The League Of Nations And The Debate On Disarmament 1918 1919

This essay regards the early stages of the debate on Disarmament at the end of World War I, when the international community intended to limit countries’ armaments (and expenses) according to a widespread sentiment in public opinion, after a huge moral and physical devastation. In 1918 some draft projects of the League of Nations Covenant were elaborated by the Great Powers and the original texts demonstrate the initial absence of the matter, but as the brainstorming continued, the articles regarding the way to disarm appeared even more pregnant. The question at stake concerned the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national defence and the fulfilment of international obligations, the abolition of the mandatory conscription, the prohibition to earn private profits from the manufacture of arms, the control of arms trafficking, and the ‘full and frank’ publicity of military programs. In 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, motivated men worked to create an organization (forerunner of the United Nations) with the aim of avoiding future wars. In the final version of the Covenant some articles to realize Disarmament were present and a specific ‘Commission’ to carry on the related duties was established: the correspondence between the protagonists shows the difficulties in approaching the issue.

In the interwar period potential future military conflict seemed particularly devastating for military and civilian society alike, thanks to developments in chemical, air and armoured warfare. This study analyses how a small state, the Netherlands, approached this conundrum and aimed to survive a future war.

This book traces the position of the United States of America on aggression, beginning with the Declaration of Independence up to 2020, covering the four years of the Trump Administration. The decision of the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 2018 has added further value to a book concerning the position and practice of one of the most influential states, a global military power and permanent member of the UN Security Council. Organized along chronological lines, the work examines whether, or to what extent, the US position has evolved over time. The book explores how the definition of the crime can impact upon the US, notwithstanding its failure to ratify the Rome Statute. It also shows that the US practice and opinio iuris about the law applicable to the use of force might influence, as it has done in the past, the law itself. The work will be a valuable guide for students, academics and professionals with an interest in International Criminal Law.

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the international community came together to find a way forward in the aftermath of the First World War. The conference is often judged a failure, as the resulting Treaty of Versailles did not bring long-term peace with Germany. By following the activities of British delegate and wartime Minister of Blockade Lord Robert Cecil, this book examines the struggles and successes of the conference, as delegates from around the world grappled with the economic, political and humanitarian catastrophes overwhelming Europe in 1919. After the Great War describes, for the first time, the significant role of economic warfare at the Peace Conference and in the post-war settlement. Lord Cecil's sometimes difficult partnership with US President Woodrow Wilson forged a new, permanent, international diplomatic organization – the League of Nations – and supplied it with the power to create collective blockades against aggressive states. Leaders of the Allied economic war before the Armistice became, in Paris, leaders of humanitarian-minded international outreach to their former enemies in Germany and Austria. After the Great War promotes a new understanding of these underappreciated internationalists in Paris, many of whom transitioned into leading the League of Nations even before the Peace Conference ended. Often derided as an idealistic fantasy, international peace enforced by economic sanctions appeared a realistic possibility when the Treaty was signed at the end of June 1919.

This book is the first volume in a trilogy that traces the development of the academic subject of International Relations, or what was often referred to in the interwar years as International Studies. This first volume takes on the origins of International Relations, beginning with the League of Nations and the International Studies Conference in Berlin in 1928 and tracing its development through the Paris Peace Conference, the quest for cooperation in the Pacific, the Institute of Pacific Relations and lessons from Copenhagen, Shanghai and Manchuria. This project is an impressive and exhaustive consideration of the evolution of IR and is aptly published in celebration of the discipline's centenary.

In early October 1935 and without any declaration of war some two hundred thousand men, comprising soldiers and airmen of the Italian armed forces, Fascist ‘Blackshirt’ Militia, Eritrean ascari and Somali dubats, invaded the independent state of Ethiopia (Abyssinia). It was an operation entirely of choice, the chooser being Il Duce: Benito Mussolini. The resultant conflict is often described as a colonial war. while it was certainly launched with the intent of turning Ethiopia into an Italian possession, it was in fact a war of aggression against an independent, sovereign, state with membership of the League of Nations. A state that had, according to one of its nineteenth-century rulers, been ‘for fourteen centuries a Christian island in a sea of pagans’. The swiftness of the Italian victory resulted from their possession and ruthless use of technology; most particularly aircraft, mustard gas, and motorisation/mechanisation. Since they were fighting an enemy who possessed none of these things, then they were able to wage, indeed inaugurate, what the prominent military theorist JFC Fuller dubbed ‘totalitarian warfare’ or, as it became known a few years later, total war. This, he opined, was the Fascist, the scientific, way of making war. In his considered view, the Fascist Army that waged it was ‘a scientific military instrument.’ This book examines that campaign in military and political terms.

A pioneering regional approach to the study of international order in Central Europe following the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, and the subsequent creation of the League of Nations.

The first international history of the emergence of economic sanctions during the interwar period and the legacy of this development Economic sanctions dominate the landscape of world politics today. First developed in the early twentieth century as a way of exploiting the flows of globalization to defend liberal internationalism, their appeal is that they function as an alternative to war. This view, however, ignores the dark paradox at their core: designed to prevent war, economic sanctions are modeled on devastating techniques of warfare. Tracing the use of economic sanctions from the blockades of World War I to the policing of colonial empires and the interwar confrontation with fascism, Nicholas Mulder uses extensive archival research in a political, economic, legal, and military history that reveals how a coercive wartime tool was adopted as an instrument of peacekeeping by the League of Nations. This timely study casts an overdue light on why sanctions are widely considered a form of war, and why their unintended consequences are so tremendous.