The Theory Of Knowledge Routledge Revivals

L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) was fundamental to the New Liberal movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. He authored many important works in the fields of philosophy, economics and social liberalism. First published in 1896, The Theory of Knowledge considers the content and validity of knowledge, and the conditions on which our understanding of knowledge is based. It is a rich and important classic, which remains of value to students and academics with an interest in sociology, anthropology and the philosophy of logic.

First published in 1962, this book provides a systematic account of the development of Plato’s theory of knowledge. Beginning with a consideration of the Socratic and other influences which determined the form in which the problem of knowledge first presented itself to Plato, the author then works through the dialogues from the Meno to the Laws and examines in detail Plato’s progressive attempts to solve the problem.

First published in 1980, this book presents a study of knowledge and the patterns of social and scientific thought. Keith Dixon argues that traditional and contemporary formulations of the sociology of knowledge involve a series of fallacies, and the claim to reduce knowledge to ideology devalues the role of reasoned inquiry. Chapters discuss such areas as the theories of Marx and Mannheim, the sociology of science and of religious belief. With a detailed conclusion analysing the foundations and limits of the sociology of knowledge, this reissue will provide an interesting and useful analysis for students of Sociology.

Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge, first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’.

This title, first published in 1975, contains two complimentary studies by Paul Q. Hirst: the first based on Claude Bernard’s theory of scientific knowledge, and the second concerning Emile Durkheim’s attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for a scientific sociology in The Rules of Sociological Method. The author’s primary concern is to answer the question: is Durkheim’s theory of knowledge logically consistent and philosophically viable? His principal conclusion is that the epistemology developed in the Rules is an impossible one and that its inherent contradictions are proof that sociology as it is commonly understood can never be a scientific discipline.

This student textbook, originally published in 1991, tackles the traditional problems of the sociology of knowledge from a new perspective. Drawing on recent developments in social theory, Tim Dant explores crucial questions such as the roles of power and knowledge, the status of rational knowledge, and the empirical analysis of knowledge. He argues that, from a sociological perspective, knowledge, ideology and discourse are different aspects of the same phenomenon, and reasserts the central thesis of the sociology - that knowledge is socially determined.