The Reduction Of Physical Theories

Using simple physical examples, this work by Erhard Scheibe presents an important and powerful approach to the reduction of physical theories. Novel to the approach is that it is not based, as usual, on a single reduction concept that is fixed once and for all, but on a series of recursively constructed reductions, with which all reductions appear as combinations of very specific elementary reductions. This leaves the general notion of theory reduction initially open and is beneficial for the treatment of the difficult cases of reduction from the fields of special and general relativity, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics,and quantum mechanics, which are treated in the second volume. The book is systematically organized and intended for readers interested in philosophy of science as well as physicists without deep philosophical knowledge.

Using simple physical examples, this work by Erhard Scheibe presents an important and powerful approach to the reduction of physical theories. Novel to the approach is that it is not based, as usual, on a single reduction concept that is fixed once and for all, but on a series of recursively constructed reductions, with which all reductions appear as combinations of very specific elementary reductions. This leaves the general notion of theory reduction initially open and is beneficial for the treatment of the difficult cases of reduction from the fields of special and general relativity, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics,and quantum mechanics, which are treated in the second volume. The book is systematically organized and intended for readers interested in philosophy of science as well as physicists without deep philosophical knowledge.

This classic work in the philosophy of physical science is an incisive and readable account of the scientific method. Pierre Duhem was one of the great figures in French science, a devoted teacher, and a distinguished scholar of the history and philosophy of science. This book represents his most mature thought on a wide range of topics.

Quantum theory offers a strange, and perhaps unique, case in the history of science. Although research into its roots has provided important results in recent years, the debate goes on. Some theorists argue that quantum theory is weakened by the inclusion of the so called "reduction of the state vector" in its foundations. Quantum Theory without Reduction presents arguments in favor of quantum theory as a consistent and complete theory without this reduction and as a theory capable of explaining all known features of the measurement problem. This collection of invited contributions defines and explores different aspects of this issue, bringing an old debate into a new perspective and leading to a more satisfying consensus about quantum theory. The book will be of interest to researchers in theoretical physics and mathematical physics involved in the foundations of quantum theory. Scientists, engineers, and philosophers interested in the conceptual problems of quantum theory will also find this work stimulating.

This book offers the first systematic review of the structuralism of physical theories. Particular emphasis is placed on the inclusion of empirical imprecision into formal reconstructions of theories. The proposed measure of imprecision allows for a topological comparison of theories. Considering the ongoing debates on the nature of the thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics, as well as on limit relations between classical and quantum mechanics, the author asserts that the Bourbaki-style structuralism, together with E. Scheibe's theory of reduction, is the best choice for reconstructing and analyzing the related questions of reduction and emergence. Readers will appreciate the critical overview of the main positions in philosophy of science, examined with particular attention to their applicability to current problems of fundamental theories of physics.

The present volume contains 14 contributions presented at a colloquium on "Structure and Approximation in Physical Theories" held at Osnabruck in June 1980. The articles are presented in the revised form written after the colloquium and hence also take account of the results of the discussion at the colloquium. It is a striking feature that the problem of approximation in physical theories has only recently found some attention in the philosophy of science, although the working physicist is con stantly confronted with those questions. No interesting theory of exact science exactly fits its experimental data; almost every relation between different theories is an approximate one. There fore an adequate reconstruction of physical theories must take into account and conceptualize the moment of approximation. The majority of the articles in this book is centered around this subject. There are at least two elaborate, 'structuralistic' approaches to the formalization of physical theories in which the aspect of approximation has been incorporated: the approach due to P. Suppes, J. Sneed, W. Stegmuller ("S-approach") and the approach of G. Lud wig and his co-workers ("L-approach"). The articles in this book correspondingly fall into three classes: presentation, elaboration and critique of the L-approach [Hartkamper/Schmidt, Ludwig, Neumann, Werner, Schmidt, Mayr, Kamiah, Majer, Grafe] or of the S-approach [Moulines, Balzer, Cooke], and articles referring to both approaches or concerned with related matters [Scheibe, Pfarr, Castrigiano]. Of course, this is only a rough classification and each article must be appraised in its own right.

The book is drawn from the Tarner lectures, delivered in Cambridge in 1993. It is concerned with the ultimate nature of reality, and how this is revealed by modern physical theories such as relativity and quantum theory. The objectivity and rationality of science are defended against the views of relativists and social constructionists. It is claimed that modern physics gives us a tentative and fallible, but nevertheless rational, approach to the nature of physical reality. The role of subjectivity in science is examined in the fields of relativity theory, statistical mechanics and quantum theory, and recent claims of an essential role for human consciousness in physics are rejected. Prospects for a 'Theory of Everything' are considered, and the related question of how to assess scientific progress is carefully examined.