The Six Scripts Or The Principles Of Chinese Writing By Tai Tung

An English translation by L. C. Hopkins of Tai T'ung's Liu Shu Ku, first published in 1881.

The three-volume sets constitute the refereed proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Knowledge Science, Engineering and Management, KSEM 2022, held in Singapore, during August 6–8, 2022. The 169 full papers presented in these proceedings were carefully reviewed and selected from 498 submissions. The papers are organized in the following topical sections: Volume I:Knowledge Science with Learning and AI (KSLA) Volume II:Knowledge Engineering Research and Applications (KERA) Volume III:Knowledge Management with Optimization and Security (KMOS)

The Emergence of Word-Meaning in Early China makes an innovative contribution to studies of language by historicizing the Chinese notion that words have "meaning" (content independent of instances of use). Rather than presuming that the concept of word-meaning had always existed, Jane Geaney explains how and why it arose in China. To account for why a normative term (yi, "duty, morality, appropriateness") came to be used for "meanings" found in dictionaries, Geaney examines interrelated patterns of word usage threading through and across a wide range of genres. These patterns show that by the first millennium, as textual production exploded—and as radically different writing forms (in Buddhist sutras) were encountered—yi already functioned as an externally accessible "model" for semantic interpretation of texts and sayings. The book has far-reaching implications. Because the idea of word-meaning is fundamental to theorizing, the book illuminates not only semantic ideas and the normativity of language in Early China, but also aspects of early Chinese philosophy and intellectual history. As the internet supplants one form of media (print), thereby reducing knowledge to vast digital databases, so too, this book explains, two thousand years ago a culture that prized oral and visual balance became an "empire of the text."

Some might ask "Why Locke's theory of knowledge now?" Though appreciated for his social philosophy, Locke has been criticized for his work in the field of epistemology ever since the publication of the Essay. It is even as if Locke serves only as an example of how not to think. When people criticize Locke, they usually cite the hostile commen taries of Berkeley, Kant, Husserl, or Sellars. But, one might ask, are they not all so eager to show the excellence of their own epistemo logical views that they distort and underestimate Locke's thought? Russell aptly noted in his History of Western Philosophy that: No one has yet succeeded in inventing a philosophy at once credible and self-consis tent. Locke aimed at credibility, and achieved it at the expense of consistency. Most of the great philosophers have done the opposite. A philosophy which is not self-consis tent cannot be wholly true, but a philosophy which is self-consistent can very well be wholly false. The most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies, but for that very reason have been partially true. There is no reason to suppose that a self consistent system contains more truth than one which, like Locke's, is obviously more or less wrong. (B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], p. 613. ) Here Russell is uncommonly charitable with Locke.