Legislative Term Limits Public Choice Perspectives

In developing Legislative Term Limits, the editor has included material that has explicit and testable models about the expected consequences of term limits that reflect Public Choice perspectives. This book contains the best efforts of economists and political scientists to predict the consequences of legislative term limits.

This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions to the field of public choice.

Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.

It has been predicted that term limits in state legislatures--soon to be in effect in eighteen states--will first affect the composition of the legislatures, next the behavior of legislators, and finally legislatures as institutions. The studies in Term Limits in State Legislatures demonstrate that term limits have had considerably less effect on state legislatures than proponents predicted. The term-limit movement--designed to limit the maximum time a legislator can serve in office--swept through the states like wildfire in the first half of the 1990s. By November 2000, state legislators will have been "term limited out" in eleven states. This book is based on a survey of nearly 3,000 legislators from all fifty states along with intensive interviews with twenty-two legislative leaders in four term-limited states. The data were collected as term limits were just beginning to take effect in order to capture anticipatory effects of the reform, which set in as soon as term limit laws were passed. In order to understand the effects of term limits on the broader electoral arena, the authors also examine data on advancement of legislators between houses of state legislatures and from the state legislatures to Congress. The results show that there are no systematic differences between term limit and non-term limit states in the composition of the legislature (e.g., professional backgrounds, demographics, ideology). Yet with respect to legislative behavior, term limits decrease the time legislators devote to securing pork and heighten the priority they place on the needs of the state and on the demands of conscience relative to district interests. At the same time, with respect to the legislature as an institution, term limits appear to be redistributing power away from majority party leaders and toward governors and possibly legislative staffers. This book will be of interest both to political scientists, policymakers, and activists involved in state politics. John M. Carey is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis. Richard G. Niemi is Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester. Lynda W. Powell is Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester.

This book considers whether term limits help curb careerism in the US state legislatures. Term limits are popular among the public and have been overwhelmingly successful once on the ballot. Despite this, very little is known about the long-term effects of these institutional rules. If term limits were sold to the public to remove entrenched incumbents from office, how do they alter the careers of legislators and what are the implications? Butcher suggests that term limits do not end careers but instead, lawmakers have become more creative in their pursuits. She finds that the presence of term limits has created a new career system unique to those states that have limits. In each chapter, there is a quantitative analysis, followed by qualitative interviews to better understand the underlying motivations of members.

The Test of Time brings together fifteen outstanding empirical studies, contributed by top political scientists and state policymakers. This volume offers both case studies of key states and cross-state comparisons that examine how legislatures, legislators, and political linkages such as lobbying and electoral competition have been affected by the imposition of legislative term limits. This essential source includes both a comprehensive annotated bibliography of term limits literature and a history of the term limits movement.