The New Commonwealth Model Of Constitutionalism

Stephen Gardbaum proposes and examines a new way of protecting rights in a democracy.

Judicializing Everything? focuses on judicial decision-making in parliamentary states that have recently adopted bills of rights.

Unlike many other countries, the United States has few constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income, housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees. However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under American constitutional law. Under "strong-form" judicial review, as in the United States, judicial interpretations of the constitution are binding on other branches of government. In contrast, "weak-form" review allows the legislature and executive to reject constitutional rulings by the judiciary--as long as they do so publicly. Tushnet describes how weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce constitutional norms on their own. With that background, he turns to social welfare rights, explaining the connection between the "state action" or "horizontal effect" doctrine and the enforcement of social welfare rights. Tushnet then draws together the analysis of weak-form review and that of social welfare rights, explaining how weak-form review could be used to enforce those rights. He demonstrates that there is a clear judicial path--not an insurmountable judicial hurdle--to better enforcement of constitutional social welfare rights.

The bills of rights adopted in the Commonwealth countries of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and, at the subnational level, Australia in recent decades, have prompted scholars and institutional actors involved in the process of constitutional design and reform to rethink how to evaluate and compare the different approaches to human rights protection. They have challenged a number of assumptions in the field, for example, that courts must have the power to invalidate laws that are found to violate rights (ie courts can now be given non-binding powers), that courts must have the 'final word' on rights issues (ie legislatures can now be given the power to override judicial decisions) and that bills of rights are enforced exclusively by courts (ie legislators can now be given new responsibilities to ensure that the laws they enact are compatible with rights).This book addresses three questions arising from these developments. How do these new bills of rights differ from the traditional approaches to rights protection? Why, if at all, should we consider the Commonwealth's approach over the traditional approaches? What compromises must be struck in the course of adopting a bill of rights of this variety? In answering these questions, the book sets out a new framework for comparison that focuses on the types of inter-institutional disagreement facilitated by and found in the different approaches to rights protection. It also identifies a previously unrecognised element of the Commonwealth's approach - the normative trade-offs with other constitutional principles and values - that is pivotal to understanding its operation. Finally, it seeks to contribute to future debates about rights reform in Australia and elsewhere by setting out a number of lessons that emerge from the answers to these three questions.**Dr Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism, was joint winner of the inaugural Holt Prize 2015.

Stephen Gardbaum argues that recent bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia are an experiment in a new third way of organizing basic institutional arrangements in a democracy. This 'new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism' promises both an alternative to the conventional dichotomy of legislative versus judicial supremacy and innovative techniques for protecting rights. As such, it is an intriguing and important development in constitutional design of relevance to drafters of bills of rights everywhere. In developing the theory and exploring the practice of this new model, the book analyses its novelty and normative appeal as a third general model of constitutionalism before presenting individual and comparative assessments of the operational stability, distinctness and success of its different versions in the various jurisdictions. It closes by proposing a set of general and specific reforms aimed at enhancing these practical outcomes.

The central role that good, effective and capable governance plays in the economic and social development of a country is now widely recognised. Using the Commonwealth countries of eastern and southern Africa, this book analyses some of the key constitutional issues in the process of developing, strengthening and consolidating the capacity of states to ensure the good governance of their peoples. Utilising comparative material, the book seeks to draw lessons, both positive and negative, about the problems of constitutionalism in the region and, in doing so, critically addresses the legal issues involved in seeking to make constitutions 'work' in practice.

Ever since the Second World War, a new constitutional model has emerged worldwide that gives a pivotal role to judges. Against the New Constitutionalism challenges this reigning paradigm and develops a distinctively liberal position against strong constitutional review that puts the emphasis on epistemic considerations. The author considers whether the minimalist judicial review of Nordic countries is more in line with the best justification of the institution than the Commonwealth model that occupies a central place in contemporary constitutional scholarship.

Offers a public law theory that elaborates the idea of human dignity to illuminate and justify innovations in constitutional practice.