The Strategic Defence And Security Review And The National Security Strategy

The national security strategy of the United Kingdom is to use all national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend the country's influence in the world and strengthen security. The National Security Council ensures a strategic and co-ordinated approach across the whole of Government to the risks and opportunities the country faces. Parts 1 and 2 of this document outline the Government's analysis of the strategic global context and give an assessment of the UK's place in the world. They also set out the core objectives of the strategy: (i) ensuring a secure and resilient UK by protecting the country from all major risks that can affect us directly, and (ii) shaping a stable world - actions beyond the UK to reduce specific risks to the country or our direct interests overseas. Part 3 identifies and analyses the key security risks the country is likely to face in the future. The National Security Council has prioritised the risks and the current highest priority are: international terrorism; cyber attack; international military crises; and major accidents or natural hazards. Part 4 describes the ways in which the strategy to prevent and mitigate the specific risks will be achieved. The detailed means to achieve these ends will be set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (Cm. 7948, ISBN 9780101794824), due to publish on 19 October 2010.

Government response to HC 761, session 2010-12 (ISBN 9780215561138)

In this report the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy finds that the National Security Strategy should address more fundamental questions about the UK's role in the world and its relationship with the USA and other allies. The Strategy also needs to be subject to a much wider public debate. The Committee says that: there is no evidence that the NSS has influenced decisions made since the Strategic Defence and Security Review; there should be an "overarching strategy", a document designed to guide government decision-making and crisis management both at home and on the international stage; the Government's assertion that there will be no reduction in the UK's influence on the world stage is wholly unrealistic in the medium to long term and the UK needs to plan for a changing, and more partnership-dependent, role in the world. The Government's unwillingness to provide the Committee with all the information it has asked for about the National Security Risk Assessment means that it is unable to give Parliament any assurances about its adequacy. The report also notes concern that the National Security Council's oversight of security issues is not sufficiently broad and strategic, given that it was deeply involved in operations in Libya and failed to discuss the national security implications of the Eurozone crisis or the possibility of Scottish independence.

This report notes mounting concern that UK Armed Forces may be falling below the minimum utility required to deliver the commitments that they are currently being tasked to carry out let alone the tasks they are likely to face between 2015 to 2020 when it is acknowledged that there will be capability gaps. The Committee is concerned that UK Armed Forces will be continually operating at the maximum level envisaged by the Defence Planning Assumptions. The Committee is not convinced that this aspiration can be achieved by co-operation with our allies given the challenges of aligning political with operational needs. The SDSR identified seven military tasks and the Defence Planning Assumptions that underpin them. However the Review fails to show how decisions such as those on the Aircraft Carriers and Nimrod MRA4 will lead to the Armed Forces being able to undertake those military tasks. The Committee has serious concerns over the realisation of what is called "Future Force 2020", the Government's intended shape of the Armed Forces from 2020, particularly as the provision of the necessary resources is only a Government aspiration, not Government policy. The MoD must reform, and ensure substantially improved transparency and control over, its finance and budgetary practices. When committing to undertake new operations the Government should state from the outset where that operation fits in the Defence Planning Assumptions and which of the military tasks it is meeting. The Committee is concerned that the Government seems to have postponed the sensible aspiration of bringing commitments and resources into line, in that it has taken on the new commitment of Libya while reducing the resources available to MoD.

The need for security and the institutionalization of that security in national strategy and its associated documents is becoming a significant concern for nations in the 21st century international system. This need requires the development of national-level strategies that are designed with objectives; the attainment of which can ensure that the conditions necessary for security for a given actor in the international system can be met. The intent of this monograph is to explore the actual processes that nation-states employ to craft their national security strategy-related documents. The study aligned individual case studies of nation-states conducting their national strategy document formulation processes. These case studies were selected based upon a determination of two primary factors: 1) the nation-states in question had developed national security strategy documents that involved participation in the drafting process from more than one department or agency from the executive branch of government; and, 2) individual participants that were involved in the actual drafting process would be willing to respond to the questions delineated above, either in person or by written response. In addition, subject to travel resource availability, an effort was made to have as many different regions of the world as possible represented in the review. Ultimately, five countries and their national strategy documents were selected for assessment: Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Once the data was gathered, the monograph written so as to compare and contrast the various processes employed by each nation in their strategy document development. The last portion of the analysis evaluates the lessons learned from all five cases and identifies specific lessons that could be applicable to strategy document formulation for any future actor engaged in the process.

The Work Of The Joint Committee On The National Security Strategy In 2013-14 (HC 169, HL 1257) covers the work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which was established with a broad role; to consider the National Security Strategy. In practice, the Committee has considered not only the National Security Strategy (NSS) document 'A Strong Britain In An Age Of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' published by the Government in 2010 (see below), but also the wider strategy that underlies government decision making on matters affecting national security. The report gives an account of activities over the past year, highlighting in particular the evidence session with the Prime Minister in January 2014; draws attention to areas of continuing concern; and outlines objectives for the remainder of the Parliament.

The British government periodically publishes a Strategic Defence and Security Review, an appraisal of the armed forces that seeks to understand and prepare for the defense challenges that lie ahead. This report is often controversial—the 2010 review, for example, made headlines for all the wrong reasons, as major defense projects such as the NIMROD aircraft were discontinued at huge cost, while other projects were maintained only because they were too expensive to abandon. In advance of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, Jonathan Shaw argues persuasively for the need to rethink how governments and Whitehall devise their strategies and reach crucial decisions. Beginning with the review’s often imprecise use of language, Shaw challenges the assumptions that underlie the British government’s current practices. Ultimately, he suggests how Whitehall can improve its approaches and, equally important, its credibility.