The Royal Navy In Eastern Waters

How British naval power in the Indian Ocean played a critical early role in WWII: “Commands the reader's attention. . . . a history game-changer.” —Warship, Naval Books of the Year This new work tells the compelling story of how the Royal Navy secured the strategic space from Egypt in the west to Australasia in the East through the first half of the Second World War—and explains why this contribution, made while Russia’s fate remained in the balance and before American economic power took effect, was so critical. Without it, the war would certainly have lasted longer and decisive victory might have proved impossible. After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was surely the Royal Navy’s finest achievement, the linchpin of victory. The book moves authoritatively between grand strategy, intelligence, accounts of specific operations, and technical assessment of ships and weapons. It challenges established perceptions of Royal Navy capability and will change the way we think about Britain’s role and contribution in the first half of the war. The Navy of 1939 was stronger than usually suggested and British intelligence did not fail against Japan. Nor was the Royal Navy outmatched by Japan, coming very close to a British Midway off Ceylon in 1942. And it was the Admiralty, demonstrating a reckless disregard for risks, that caused the loss of Force Z in 1941. The book also lays stress on the key part played by the American relationship in Britain’s Eastern naval strategy. Superbly researched and elegantly written, it adds a hugely important dimension to our understanding of the war in the East.

Provides a comprehensive overview of the activities of the British navy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans from the earliest times to the present. This book outlines the early voyages of the English East India Company, its building of its own naval forces and its conflicts with Indian states. It examines the opening up of the Pacific Ocean, the wars with the French in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the activities of the British navy in the later nineteenth century, both off the coasts of China and Japan, and also in the many other places to which the navy's very great power extended. It goes on to consider the wars of the twentieth century, Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez, and Britain's continuing relative decline. Throughout, the book provides accounts of battles and other actions, and relates the activities of the British navy to the wider political situation and to the activities of other European and Asian navies.

Between the ending of the Great War and the start of the Second World War in 1939, the Royal Navy remained the largest in the world. But with the League of Nations seeming to offer a solution to all future conflicts, a country weary of war and without an obvious enemy there seemed no need for a large battlefleet.

This revisionist book compares and contrasts US and British naval practice and war planning in the Far East during the pre-war period. Drawing on new archival evidence, the author reveals information about the state of war planning in both navies, which radically challenges the conclusions of Marder, Roskill and others.The terms 'Singapore Strategy' and 'Main Fleet to Singapore' have carried with them implications that British Far-Eastern strategy was devoted exclusively to the relief of Singapore, and that the Admiralty was unconcerned about the area north of the Malay Barrier. This book suggests otherwise. The author argues that Admiralty planning had returned to a pre-war framework that called for the rescue and relief of Singapore and Hong Kong together; the Admiralty was not only concerned with the defence of the Malay Barrier but also had a strong interest in the area to its immediate north, and had already agreed to operate the fleet on arrival from Manila.

This revisionist study shows how the Royal Navy's ideas about the meaning and application of seapower shaped its policies during the years between the wars. It examines the navy's ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, the real meaning of the 'one power standard', naval strategies for war with the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy, the influence of Mahan, the role of the navy in peacetime, and the use of propaganda to influence the British public.

The story of the British Eastern Fleet, which operated in the Indian Ocean against Japan, has rarely been told. Although it was the largest fleet deployed by the Royal Navy prior to 1945 and played a vital part in the theater it was sent to protect, it has no place in the popular consciousness of the naval history of the Second World War. So Charles Stephenson’s deeply researched and absorbing narrative gives this forgotten fleet the recognition it deserves. British prewar naval planning for the Far East is part of the story, as is the disastrous loss of the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse in 1941, but the body of the book focuses on the new fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir James Somerville, and its operations against the Japanese navy and aircraft as well as Japanese and German submarines. Later in the war, once the fleet had been reinforced with an American aircraft carrier, it was strong enough to take more aggressive actions against the Japanese, and these are described in vivid detail. Charles Stephenson’s authoritative study should appeal to readers who have a special interest in the war with Japan, in naval history more generally and Royal Navy in particular.