The Refutation Of The Self In Indian Buddhism

Since the Buddha did not fully explain the theory of persons that underlies his teaching, in later centuries a number of different interpretations were developed. This book presents the interpretation by the celebrated Indian Buddhist philosopher, Candrakīrti (ca. 570-650 C.E.). Candrakīrti's fullest statement of the theory is included in his Autocommentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatārabhasya), which is, along with his Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra ), among the central treatises that present the Prāsavgika account of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy. In this book, Candrakīrti's most complete statement of his theory of persons is translated and provided with an introduction and commentary that present a careful philosophical analysis of Candrakīrti's account of the selflessness of persons. This analysis is both philologically precise and analytically sophisticated. The book is of interest to scholars of Buddhism generally and especially to scholars of Indian Buddhist philosophy.

In this book, Vasubandhu's classic work Refutation of the Theory of a Self is translated and provided with an introduction and commentary. The translation, the first into a modern Western language from the Sanskrit text, is intended for use by those who wish to begin a careful philosophical study of Indian Buddhist theories of persons. Special features of the introduction and commentary are their extensive explanations of the arguments for the theories of persons of Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavâdines, the Buddhist philosophers whose theory is the central target of Vasubandhu's refutation of the theory of a self.

This book addresses prominent views on the nature of the self in Indian philosophical traditions and presents Buddhist critiques of those conceptions through the translation and commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s chapter in the Tattvasaṃgraha on theories of a self and Kamala-śīla’s commentary on it in his Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā. The book is comprised of an introduction presenting the theories of a self in the Indian Buddhist Middle Way philosophies and in the different philosophical schools Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla study and offers a background for the translation. The detailed translation that follows reveals the theories of a self that are explained in the philosophical schools in India called the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Jain, Advaita Vedanta, and Vātsīputrīya. It is complemented by a thorough commentary by the author which brings the text to light for a modern audience. A useful contribution to Indian philosophy and global philosophy, this book will be of interest to researchers in the fields of Philosophy, Religious Studies and Buddhist Studies.

In The Concealed Art of the Soul, Jonardon Ganeri presents a variety of perspectives on the nature of the self as seen by major schools of classical Indian philosophy. For Indian thinkers, a philosophical treatise about the self should not only reveal the truth about the nature of the soul, but should also engage the reader in a process of study and contemplation that will eventually lead to self-transformation. By combining careful attention to philosophical content and sensitivity to literary form, Ganeri deepens our understanding of some of the greatest works in Indian literary history. His magisterial survey includes the Upanisads, the Buddha's discourses, the epic Mahabharata, and the writings of Candrakirti, whose work was later to provide the foundation for Tibetan Buddhism. Ganeri argues that many Western theories of selfhood are not only present in, but are developed to high degree of sophistication in these writings, and that there are other ideas about the self found in the work of classical Indian thinkers which present-day analytic philosophers have not yet begun to explore. Scholars and students of philosophy and religious studies, particularly those with an interest in Indian and Western conceptions of the self, will find this book fascinating reading.

The debates between various Buddhist and Hindu philosophical systems about the existence, definition and nature of self, occupy a central place in the history of Indian philosophy and religion. These debates concern various issues: what 'self' means, whether the self can be said to exist at all, arguments that can substantiate any position on this question, how the ordinary reality of individual persons can be explained, and the consequences of each position. At a time when comparable issues are at the forefront of contemporary Western philosophy, in both analytic and continental traditions (as well as in their interaction), these classical and medieval Indian debates widen and globalise such discussions. This book brings to a wider audience the sophisticated range of positions held by various systems of thought in classical India.

Philosophical arguments for and against the existence of God have been crucial to Euro-American and South Asian philosophers for over a millennium. Critical to the history of philosophy in India, were the centuries-long arguments between Buddhist and Hindu philosophers about the existence of a God-like being called Isvara and the religious epistemology used to support them. By focusing on the work of Ratnakirti, one of the last great Buddhist philosophers of India, and his arguments against his Hindu opponents, Parimal G. Patil illuminates South Asian intellectual practices and the nature of philosophy during the final phase of Buddhism in India. Based at the famous university of Vikramasila, Ratnakirti brought the full range of Buddhist philosophical resources to bear on his critique of his Hindu opponents' cosmological/design argument. At stake in his critique was nothing less than the nature of inferential reasoning, the metaphysics of epistemology, and the relevance of philosophy to the practice of religion. In developing a proper comparative approach to the philosophy of religion, Patil transcends the disciplinary boundaries of religious studies, philosophy, and South Asian studies and applies the remarkable work of philosophers like Ratnakirti to contemporary issues in philosophy and religion.

Organised in broadly chronological terms, this book presents the philosophical arguments of the great Indian Buddhist philosophers of the fifth century BCE to the eighth century CE. Each chapter examines their core ethical, metaphysical and epistemological views as well as the distinctive area of Buddhist ethics that we call today moral psychology. Throughout, this book follows three key themes that both tie the tradition together and are the focus for most critical dialogue: the idea of anatman or no-self, the appearance/reality distinction and the moral aim, or ideal. Indian Buddhist philosophy is shown to be a remarkably rich tradition that deserves much wider engagement from European philosophy. Carpenter shows that while we should recognise the differences and distances between Indian and European philosophy, its driving questions and key conceptions, we must resist the temptation to find in Indian Buddhist philosophy, some Other, something foreign, self-contained and quite detached from anything familiar. Indian Buddhism is shown to be a way of looking at the world that shares many of the features of European philosophy and considers themes central to philosophy understood in the European tradition.