The Right Balance For Banks

The global financial crisis produced an important agreement among regulators in 2010–11 to raise capital requirements for banks to protect them from insolvency in the event of another emergency. In this book, William R. Cline, a leading expert on the global financial system, employs sophisticated economic models to analyze whether these reforms, embodied in the Third Basel Accord, have gone far enough. He calculates how much higher bank capital reduces the risk of banking crises, providing a benefit to the economy. On the cost side, he estimates how much higher capital requirements raise the lending rate facing firms, reducing investment in plant and equipment and thus reducing output in the economy. Applying a plausible range of parameters, Cline arrives at estimates for the optimal level of equity capital relative to total bank assets. This study also challenges the recent "too much finance" literature, which holds that in advanced countries banking sectors are already too large and are curbing growth.

Central banks may operate perfectly well without capital as conventionally defined. A large negative net worth, however, is likely to compromise central bank independence and interfere with its ability to attain policy objectives. If society values an independent central bank capable of effectively implementing monetary policy, recapitalization may become essential. Proper accounting practice in determining central bank profit or loss and rules governing the transfer of the central bank’s operating result to the treasury are also important. A variety of country-specific central bank practices are reviewed to support the argument.

Introduction : the new economics of debt and financial fragility /Moritz Schularik --Part 1. Finance unbound : the rise of finance and the economy.How to think about finance /Atif Mian ; comment by Karen Dynan --Reconsidering the costs and benefits of debt booms for the economy /Emil Verner ; comment by Holger Mueller --Part 2. Risk-taking : incentives, investors, institutions.Are bank CEO's to blame? /Rüdiger Fahlenbrach ; comment by Sameul G. Hanson --A new narrative of investors, subprime lending, and the 2008 crisis /Stefania Albanesi ; comment by Fernando Ferreira --Bank capital before and after financial crises /Òscar Jordà, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor ; comment by Anna Kovner --Part 3. Mispricing risks : credit booms and risk premia.Beliefs and risk-taking /Alessia de Stefani and Kaspar Zimmermann ; comment by Yueran Ma --A new approach to measuring banks' risk exposure /Juliane Begenau ; comment by Nina Boyarchenko --Is risk mispriced in credit booms? /Tyler Muir --Part 4. Financial crises : reconsidering the origins and consequences.Historical banking crises : a new database and a reassessment of their incidence and severity /Matthew Baron and Daniel Dieckelmann ; comment by Mark Carlson --Was the U.S. Great Depression a credit boom gone wrong? /Natascha Postel-Vinah ; comment by Eugene N. White --Sectoral credit booms and financial stability /Kärsten Muller ; comment by Orsola Costantini.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

Following the COVID shock, supervisors encouraged banks to use capital buffers to support the recovery. However, banks have been reluctant to do so. Provided the market expects a bank to rebuild its buffers, any draw-down will open up a capital shortfall that will weigh on its share price. Therefore, a bank will only decide to use its buffers if the value creation from a larger loan book offsets the costs associated with a capital shortfall. Using market expectations, we calibrate a framework for assessing the usability of buffers. Our results suggest that the cases in which the use of buffers make economic sense are rare in practice.

The appropriate level of bank capital and, more generally, a bank’s capacity to absorb losses, has been at the core of the post-crisis policy debate. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on how much capital would have been needed to avoid imposing losses on bank creditors or resorting to public recapitalizations of banks in past banking crises. The paper also looks at the welfare costs of tighter capital regulation by reviewing the evidence on its potential impact on bank credit and lending rates. Its findings broadly support the range of loss absorbency suggested by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee for systemically important banks.

To stabilize and bring down nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the Italian banking system, the Italian authorities have been implementing a number of reforms, aimed among others at speeding up insolvency and enforcement proceedings, strengthening bank corporate governance, cleaning up balance sheets, and facilitating bank consolidation. This paper examines the Italian banking system’s NPL problem, which ties up capital, weighing on bank profitability and authorities’ economic reforms. It argues for a comprehensive approach, encompassing economic, supervisory, and legal measures. The authorities’ reforms are important steps toward this end. The paper describes measures that could further support their actions.