The Structure Of Value

Hartman's revolutionary book introduces formal orderly thinking into value theory. It identifies three basic kinds of value, intrinsic goods (e.g., people as ends in themselves), extrinsic goods (e.g., things and actions as means to ends), and systemic goods (conceptual values). All good things share a common formal or structural pattern: they fulfill the ideal standards or "concepts" that we apply to them. Thus, this theory is called "formal axiology." Some values are richer in good-making property-fulfillment than others, so some desirable things are better than others and form patterned hierarchies of value. How we value is just as important as what we value, and evaluations, like values, share structures or formal patterns, as this book demonstrates. Hartman locates all of this solidly within the framework of historical value theory, but he moves successfully and creatively beyond philosophical tradition and toward the creation of a new value science.

Hartman's revolutionary book introduces formal orderly thinking into value theory. It identifies three basic kinds of value, intrinsic goods (e.g., people as ends in themselves), extrinsic goods (e.g., things and actions as means to ends), and systemic goods (conceptual values). All good things share a common formal or structural pattern: they fulfill the ideal standards or "concepts" that we apply to them. Thus, this theory is called "formal axiology." Some values are richer in good-making property-fulfillment than others, so some desirable things are better than others and form patterned hierarchies of value. How we value is just as important as what we value, and evaluations, like values, share structures or formal patterns, as this book demonstrates. Hartman locates all of this solidly within the framework of historical value theory, but he moves successfully and creatively beyond philosophical tradition and toward the creation of a new value science.

This book explores the theory of value structure, or axiology, in metaethics and defends the thesis that aspects of "better than" comparisons may outrank each other and that value cannot always be summed up neatly.

The theory of value structure concerns the meaning of “better than” and “good,” as well as the way in which values serve as a basis for rational decision making. Drawing methodologically from economics and theories of decision making, the aim of serious axiology in metaethics is to do justice to problems that have puzzled philosophers of value for centuries. Can value comparisons be cyclic? Are all values comparable with each other and can decision makers just add up different aspects of an evaluation to determine the best course of action? A Theory of Value Structure: From Values to Decisions starts with a thorough introduction to the modeling of “better than” comparisons from a normative perspective. In the philosophical part of the book, Erich H. Rast argues that aspects of “better than” comparisons can differ qualitatively so much that one aspect may outrank another. Consequently, the classical weighted sum aggregation model fails. Values cannot always be summed up and comparisons may be fundamentally noncompensatory, an indeterminacy that explains problems like the apparent nontransitivity of “better than” and hard cases in decision making. Using a lexicographic method of value comparisons, Rast develops a multidimensional theory of “better than” and shows how and to which extent it can be combined with standard methods of decision making under uncertainty by using rank-dependent utility theory.

Formal representations of values and norms are employed in several academic disciplines and specialties, such as economics, jurisprudence, decision theory and social choice theory. Sven Ove Hansson closely examines such foundational issues as the values of wholes and the values of their parts, the connections between values and norms, how values can be decision-guiding and the structure of normative codes with formal precision. Models of change in both preferences and norms are offered, as well as a method to base the logic of norms on that of preferences. Hansson has developed a unified formal representation of values and norms that reflects both their static and their dynamic properties. This formalized treatment, carried out in terms of both informal value theory and precise logical detail, will contribute to the clarification of certain issues in the basic philosophical theory of values and norms.

During the final decade or so of his life, Hartman frequently delivered a series of lectures in which he outlined the need for a scientific theory of human values, the theoretical requirements demanded of an effective value theory, and his rationale behind the development of the particular value theory he developed, which he named formal axiology. He named these lectures, collectively, Five Lectures in Formal Axiology. By bringing these lectures together in one volume, we are able to offer to readers the clearest, most cogent, and most concise description of his theory that Hartman ever wrote. If you have ever been put off by the sheer mass and intellectual density of either The Structure of Value or The Knowledge of Good, then you will find these Five Lectures to be a breath of fresh air. Written as they were for oral delivery, they have a cadence and clarity to them that make them a pleasure to read. Hartman concludes these lectures with a description of how his theory might be applied in various real-world situations. Specifically, he discusses how formal axiology can be applied to studies of economics and political economies, including profit sharing; to international affairs, including matters of war and peace; and to personal ethics. To Hartman, nothing less than the survival of human existence depends on this.

The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be “value-free.” In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence. Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.

This book analyses the impact of socio-structural variables, such as social class, religion, urban/rural residence, age and gender, on influencing an individual’s voting preferences. There have been major changes in recent decades both to social structure and how social structure determines people’s voting behaviour. There has also been a shift in value orientations, for example from religious to secular values and from more authoritarian to libertarian values. The author addresses the questions: How do social structure and value orientations influence party choice in advanced industrial democracies?; To what extent is the impact of social structure on party choice transmitted via value orientations?; To what extent is the impact of value orientations on party choice causal effects when controlled for the prior structural variables? The book will be of use to advanced students and scholars in the fields of comparative politics, electoral politics and political sociology.