The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy

The breakup of the Soviet Union left a cold war nuclear legacy consisting of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and a sprawling infrastructure for their production and maintenance. This book examines the fate of this vast nuclear weapon complex and the unprecedented non-proliferation challenges associated with the breakup of a nuclear weapon state. It describes the high-level diplomatic bargaining efforts to consolidate in Russia the nuclear weapons based in newly independent Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and to strengthen central control over these weapons. It surveys the problems associated with dismantling nuclear weapons and the difficulties involved in safely storing and disposing of large stockpiles of fissile material. It reviews the key provisions of the principal nuclear arms control measures and initiatives, including the START I and START II treaties. Finally, the book assesses the contribution of international assistance programmes to the denuclearization process under way in the former Soviet Union.

*Includes pictures *Includes a bibliography for further reading Tens of millions died during World War II as the warring powers raced to create the best fighter planes, tanks, and guns, and eventually that race extended to bombs which carried enough power to destroy civilization itself. While the war raged in Europe and the Pacific, a dream team of Nobel Laureates was working on the Manhattan Project, a program kept so secret that Vice President Harry Truman didn't know about it until he took the presidency after FDR's death in April 1945. The Manhattan Project would ultimately yield the "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" bombs that released more than 100 Terajoules of energy at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but weeks earlier, on July 16, 1945, the first detonation of a nuclear device took place in Alamogordo, New Mexico. The first bomb was nicknamed the "gadget," to avoid espionage attempts to discover that it was, indeed, a bomb. In some sense, the device detonated in July was not really a "bomb" anyway; it was not a deployable device, though it was a detonatable one. With this success, word reached President Truman, who was then attending the Potsdam Conference, and while there, he presented the news to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Stalin feigned surprise; in an ironic twist of fate, espionage missions had revealed American nuclear research to the Soviets before it had even reached Vice President Truman. The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, along with the Cold War-era tests and their accompanying mushroom clouds, would demonstrate the true power and terror of nuclear weapons, but in the late 1930s these bombs were only vaguely being thought through, particularly after the successful first experiment to split the atom by a German scientist. Despite the fact the Nazis' quest for a nuclear weapon began in earnest in 1939, no one really had a handle on how important nuclear weapons would prove to war and geopolitics, so the Germans were hesitant to expend resources on it. Moreover, they were hampered by the fact their policies had compelled Jewish scientists like Liz Meitner and Albert Einstein to flee before the war. For their part, Stalin's regime had been working on a nuclear weapons program since 1942, relying greatly upon successful Soviet espionage to help lead the way. With intelligence sources connected to the Manhattan Project, Stalin was able to keep abreast of the Allies' progress toward creating an atomic bomb, so that by 1945, the Soviets already had a working blueprint of America's first atomic bombs. On August 29, 1949, the Soviets successfully tested an atomic bomb, and with that, the Soviet Union became the second nation after the U.S. to develop and possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear age itself was still in its infancy, but within a few short years the advent of nuclear war loomed over the world and the prospect of a malign dictatorship possessing nuclear superiority kept Western leaders awake at night. The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program: The History and Legacy of the USSR's Efforts to Build the Atomic Bomb examines the Soviets' race to reach the ultimate goal during and after World War II, and how they went about their objectives. Along with pictures of important people, places, and events, you will learn about Nazi Germany's nuclear weapons program like never before.

First published in 1997, this volume builds its discussion on a technological base along with policy implications, and constitutes a review of the current situation in international security created by the Cold War, and how the end of the Cold War is likely to change the situation. As the close of the Cold War created a multitude of changes in international security, resulting in a broad range of topics tackled in this collection. It features specialists in military technology, physics, political science, public and international affairs.

Nuclear arms reduction agreements and parallel commitments since 1987 will remove from active deployment about 27,000 former Soviet Union bombs and warheads. When START I and II are fully implemented, Russia will have eliminated 1,000 strategic delivery vehicles and removed from active deployment 4,500 strategic warheads. Ukraine will give up 176 SS-19s and -24s and 1,240 strategic warheads as well as cruise missile warheads. Kazakhstan will relinquish 104 SS-18s and 1,040 strategic warheads. The 81 SS-25 single-warhead missiles placed in Belarus by the Soviet Union will be withdrawn and probably redeployed on Russian territory. The United States will eliminate over 1,300 strategic delivery vehicles under the START agreements, and will remove from active deployment more than 6,000 strategic warheads. These reductions, in terms of systems scheduled for elimination and the destructive potential they represent, amount to the greatest program of disarmament in human history. The process also signals a change in relations between Washington and Moscow, if only by dramatically reversing the trend to increase nuclear weapons targeted against each other's homeland.

This book is about nuclear legacies in Russia and Central Asia, focusing on selected sites of the Soviet atomic program, many of which have remained understudied. Nuclear operations, for energy or military purposes, demanded a vast infrastructure of production and supply chains that have transformed entire regions. In following the material traces of the atomic programs, contributors pay particular attention to memory practices and memorialization concerning nuclear legacies. Tracing the Atom foregrounds historical and contemporary engagements with nuclear politics: how have institutions and governments responded to the legacies of the atomic era? How do communities and artists articulate concerns over radioactive matters? What was the role of radiation expertise in a broader Soviet and international context of the Cold War? Examining nuclear legacies together with past atomic futures and post-Soviet memorialization and nuclear heritage shines light on how modes of knowing intersect with livelihoods, compensation policies, and historiography. Bringing together a range of disciplines – history, science and technology studies, social anthropology, literary studies, and art history – this volume offers insights that broaden our understanding of twentieth-century atomic programs and their long aftermaths.

A study of the legacy of nuclear contamination in the Soviet Union. It gives the location and characteristics of the accumulated radioactive material and wastes by each sector, from ore and mining to use and disposal. It describes types of storage, capacity and utilization, age and location. It gives information on the territories and locations contaminated, by normal operations and by accidents, from which strategic plans for remediation can be formulated.

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser's provocative work is organized in three parts. "The Questions behind the Questions" evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. "Alternative Nuclear Worlds" compares "mutual assured destruction capabilities" (MAD)--a world in which both superpowers' societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation--to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, "Decisions in MAD" addresses key choices facing American decision makers. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.