The Political And Institutional Effects Of Term Limits

Please note this is a 'Palgrave to Order' title. Stock of this book requires shipment from an overseas. It will be delivered to you within 12 weeks. This innovative volume examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, campaign contributions, and the activities of the Michigan legislature with in-depth interviews with legislators.

Please note this is a 'Palgrave to Order' title. Stock of this book requires shipment from an overseas. It will be delivered to you within 12 weeks. This innovative volume examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, campaign contributions, and the activities of the Michigan legislature with in-depth interviews with legislators.

The first comprehensive look at the long-term effect of the 1990s wave of term limits legislation

Intriguing case study of Michigan that demonstrates the implementation of term limits can impede democracy

It has been predicted that term limits in state legislatures--soon to be in effect in eighteen states--will first affect the composition of the legislatures, next the behavior of legislators, and finally legislatures as institutions. The studies in Term Limits in State Legislatures demonstrate that term limits have had considerably less effect on state legislatures than proponents predicted. The term-limit movement--designed to limit the maximum time a legislator can serve in office--swept through the states like wildfire in the first half of the 1990s. By November 2000, state legislators will have been "term limited out" in eleven states. This book is based on a survey of nearly 3,000 legislators from all fifty states along with intensive interviews with twenty-two legislative leaders in four term-limited states. The data were collected as term limits were just beginning to take effect in order to capture anticipatory effects of the reform, which set in as soon as term limit laws were passed. In order to understand the effects of term limits on the broader electoral arena, the authors also examine data on advancement of legislators between houses of state legislatures and from the state legislatures to Congress. The results show that there are no systematic differences between term limit and non-term limit states in the composition of the legislature (e.g., professional backgrounds, demographics, ideology). Yet with respect to legislative behavior, term limits decrease the time legislators devote to securing pork and heighten the priority they place on the needs of the state and on the demands of conscience relative to district interests. At the same time, with respect to the legislature as an institution, term limits appear to be redistributing power away from majority party leaders and toward governors and possibly legislative staffers. This book will be of interest both to political scientists, policymakers, and activists involved in state politics. John M. Carey is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis. Richard G. Niemi is Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester. Lynda W. Powell is Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester.

Presidential term limits are one of the most important institutions in presidentialism. They are at the center of contemporary and historical debates and political battles between incumbent presidents seeking additional terms and their political opponents warning against democratic backsliding and the dangers of personalism. Bringing the team of country experts, comparativists, theorists, constitutional lawyers, and policy practitioners together, The Politics of Presidential Term Limits is a book that aims to provide a one-stop source for the comprehensive study of this topic. It includes theory and survey chapters that explain presidential term limits as an idea, constitutional norm, and an institution; country and comparative chapters including historical, intra-regime, and comparative regional studies, chapters that examine the effects of term limits as well as studies from the perspective of on-the-ground international constitutional builders and that ask what difference do term limits make.--Provided by publisher

This book examines how legislature rules affect the behavior of its members and policies.

In developing Legislative Term Limits, the editor has included material that has explicit and testable models about the expected consequences of term limits that reflect Public Choice perspectives. This book contains the best efforts of economists and political scientists to predict the consequences of legislative term limits.