy of the American people,” and seeks foreign assistance investigating domestic political rivals? Whatever one thinks of President Trump, many think the Constitution will safeguard us from lasting damage. But is that assumption justified? How to Save a Constitutional Democracy mounts an urgent argument that we can no longer afford to be complacent. Drawing on a rich array of other countries’ experiences with democratic backsliding, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq show how constitutional rules can both hinder and hasten the decline of democratic institutions. The checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, and individual rights—such as those enshrined in the First Amendment—often fail as bulwarks against democratic decline. The sobering reality for the United States, Ginsburg and Huq contend, is that the Constitution’s design makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. Its structural rigidity has had unforeseen consequence—leaving the presidency weakly regulated and empowering the Supreme Court conjure up doctrines that ultimately facilitate rather than inhibit rights violations. Even the bright spots in the Constitution—the First Amendment, for example—may have perverse consequences in the hands of a deft communicator who can degrade the public sphere by wielding hateful language banned in many other democracies. We—and the rest of the world—can do better. The authors conclude by laying out practical steps for how laws and constitutional design can play a more positive role in managing the risk of democratic decline.

This book argues that the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, should embrace an interpretive framework that promotes equal participation in the democratic process, fosters accountability, and facilitates robust public discourse among citizens of all backgrounds. The authors propose a solution that strives to restore integrity to the Court’s decision-making process by eschewing ideology and a focus on the utility of outcomes in favor of an intellectually honest jurisprudence that gives all citizens a meaningful voice in governance. The work is divided into seven parts. Parts I–V identify the worst decisions in the Court history and the common themes that helped produce them. The chapters within each part are dedicated to a single Supreme Court decision, in which the authors analyze the Court’s reasoning and explain why it undermined federalism, separation of powers, and democratic governance. Additionally, the authors explain why these decisions compromised the relationship between the Court and coordinate branches, the federal government and the states, and citizens and their elected representatives. Part VI identifies several of the best Supreme Court decisions, and explains why they provide a principled framework that can be applied in other cases and result in a pro-democracy jurisprudence. Finally, in Part VII the authors propose a comprehensive solution that should inform the Justices’ judicial philosophies, regardless of ideology, and strive to promote an equal and participatory democracy. The final chapter offers concluding thoughts and argues that a healthy democracy is the foundation upon which equality rests, and that a collective view of rights is the path by which to restore liberty for all citizens.

In this book the author argues that judicial activism in respect of the protection of human rights and dignity and the right to due process is an essential element of the democratic rule of law in a constitutional democracy as opposed to being ‘judicial overreach’. Selected recent case law is explored from the US and Canadian Supreme Courts as well as the European Court of Human Rights illustrating that these Courts have, at times, engaged in judicial activism in the service of providing equal protection of the law and due process to the powerless but have, on other occasions, employed legalistic but insupportable strategies to sidestep that obligation.The book will be of interest to those with a deep concern regarding the factors that influence judicial decision-making and the judiciary's role through judgments in promoting and preserving the underpinnings of democracy. This includes legal researchers, the judiciary, practicing counsel and legal academics and law students as well as those in the area of democracy studies, in addition to scholars in the fields of sociology and philosophy of law.

The process used to select judges of the Supreme Court of Canada has provoked criticism from the start. Some observers argue the process - where the prime minister has unfettered discretion - suffers from a democratic deficit, but there is also disagreement regarding alternative methods of selection. The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming Canada's Supreme Court explores the institutional features of the Court, whether the existing process used to select judges ought to be reformed, the overall legitimacy of the Court, as well as the selection and appointment processes of Supreme Court justices in other liberal democracies. This book will be of special interest to students and scholars of Canadian federalism, the judiciary, and comparative supreme courts. The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming Canada's Supreme Court is the second volume in the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations' Democratic Dilemma series. The first, The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian Senate is edited by Jennifer Smith. Contributors include Arthur Benz (Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany), Jorge O. Bercholc (Institute of Social and Legal Research Ambrosio L. Gioja), Eugénie Brouillet (Université Laval), Erin Crandall (McGill University), Neil Cruickshank (Algoma University), F.C. DeCoste (University of Alberta), Yonatan Fessha (University of the Western Cape, South Africa), Peter W. Hogg (Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP), Eike-Christian Hornig (Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany), Allan C. Hutchinson York University), Achim Hurrelmann (Carleton University), Andrée Lajoie (Université de Montréal), Martin Manolov (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada), Aman McLeod (Rutgers University), Peter McCormick (University of Lethbridge), Peter Oliver (University of Ottawa), Yves Tanguay (CRIDAQ), Alan Trench (solicitor, England and Wales), and Nadia Verrelli (Algoma University and Queen's University).

After more than seventy years of uninterrupted authoritarian government headed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Mexico formally began the transition to democracy in 2000. Unlike most other new democracies in Latin America, no special Constitutional Court was set up, nor was there any designated bench of the Supreme Court for constitutional adjudication. Instead, the judiciary saw its powers expand incrementally. Under this new context inevitable questions emerged: How have the justices interpreted the constitution? What is the relation of the court with the other political institutions? How much autonomy do justices display in their decisions? Has the court considered the necessary adjustments to face the challenges of democracy? It has become essential in studying the new role of the Supreme Court to obtain a more accurate and detailed diagnosis of the performances of its justices in this new political environment. Through critical review of relevant debates and using original data sets to empirically analyze the way justices voted on the three main means of constitutional control from 2000 through 2011, leading legal scholars provide a thoughtful and much needed new interpretation of the role the judiciary plays in a country’s transition to democracy This book is designed for graduate courses in law and courts, judicial politics, comparative judicial politics, Latin American institutions, and transitions to democracy. This book will equip scholars and students with the knowledge required to understand the importance of the independence of the judiciary in the transition to democracy.