The Supreme Court Versus Congress

A comprehensive and focused review of all of the Supreme Court's overturns of Congress on constitutional grounds from 1789 to the present suited to college-level political science and constitutional law courses as well as law school students. The always-controversial practice of judicial review of Congress is not prescribed in the Constitution, but is arguably a valid way to protect the rights of individuals or guard against unfair rule by the majority. This book offers a historical review and indictment of the Supreme Court's overruling of Congress, ultimately taking a position that this has been more detrimental than beneficial to the democratic process in the United States, and that in the aggregate rights of individuals and minorities would have been better served if the relevant laws of Congress had been enforced rather than struck down by the Court. Written by an author who is a historian and a lawyer, the book covers all Supreme Court overrides of Congress through 2014, including major historical turning points in Supreme Court legislation and such recent and relevant topics as the Affordable Care Act, limits on contributions to political candidates and campaigns from wealthy individuals, and the Defense of Marriage Act. The discussions of specific cases are made in relevant context and focus on "big picture" themes and concepts without skipping key details, making this a useful volume for law and university level students while also being accessible to general readers.

Since the early 1960s the Supreme Court and its congressional critics have been locked in a continuing dispute over the issues of school prayer, busing, and abortion. Although for years the Court's congressional foes have introduced legislation designed to curb the powers of the federal courts in these areas, they have until now failed to enact such proposals. It is likely that these legislative efforts and the present confrontation with the Court will continue. Edward Keynes and Randall Miller argue that Congress lacks the constitutional power to legislate away the powers of the federal courts and to prevent individuals from seeking redress for presumed infringements of their constitutional rights in these areas. They demonstrate that neither the framers nor ratifiers of the Constitution intended the Congress to exercise plenary power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Throughout its history the Court has never conceded unlimited powers to Congress; and until the late 1950s Congress had not attempted to gerrymander the Court's jurisdiction in response to specific decisions. But the authors contend this is just what the sponsors of recent legislative attacks on the Court intend, and they see such efforts as threatening the Court's independence and authority as defined in the separation of powers clauses of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court is frequently portrayed as an isolated entity void of politics that reaches judgments by some unseen and unknowable logic. At the same time, Congress is cast as a singularly political enterprise with little regard for nuanced lawmaking. This volume of original essays by leading scholars shows both branches in a new light. It explores the impact of sustained partisan politics, the recent reassertion of legislative power at the expense of judicial review, and the sometimes stormy relationship between Congress and the Court.

Assesses role of present-day Supreme Court in relation to its constitutional mandate and limitations and its historically accepted role. Includes Legislative Reference Service report "Supreme Court Decisions, 1953-68, Which Have Modified Prior Interpretations or Established New Constitutional Principals" (Aug. 7, 1968. p. 253-337).