The Psychological Foundations Of Evidence Law

Identifies and evaluates the psychological choices implicit in the rules of evidence Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.

Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.

Philosophy has a strong presence in evidence law and the nature of evidence is a highly debated topic in both general and social epistemology; legal theorists working in the evidence law area draw on different underlying philosophical theories of knowledge, inference and probability. Core evidentiary concepts and principles, such as the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and others, reply on moral and political philosophy for their understanding and interpretation. Written by leading scholars across the globe, this volume brings together philosophical debates on the nature and function of evidence, proof, and law of evidence. It presents a cross-disciplinary overview of central issues in the theory and methodology of legal evidence and covers a wide range of contemporary debates on topics such as truth, proof, economics, gender, and race. The volume covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation. Divided in to five parts, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.

Explores the challenges of governing in a post-truth world The relationship between truth and politics has rarely seemed more troubled, with misinformation on the rise, and the value of expertise in democratic decision-making increasingly being dismissed. In Truth and Evidence, the latest installment in the NOMOS series, Melissa Schwartzberg and Philip Kitcher bring together a distinguished group of interdisciplinary scholars in political science, law, and philosophy to explore the most pressing questions about the role of truth, evidence, and knowledge in government. In nine timely essays, contributors examine what constitutes political knowledge, who counts as an expert, how we should weigh evidence, and what can be done to address deep disinformation. Together, they address urgent questions such as what facts we require to confront challenges like COVID-19; what it means to #BelieveWomen; and how white supremacy shapes the law of evidence. Essential reading for our fraught political moment, Truth and Evidence considers the importance of truth in the face of widespread efforts to turn it into yet another tool of political power.

"The Roots of Modern Psychology and Law: A Narrative History reveals how the field of psychology and law developed during the first decade following the founding of the American Psychology-Law Society"--

Leading scholar Tom R. Tyler provides a timely and engaging introduction to the field of law and psychology. This Advanced Introduction outlines the main areas of research, their relevance to law and the way that psychological findings have shaped – or failed to shape – the corresponding areas of law. Key features include focus on the relevance of psychological theories to topics in law, emphasis on the institutional realities within which law functions and discussion of the problems of bringing research findings into the legal system.

Winner, 2021 Lawrence S. Wrightsman Book Award, given by the American Psychology-Law Society Bridges family law and current psychological research to shape understanding of legal doctrine and policy Family law encompasses legislation related to domestic relationships—marriages, parenthood, civil unions, guardianship, and more. No other area of law touches so closely to home, or is changing at such a rapid pace—in fact, family law is so dynamic precisely because it is inextricably intertwined with psychological issues such as human behavior, attitudes, and social norms. However, although psychology and family law may seem a natural partnership, both fields have much to learn from each other. Our laws often fail to take into account our empirical knowledge of psychology, falling back instead on faulty assumptions about human behavior. This book encourages our use of psychological research and methods to inform understandings of family law. It considers issues including child custody, intimate partner violence, marriage and divorce, and child and elder maltreatment. For each topic discussed, Eve Brank presents a case, statute, or legal principle that highlights the psychological issues involved, illuminating how psychological research either supports or opposes the legal principles in question, and placing particular emphasis on the areas that are still in need of further research. The volume identifies areas where psychology practice and research already have been or could be useful in molding legal doctrine and policy, and by providing psychology researchers with new ideas for legally relevant research.

In the past few decades, economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies that attest to prevalent and systematic deviations from the assumptions of economic rationality. While the findings on bounded rationality and heuristics and biases were initially perceived as antithetical to standard economic and legal-economic analysis, over time they have been largely integrated into mainstream economic analysis, including economic analysis of law. Moreover, the impact of behavioral insights has long since transcended purely economic analysis of law: in recent years, the behavioral movement has become one of the most influential developments in legal scholarship in general. Behavioral Law and Economics offers a state-of-the-art overview of the field. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman survey the entire body of psychological research that lies at the basis of behavioral analysis of law, and critically evaluate the core methodological questions of this area of research. Following this, the book discusses the fundamental normative questions stemming from the psychological findings on bounded rationality, and explores their implications for setting the law's goals and designing the means to attain them. The book then provides a systematic and critical examination of the contributions of behavioral studies to all major fields of law including: property, contracts, consumer protection, torts, corporate, securities regulation, antitrust, administrative, constitutional, international, criminal, and evidence law, as well as to the behavior of key players in the legal arena: litigants and judicial decision-makers.