The Politics Of Nuclear Consultation In Nato 1965 1980

This important study contributes to the understanding of the issues and polices of the nuclear arms control questions.

This book examines the processes of nuclear policymaking in NATO and the interaction of alliance strategy with the docrines underlying it. Dr. Buteux focuses on the issue of theatre nuclear force modernisation to illustrate his thesis that NATO's strategic posture results from a political process in which other than purely strategic objectives are sought; agreements on alliance strategy may in fact be related only indirectly to the actual military posture of the alliance and the means available to support it. The book highlights the cumulative effect of strategic and technological change on the strategy and nuclear politics of NATO. Emphasizing that the present strategic environment has called into question many of the strategic and political premises on which NATO's nuclear posture has been based, Dr. Buteux gives special attention to recent proposals to deploy enhanced-radiation weapons (the "neutron bomb") and new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. He considers the impact of these proposals on NATO's nuclear policymaking process and on the ability of the alliance to continue to base its deterrent posture on the concept of flexible response.

Drawing on primary sources from both sides of the Atlantic, Britain and the Bomb explores how economic, political, and strategic considerations have shaped British nuclear diplomacy. The book concentrates on Prime Minister Harold Wilson's first two terms of office, 1964-1970, which represent a critical period in international nuclear history. Wilson's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and his support for continued investment in the British nuclear weapons program, despite serious economic and political challenges, established precedents that still influence policymakers today. The continued independence of Britain's nuclear force, and the enduring absence of a German or European deterrent, certainly owes a debt to Wilson's handling of nuclear diplomacy more than four decades ago. Beyond highlighting the importance of this period, the book explains how and why British nuclear diplomacy evolved during Wilson's leadership. Cabinet discussions, financial crises, and international tensions encouraged a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of strategic independence and the creation of a non-proliferation treaty. Gill shows us that British nuclear diplomacy was a series of compromises, an intricate blend of political, economic, and strategic considerations.

Despite momentous change, NATO remains a crucial safeguard of security and peace. Today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with nearly thirty members and a global reach, differs strikingly from the alliance of twelve created in 1949 to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” These differences are not simply the result of the Cold War’s end, 9/11, or recent twenty-first-century developments but represent a more general pattern of adaptability first seen in the incorporation of Germany as a full member of the alliance in the early 1950s. Unlike other enduring post–World War II institutions that continue to reflect the international politics of their founding era, NATO stands out for the boldness and frequency of its transformations over the past seventy years. In this compelling book, Seth A. Johnston presents readers with a detailed examination of how NATO adapts. Nearly every aspect of NATO—including its missions, functional scope, size, and membership—is profoundly different than at the organization’s founding. Using a theoretical framework of “critical junctures” to explain changes in NATO’s organization and strategy throughout its history, Johnston argues that the alliance’s own bureaucratic actors played important and often overlooked roles in these adaptations. Touching on renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, which has reignited the debate about NATO’s relevance, as well as a quarter century of post–Cold War rapprochement and more than a decade of expeditionary effort in Afghanistan, How NATO Adapts explores how crises from Ukraine to Syria have again made NATO’s capacity for adaptation a defining aspect of European and international security. Students, scholars, and policy practitioners will find this a useful resource for understanding NATO, transatlantic relations, and security in Europe and North America, as well as theories about change in international institutions.

Fundamental changes in international relations during 1989-90 toppled the pillars of the security policy paradigm which had characterised the Cold War. That convulsion swept aside the last of many nuclear debates to rend NATO. Immediately the nuclear problems which had plagued the 1980s were tossed aside. Yet many important and interesting elements of the decade's nuclear history had not been fully explained. With the nuclear issue's rapid shift to irrelevancy, previously hidden information on the period became at once less secret and more easily available. Thus through extensive interviews with participants and careful analysis of open sources, missing parts of the puzzle emerged. This book is intended to provide a fuller explanation of NATO's last great nuclear debate.

Originally published in 1985, this book explores the nuclear confrontation between East and West in Europe: where we stand, how we got there and what the future may hold. Its concluding chapter outlines the prospects for nuclear arms control in Europe, and it frames the debate over NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. Can NATO reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons? Can it cope with the issues at all? The chapters on NATO theatre nuclear forces and doctrine provide a rich background to current policy issues. The public debate over NATO’s 1979 decision to deploy new American cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe was hardly unprecedented in NATO’s history: similar controversy surrounded NATO deliberations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That debate, however, subsided in the mid-1960s; the nuclear question in Europe was relegated to the ‘wilderness’, though efforts – largely unavailing – continued within official circles to define more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s defense. Against this backdrop, the nuclear debate emerged again in the 1970s. This title unravels the military and political considerations at play in that debate and maps the European politics surrounding it. Today it can be read in its historical context.