The Strategy In Afghanistan And Recent Reports By The Afghanistan Study Group And The Atlantic Council Of The United States

Ahead of President Obama's December review of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, a new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)-sponsored Independent Task Force report on U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan finds that the current approach to the region is at a critical point. "We are mindful of the real threat we face. But we are also aware of the costs of the present strategy. We cannot accept these costs unless the strategy begins to show signs of progress," says the Task Force. While the Task Force offers a qualified endorsement of the current U.S. effort in Afghanistan, including plans to begin a conditions-based military drawdown in July 2011, the Obama administration's upcoming December 2010 review should be "a clear-eyed assessment of whether there is sufficient overall progress to conclude that the strategy is working." If not, the report argues that "a more significant drawdown to a narrower military mission would be warranted." The Task Force, chaired by former deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage and former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger, and directed by CFR Senior Fellow Daniel S. Markey, notes that nine years into the Afghan war, the outcome of the struggles in the region are still uncertain and the stakes are high. "What happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan matters to Americans," affirms the report. It warns that "militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan pose a direct threat to the United States and its allies. They jeopardize the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear power that lives in an uneasy peace with its rival, India." The Task Force supports the U.S. investment in a long-term partnership with Pakistan, but underscores that it is only sustainable if Pakistan takes action against all terrorist organizations based on its soil. Concrete Pakistani actions against terror groups "are the bedrock requirements for U.S. partnership and assistance over the long run." In Pakistan, "the United States aims to degrade and defeat the terrorist groups that threaten U.S. interests from its territory and to prevent turmoil that would imperil the Pakistani state and risk the security of Pakistan's nuclear program." The Task Force notes that these goals are best achieved through partnership with a stable Pakistani state, but that "the challenge of fighting regional terrorist networks is compounded by the fact that Pakistan draws distinctions between such groups." Flood-ravaged Pakistan also faces "enormous new stresses on the state-already challenged by political, economic, and security problems-increasing disaffection among its people, and weakening its ability to fight extremists in its territory." In Afghanistan, "the United States seeks to prevent the country from becoming a base for terrorist groups that target the United States and its allies and to diminish the potential that Afghanistan reverts to civil war, which would destabilize the region." Afghanistan faces the challenges of "pervasive corruption that breeds the insurgency; weak governance that creates a vacuum; Taliban resilience that feeds an atmosphere of intimidation; and an erratic leader whose agenda may not be the same as that of the United States."

The war in Afghanistan has run for more than a decade, and NATO has become increasingly central to it. In this book, Sten Rynning examines NATO's role in the campaign and the difficult diplomacy involved in fighting a war by alliance. He explores the history of the war and its changing momentum, and explains how NATO at first faltered but then improved its operations to become a critical enabler for the U.S. surge of 2009. However, he also uncovers a serious and enduring problem for NATO in the shape of a disconnect between high liberal hopes for the new Afghanistan and a lack of realism about the military campaign prosecuted to bring it about. He concludes that, while NATO has made it to the point in Afghanistan where the war no longer has the potential to break it, the alliance is, at the same time, losing its own struggle to define itself as a vigorous and relevant entity on the world stage. To move forward, he argues, NATO allies must recover their common purpose as a Western alliance, and he outlines options for change.

Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring—and so elusive—to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when "grand strategy" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is. Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to "do" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking—but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come.

Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is the longest martial conflict in its history precipitated literally overnight by a world changing event in the 2001 9/11 attack in New York City. In 2010, the Afghan “Mission” remains front page news for Canadians, even threatening to undermine the Federal Government due to the so-called “Detainee Scandal.” The human cost (Canadian and Afghan), financial burdens and impact on the self-perception of Canadians as a peace keeping “Middle-Power” are immense and likely will form a watershed in Canadian history. And yet, the “Mission” remains little scrutinized by faith communities, and further, left as a non-conversation for many and the domain of a nebulous foreign policy and largely toothless Manley Report. This volume is the first such major attempt by the Centre for Public Theology to bring together theologians, philosophers, faith leaders, NGOs, politicians and other academics from sociology, politics and peace-keeping in order to dialogue about the impact of the Afghan “Mission.” These papers form much of the conversation of a conference held in May 2009 at the Centre for Public Theology. The papers offer reflections on the Manley Report, investigations on the theological and philosophical issues at play in Canada’s response, interaction with Canada’s shift from “peace-keeping” to “war-fighting” and the new NATO mandate, thoughts on the role of Islamic nations and analysis of the role of the Abrahamic faith communities in this wider Canadian conversation. The Centre for Public Theology is a federally funded research centre housed at Huron University College whose mandate is to bring into conversation academics, NGOs, media, Government and the public on issues of public policy and life with a particular attention to the role of religion in Canadian life. Its founding motto is “intelligence, not advocacy.” It is not an advocacy or lobbying centre, instead seeking only to facilitate dialogue across boundaries. Its webpage can be found at www.publictheology.org.