The Superpowers And The Middle East

This text presents an overview of the actions and policies of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East, revealing how their intense rivalry on a global level led to self-defeating ignorance of important regional considerations.

This edited volume re-assesses the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and key regional players in waging and halting conflict in the Middle East between 1967 and 1973. These were pivotal years in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the effects still very much in evidence today. In addition to addressing established debates, the book opens up new areas of controversy, in particular concerning the inter-war years and the so-called ‘War of Attrition’, and underlines the risks both Moscow and Washington were prepared to run in supporting their regional clients. The engagement of Soviet forces in the air defence of Egypt heightened the danger of escalation and made this one of the hottest regional conflicts of the Cold War era. Against this Cold War backdrop, the motives of both Israel and the Arab states in waging full-scale and lower-intensity conflict are illuminated. The overall goal of this work is to re-assess the relationship between the Cold War and regional conflict in shaping the events of this pivotal period in the Middle East. The Cold War in the Middle East will be of much interest to students of Cold War studies, Middle Eastern history, strategic studies and international history.

This is an excellent first book by a young Lebanese scholar. He brings analytical sophistication and detailed knowledge of a wide variety of sources to bear on a crucial period when the Cold War was being fought out in the Middle East. He is quick to note that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was particularly successful in exerting its influence in the region. In addition, the local powers quickly learned to exploit the superpower rivalry. He also vividly conveys how the Israeli challenge exacerbated inter-Arab relations. Finally, relying on Arabic sources, he gives a glimpse into the internal decision-making of Egypt and other Arab states, noting that they often overestimated their importance to outside powers. This well-researched and objective study is a welcome addition to serious history written by Middle East scholars from the region. -- from Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995).

The contributors to this book offer an explanation of Soviet and U.S. policy in the Middle East by exploring how the superpowers define their goals in the region, the factors that both stimulate and constrain the United States and the Soviet Union in the implementation of their objectives, and how their mutual perceptions influence behavior. The ch

Strategically placed on the global chess board, as well as controlling vast oil resources, the Middle East was one of the main theatres of Cold War. In the 1950s the Soviet Union had taken advantage of Arab Nationalists’ disillusion with British and French Imperialism, along with the emerging Arab-Israeli conflict, to establish relations with Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The United States responded by moving in to shore up the Western position. Confrontation was inevitable. Superpower Intervention in the Middle East was written in 1978, when this confrontation was at its height. The book’s main theme focuses on how the superpowers became competitively involved in local Middle East conflicts over which they could exercise only limited control, and the risks of nuclear confrontation of the kind which occurred at the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The threat to Western oil supplies is also examined. This is a fascinating work, of great relevance to scholars and students of Middle Eastern history and political diplomacy, as well as those with an interest in the relationship between the Western superpowers and this volatile region.

This book, first published in 1991, examines in detail superpower-client relations in the Middle East. The Middle East, with its protracted and seemingly insoluble conflict and complex patterns of loyalty and hostility, is the ideal setting for the study of such relationships. Using the USSR and Syria, and the USA and Israel as case studies, this book illuminates the extent of superpower influence on client states but also the real constraints on their exercise of that influence. In analysing specific contexts over this period, the authors advance that tension between goals and constraints often favours the client state and that superpower relations are not those of dominance and subordination but bargaining relations in which clients have great leverage.

A bold reexamination of U.S. influence in the Middle East during the Cold War. The Arab Spring, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Iraq war, and the Syrian civil war—these contemporary conflicts have deep roots in the Middle East’s postwar emergence from colonialism. In The Pragmatic Superpower, foreign policy experts Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon reframe the legacy of U.S. involvement in the Arab world from 1945 to 1991 and shed new light on the makings of the contemporary Middle East. Cutting against conventional wisdom, the authors argue that, when an inexperienced Washington entered the turbulent world of Middle Eastern politics, it succeeded through hardheaded pragmatism—and secured its place as a global superpower. Eyes ever on its global conflict with the Soviet Union, America shrewdly navigated the rise of Arab nationalism, the founding of Israel, and seminal conflicts including the Suez War and the Iranian revolution. Takeyh and Simon reveal that America’s objectives in the region were often uncomplicated but hardly modest. Washington deployed adroit diplomacy to prevent Soviet infiltration of the region, preserve access to its considerable petroleum resources, and resolve the conflict between a Jewish homeland and the Arab states that opposed it. The Pragmatic Superpower provides fascinating insight into Washington’s maneuvers in a contest for global power and offers a unique reassessment of America’s cold war policies in a critical region of the world. Amid the chaotic conditions of the twenty-first century, Takeyh and Simon argue that there is an urgent need to look back to a period when the United States got it right. Only then will we better understand the challenges we face today.