The Political Economy Of Financial Market Regulation

'In this very nice volume reputed academics and central bankers discuss recent regulatory reforms in financial governance from a political economy perspective. Therefore it is invaluable for both policymakers and scholars interested in financial governance and market regulation.' - Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, Centre for Economic Policy Research, UK and CESifo Research Network, Munich, Germany This book focuses on recent financial market reforms, and their implications for social, economic and political exclusion. In particular it considers the hitherto under-researched question of whose interests govern the design of regulatory mechanisms and who influences the decision-making process. This process is set out as contested terrain, in which there are winners and losers, and in which there are inevitably circles of exclusion. The authors, comprising financial authority experts and academic specialists, expand the concept of exclusion beyond its typical social dimension to incorporate all actors, be they individuals or institutions not permitted to contribute to financial market regulation as a public good. As they point out, this may take the form of political, economic or indeed cultural exclusion. The book examines the conflicts that arise between various interests and how these are managed within the process of regulation.

The many forces that led to the economic crisis of 2008 were in fact identified, analyzed and warned against for many years before the crisis by economist Jane D�Arista, among others. Now, writing in the tradition of D�Arista's extensive work, the

Examines the law and policy of financial regulation using a combination of conceptual analysis and strong empirical research.

“This publication could not be more timely. Little more than a decade after the global financial crisis of 2008, governments are once again loosening the reins over financial markets. The authors of this volume explain why that is a mistake and could invite yet another major crisis.” —Benjamin Cohen, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA “Leading political scientists from several generations here offer historical depth, as well as sensible suggestions about what reforms are needed now.” —John Kirton, University of Toronto, Canada, and Co-founder of the G7 Research Group “A valuable antidote to complacency for policy-makers, scholars and students.” —Timothy J. Sinclair, University of Warwick, UK This book examines the long-term, previously underappreciated breakdowns in financial regulation that fed into the 2008 global financial crash. While most related literature focuses on short-term factors such as the housing bubble, low interest rates, the breakdown of credit rating services and the emergence of new financial instruments, the authors of this volume contend that the larger trends in finance which continue today are most relevant to understanding the crash. Their analysis focuses on regulatory capture, moral hazard and the reflexive challenges of regulatory intervention in order to demonstrate that financial regulation suffers from long-standing, unaddressed and fundamental weaknesses.

In the wake of the financial crisis, new regulatory measures were introduced which, along with changes in monetary and macroeconomic policy, have transformed the global financial structure. However, this new financial structure displays various fragilities. A new shadow banking system has grown both inside and outside the traditional banks and the divergence between core and periphery countries’ banks has increased further due to both the new regulations and the European Central Bank’s very peculiar interventions. Following Minsky’s approach, this volume explores the interplay between monetary policy, regulation and institutions in the aftermath of the great financial crisis. Minsky’s insights are used to interpret the recent regulatory changes and consider how they have affected the evolution of banks and financial markets. The unfortunate conclusion is that the changes in financial regulation introduced in various jurisdictions and inspired by the work of the Basel Committee, have not succeeded in thwarting the instability of the economic system. Instead, the mix of policies implemented so far has brought about increased fragility in the financial system. Minksy’s work on financial stability offers alternative solutions which policy-makers need to consider to resolve these issues. Financial Regulation in the European Union After the Crisis is an important volume for those who study political economy, banking and monetary economics.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.International banking standards are intended for the regulation of large, complex, risk-taking international banks with trillions of dollars in assets and operations across the globe. Yet they are being implemented in countries with nascent financial markets and small banks that have yet to ventureinto international markets. Why is this? This book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows howfinancial globalisation generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. It explains how specific cross-border relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors includinginvestors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions, generate regulatory interdependence. It explains why some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead todivergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory decisions in the periphery, and the ways that governments and firms from peripheral developing countries manoeuvre within the constraints andopportunities created by financial globalisation.

This book offers an interdisciplinary overview of the role of law in modern capitalism in the context of financial crisis. In this work, the reader will find a discussion of key issues relevant to the crisis that have occupied the pages of the financial press since 2007 including an assessment of the meltdown of the sub-prime mortgage market, the credit crunch, the European debt crisis and the turmoil in Greece, plus a series of theoretical contributions that are aimed to challenge perceptions of the market-state relationship and the place of law within it. The book includes a methodological defence of the state-market dichotomy, a critique of the tenets of neoclassical economics, and an evaluation of what the financial crisis heralds for the future of the political economy of western democracies. Ioannis Glinavos argues that it is a mistake to associate markets with freedom and states with oppression, and suggests that more choice for consumers can -and does- mean less choice for citizens. The book suggests that a new social contract is needed to ensure the survival of both capitalism and democracy. In contributing a unique, legal perspective to the underlying dynamics of the financial crisis, this book will be valuable to scholars and students of regulation, financial markets and economic development.

​Due to the lack of political salience that financial stability policy enjoys in tranquil economic times, this policy field lends itself particularly well to capture – the more so the more important the role of banks is in the financial system. Gundbert Scherf’s research focuses on this nexus between integrated banking, supranational monetary policy and national banking regulation. He finds that national level differences in financial systems and related institutions explain and drive variation in regulatory financial stability policy across countries.