The Soul Of Armies

For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.

Excerpt from The Soul and Body of an Army The Romans knew what they wanted when they set about making an Army. The very name they gave to the weapon to be handed to a Consul or pro-Consul embodied a clear-cut idea. "So sensible were the Romans of the imperfections of valour without skill and practice that, in their language, the name of an Army was borrowed from the word which signified exercise." Exercitus was the Roman notion of an Army - a body trainod to do in peace what they would have to do in war. Not with them a nation determined to win as a result of sheer, straightforward work, but a confederacy trusting to art, to generalship, to inspiration, expecting victory to crown the more brilliantly led. The quick-witted Greeks relied upon that reflection cast by Divinity upon the sensitive soul, that flash of light we call Genius; the matter-of-fact Romans upon putting their backs into the business. Or, to put it more technically, the Greek spirit led its leaders to study strategy, the art of manoeuvring into some position from which the greatest possible results would follow upon victory; whereas, the Romans aimed at the victory itself and concentrated rather upon tactics. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

From the author of the international bestseller "The Western Way of War" comes a fresh, exciting look at three armies whose intense spirit of mission, coupled with the genius of their leaders, led them to triumph. Maps.

This book is a companion book to another book by Philip Gibbs that is already in the library, namely Now It Can Be Told[1]. Together, both books constitute the war-time memoirs of British war-correspondent Philip Gibbs, one of the few officially accredited journalists allowed on the British sector of the Western front. He covered the war from beginning to end. The Soul of the War is the first part of his memoirs, published in 1915, Now It Can Be Told is the second part, but published immediately after the war. Taken together, both books are amongst the most important and influential books published in English during the Great War, being in no small part responsible for the emergence of the "Lost Generation" myth of the 1920's. A pre-war best-selling author and journalist, Philip Gibbs was one of the most outstanding British war-time reporters and writers. Like many reporters in the opening months of the war, Philip Gibbs and his companions seemed to posses the knack for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, following armies across northern France in the vain hope of being on hand to witness battle. He never really succeeded during the first year, aside from joining a British volunteer ambulance service on the Ypres front in late 1914. But while other reporters unashamedly spruced up their reporting, dramatizing and glorifying small insignificant incidents and passing occurrences of no import, Gibbs knew how to talk to soldiers coming from or going to the front lines, how to convey their thoughts and fears and vividly describe their battle experiences. Gibbs was a very serious writer, and extremely proficient at his trade. He knew how to get to the essence of things, to describe the feel of the times, the general attitude, and the hopes and fears of both fighting men and civilians. Not only is this voluminous book a brilliantly written commentary on the opening months of the war, it is also infused with an inner sadness that could well be considered a precursor to the post-war "lost generation" myth, which is yet another indicator at how well Gibbs could gage the feel of the times and assess its impact on future developments in society.

This is a pre-1923 historical reproduction that was curated for quality. Quality assurance was conducted on each of these books in an attempt to remove books with imperfections introduced by the digitization process. Though we have made best efforts - the books may have occasional errors that do not impede the reading experience. We believe this work is culturally important and have elected to bring the book back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide.