The National Bio And Agro Defense Facility Issues For Congress

To safeguard the U.S. against animal disease, research has been conducted at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), off the coast of N.Y., on animal diseases not native to the U.S. PIADC is outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research. A plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture bio-containment labs for R&D of diagnostic capabilities and medical counter-measures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases has been approved. A new facility will be constructed which would house high-containment labs able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as others. Community concerns about safety and security are being voiced about NBAF. This is a print on demand report.

The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to engage in research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), off the coast of New York, on animal diseases not native to the United States. When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS. Both USDA and DHS, in cooperation with USDA, conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but PIADC has been identified as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2008 and open NBAF in 2014.

Congress requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produce a site-specific biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment (SSRA) of the proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas. The laboratory would study dangerous foreign animal diseases-including the highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which affects cattle, pigs, deer, and other cloven-hoofed animals-and diseases deadly to humans that can be transmitted between animals and people. Congress also asked the Research Council to review the validity and adequacy of the document. Until these studies are complete, Congress has withheld funds to build the NBAF. Upon review of the DHS assessment, the National Research Council found "several major shortcomings." Based on the DHS risk assessment, there is nearly a 70 percent chance over the 50-year lifetime of the facility that a release of FMD could result in an infection outside the laboratory, impacting the economy by estimates of $9 billion to $50 billion. The present Research Council report says the risks and costs of a pathogen being accidently released from the facility could be significantly higher. The committee found that the SSRA has many legitimate conclusions, but it was concerned that the assessment does not fully account for how a Biosafety-Level 3 Agriculture and Biosafety-Level 4 Pathogen facility would operate or how pathogens might be accidently released. In particular, the SSRA does not include important operation risks and mitigation issues, such as the risk associated with the daily cleaning of large animal rooms. It also fails to address risks that would likely increase the chances of an FMD leak or of the disease's spread after a leak, including the NBAF's close proximity to the Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine clinics and KSU football stadium or personnel moving among KSU facilities.

The fed. gov¿t. responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. High-containment labs. (HCL) play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism. However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. A key task for policymakers is to define their goals for enhancing oversight of HCL. Illustrations

With the publication of Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Index IV, Oxford University Press continues to provide periodic stand-alone volumes containing cumulative indexes for the individual volumes in the series. Index IV (covering Terrorism Vols. 101-120) adds to the previous index volumes in order to ensure comprehensive searchability within the series. The availability of the cumulative index as well as the volume-specific indexes makes the series more convenient for the reader and provides the researcher with multiple ways to search for information. Index IV also features improved double-columned index formatting, for ease of use in a more compact volume. Although each volume in Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents contains its own volume-specific index, this comprehensive index fully indexes the last twenty volumes in the Terrorism series. Only subject indexes are included in the individual volumes, whereas this comprehensive index includes five different types of indexes including a subject index, an index organized according to the title of the document, an index based on the name of the document's author, an index correlated to the year of the document, and a subject-by-year index. This cumulative index volume therefore provides readers with multiple ways to conduct research within Volumes 101-120 of Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents.

The Directorate of Science and Technology (DST) is the primary organization for R&D in the Dept. of Homeland Security. With an budget of $932.6 million in FY 2009, it conducts R&D in several labs. of its own and funds R&D conducted by other gov¿t. agencies, the Dept. of Energy nat. labs., industry, and univ. The directorate consists of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have responsibilities, such as lab. facilities and univ. programs, that cut across the divisions. In the past, there has been criticism of the DST¿s performance. Although management changes have somewhat muted this criticism in recent years, fundamental issues remain, which this paper discusses. Charts and tables.

Contents: (1) Overview; (2) Federal R&D Funding Perspectives: Agency Perspective; Character of Work, Facilities, and Equipment Perspective; Combined Perspective; (3) Multiagency R&D Initiatives Perspective: Multiagency R&D Initiatives; National Nanotechnology Initiative; Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program; U.S. Global Change Research Program; (4) DoD; (5) DHS; (6) NIH; (7) DoE; (8) NSF; (9) Dept. of Commerce: NIST, NOAA; (10) NASA; (11) USDA; (12) Dept. of the Interior; (13) EPA; and (14) DoT. Charts and tables.