The Social Institution Of Discursive Norms

The essays in this collection explore the idea that discursive norms—the norms governing our thought and talk—are profoundly social. Not only do these norms govern and structure our social interactions, but they are sustained by a variety of social and institutional structures. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. The first offers historical perspectives on discursive norms, including a chapter by Robert Brandom on the way Hegel transformed Kant’s normativist approach to representation by adding both a social and a historicist dimension to it. Section II features four chapters that examine the sociality of normativity from within a broadly naturalistic framework. The third and final section focuses on the social dimension of linguistic phenomena such as online speech acts, oppressive speech, and assertions. The Social Institution of Discursive Norms will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy.

This book gives an interdisciplinary perspective on how the language use is shaped by and evolves with human society and how in turn social activities are constructed by the way how language is organized and communicated. With a contribution from multiple neighboring scientific disciplines, this book characterizes fundamental mechanisms, represents wide applications, and introduces state-of-the-art approaches in the modern sociolinguistic research. Three unique questions are asked and addressed by eight independent chapters: (1) the diversity and dynamics of the language use in multilingualism, human development, and organizational change; (2) the application of linguistic analysis to society, policy planning, and health education; and (3) the new approaches to sociolinguistics with an emphasis on communicative and cognitive aspects of language use.

Offering a diverse set of contributions to current social contracting research, this text illustrates how social contracts necessarily underlie and facilitate all forms of capitalist production and exchange.

This book is about rules, and especially about human capability to create, maintain and follow rules, as a root of what makes us humans different from other animals. The leading idea is that scrutinizing this capability is able to tell us who we humans are and what kinds of lives we live. It elaborates Wilfrid Sellars' visionary observation that "to say that man is a rational animal, is to say that man is a creature not of habits, but of rules"; and it builds on the ideas of Sellars' and Brandom's inferentialism, in a novel naturalistic way. The main tenet of inferentialism is that our language games are essentially rule-governed and that meanings are inferential roles. Jaroslav Peregrin sees the task of reconciliation of inferentialism and naturalism as centered around the problem of naturalization of rules. He argues that the most primitive form of a rule is a cluster of normative attitudes. We humans are specific by our tendency assume peculiar attitudes to what we do, and to do so in a specific way, which turns the attitudes into "normative" ones. This self-reflective structure characterizes our ability to build systems of interconnected rules, which have come to constitute our natural niche. Furthermore, Peregrin shows how our most important system of rules—that constitutive of our language—helped to lead us to our current position of rule-following, ultra-social, rational, and discursive creatures. Normative Species will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, social ontology, cultural evolution, and cognitive science.

In the world of academic scholarship, there exists a pressing problem that has long confounded researchers and scholars alike. The issue at hand is the glaring gap in our understanding of political asymmetry—an elusive concept that holds the key to deciphering how institutions evolve and influence normative constructs within contemporary governance structures. Despite its undeniable relevance, political asymmetry has remained a neglected subject in social science discourse. This omission hampers our capacity to explore the intricate interplay between cultural diversity, normative representations, and political dynamics. As such, a critical void persists in comprehending the complex mechanisms that underpin governance practices in our ever-evolving global landscape. Cognitive Governance and the Historical Distortion of the Norm of Modern Development: A Theory of Political Asymmetry offers an illuminating solution to this enduring problem. This pioneering work presents a comprehensive and meticulously crafted exploration of the concept of political asymmetry, providing both a theoretical taxonomy and an empirical roadmap for scholars eager to delve into uncharted territory. By bridging this knowledge gap, the book equips researchers with the tools needed to redefine how political asymmetry is not only understood but also applied in rigorous social science research. It marks a transformative shift in our approach to political science, enabling us to navigate the labyrinth of contemporary governance structures with newfound clarity.

This book argues that contractarianism is well suited as a political morality and explores the implications of deploying it in this way. It promises to revive contractarianism as a viable political theory, breaking it free from its Rawlsian moorings while taking seriously the long-standing objections to it. It’s natural to think that the state owes things to its people: physical security, public health and sanitation services, and a functioning judiciary, for example. But is there a theory—a political morality—that can explain why this is so and who the state’s people are? This new contractarianism deploys a reversed state of nature thought experiment as the starting point of political theorizing. From this starting point it develops a political morality: a theory of the common ground of the role moralities attached to the various roles within the state. Contractarianism, so understood, can provide a basis for already popular ideas in political theory—such as political and legal liberalism—and overturn conventional wisdom, for example that the state is obligated to secure justice and that animals should have no legal standing. Contractarianism, Role Obligations, and Political Morality will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral and political philosophy.

Where accounts of the relation between language and mind often rest on the concept of representation, Brandom sets out an approach based on inference, and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language. It is the first attempt to work out a detailed theory rendering linguistic meaning in terms of use.

Reflecting advances in theory, research, and application in the discipline since the publication of the Handbook of Public Relations in 2001, this new volume is global in scope and unmatched in its coverage of both academic research and professional best practice. It presents major theories in the words of the leading advocates for each theory; positions public relations as a positive force to help make society more fully functional; and challenges academics and practitioners to identify best practices that can inform the work of those in the profession.