The Russian Economic Crisis

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the character of Russia, its principal successor state, remains unresolved. So, too, does the character of Russia's relationship with the West. Though the intense U.S.-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War is over, Russia has not become the consistent partner that many on the outside hoped would emerge after the Cold War's end. The United States and Europe have taken issue with many elements of Russia's domestic trajectory and regional and international posture, including its democratic practices, energy-related activities in Europe, stance on Iran's nuclear program, and actions in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. At the same time, many Russians are also disappointed with Western policies and actions, including sympathy for Georgia, U.S. plans for missile defense, and, above all, the enlargement of NATO. This has made for a mix of resentment and assertiveness in Moscow. A principal factor enabling this assertiveness in recent years has been Russia's strong economic growth. Since 2008, though, Russia, like many other countries, has experienced a deep economic crisis. The question is how this crisis might affect Russia's domestic politics and foreign policy and, consequently, whether any change is warranted in U.S. policy toward Moscow.

This US report argues that Russia's economic crisis presents an opportunity to deepen American and European economic ties with Russia and integrate the country more firmly in the international system, something that could, over time, bring Russian and Western interests closer together.

Russia After the Global Economic Crisis examines this important country after the financial crisis of 2007–09. The second book from The Russia Balance Sheet Project, a collaboration of two of the world's preeminent research institutions, the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), not only assesses Russia's international and domestic policy challenges but also provides an all-encompassing review of this important country's foreign and domestic issues. The authors consider foreign policy, Russia and its neighbors, climate change, Russia's role in the world, domestic politics, and corruption.

In 1991, a small group of Russians emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and enjoyed one of the greatest transfers of wealth ever seen, claiming ownership of some of the most valuable petroleum, natural gas and metal deposits in the world. By 1997, five of those individuals were on Forbes Magazine's list of the world's richest billionaires.

At first, it seemed as if the international financial crisis that broke out in 2008 would have little effect in Russia and the other post-Soviet states. But, by the end of the year, growth was slowing, banks were reluctant to lend, share values had collapsed and unemployment was rising inexorably. The stability of the Putin leadership, it appeared, had been built on the turnaround in economic performance that it had managed to achieve over more than a decade. How would it cope with a sudden reversal? In Ukraine, living standards fell even more sharply. In Belarus, there were fewer obvious signs of economic difficulty, but it could hardly be unaffected by the performance of its major trading partners. Drawing on a wide range of evidence, an international group of scholars address the impact of the international financial crisis in the post-Soviet states and the continuing implications of the crisis for these countries themselves and for the wider world. This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, now known as East European Politics.

Review: "In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin's government defaulted on its domestic debt and Russia experienced a financial meltdown that brought it to the brink of disaster. In No Precedent, No plan, Martin Gilman offers an insider's view of Russia's financial crisis. As the International Monetary Fund's senior person in Moscow, Gilman was in the eye of the storm. Russia's policy response to the economic collapse stemming from the disintegration of the Soviet Union was chaotic. Fiscal deficits loomed in anticipation of future budget revenue that never seemed to materialize--despite repeated promises to the IMF. The rapid buildup of sovereign debt would have challenged even a competent government. In the new Russia, with its barely functioning government and no consensus on the path toward democratic and economic transformation, domestic politics trumped economic common sense." "Gilman argues that the debt default, although avoidable, actually spurred Russia to integrate its economy with the rest of the world. In analyzing the ordeal of the 1998 crisis, Gilman suggests that the IMF helped Russia avoid an even greater catastrophe. He details the IMF's involvement and underscores the unique challenge that Russia presented to the IMF. There really was no precedent, even if economist Joseph Stiglitz and others argued otherwise. In recounting Russia's emergence from the IMF's tutelage, Gilman explains how the shell-shocked Russian public turned to Vladimir Putin in search of stability after the trauma of 1998. And although Russia's own prospects are favorable, Gilman expresses concern that the 1998 Russian default could serve as an unfortunate precedent for sovereign defaults in the future with the IMF once again playing a similar role." "No Precedent, No Plan offers a definitive account--the first from an insider's perspective--of Russia's painful transition to a market economy."--BOOK JACKET