The Theory Of Transaction In Institutional Economics

Despite abundant literature on transaction costs, there is little to no in-depth analysis regarding what the transaction is or how it works. Drawing on both Old and New Institutional Economics and on a variety of interdisciplinary sources, this monograph traces the history of the meaning of transaction in institutional economics, mapping its topicality and use over time. This manuscript treats the idea of ‘transaction’ as a construct with legal, competitive and political dimensions, and connects different approaches within institutional economics. The book covers the contributions of key thinkers from different schools, including (in alphabetical order) Ronald H. Coase, John R. Commons, Robert Lee Hale, Oliver Hart, Mancur Olson, Thorstein Veblen and Olver E. Williamson. This book will be of interest to advanced students and researchers of institutional economics, law and economics, and economics, and the history of economic thought.

Despite abundant literature on transaction costs, there is little to no in-depth analysis regarding what the transaction is or how it works. Drawing on both mainstream and heterodox literature and a variety of interdisciplinary sources, this monograph traces the history of transaction costs in institutional economics.

A comprehensive introduction to and critical assessment of the theory and applications of the New Institutional Economics.

This book examines transaction cost economics, the influential theoretical perspective on organizations and industry that was the subject of Oliver Williamson's seminal book,Markets and Hierarchies (1975). Written by leading economists, sociologists, and political scientists, the essays collected here reflect the fruitful intellectual exchange that is occurring across the major social science disciplines. They examine transaction cost economics' general conceptual orientation, its specific theoretical propositions, its applications to policy, and its use in systematic empirical research. The chapters include classic texts, broad review essays, reflective commentaries, and several new contributions to a wide range of topics, including organizations, regulations and law, institutions, strategic management, game theory, entrepreneurship, innovation, finance, and technical information. The book begins with an overview of theory and research on transaction cost economics, highlighting the specific accomplishments of scholars working within the perspective and emphasizing the enormous influence that transaction cost reasoning exerts on the social sciences. The following section covers conceptual uses for the transaction cost framework and major theoretical or methodological elements within it, such as bounded rationality. While advancing some interesting theoretical propositions, these chapters are in fact more ambitious: each examines a specific field, area, or research program and attempts to fashion a new way of thinking about research questions. In the section on industrial applications, contributors study the application of transaction cost theory to a range of problems in utilities, telecommunications, laser printing, and early international trade. The book closes with four microanalytical chapters that delve into the structures and behaviors of specific aspects of firms and organizations: boards of directors, equity structures, employment models, human resource policies and practices, technology strategies, and innovation events. Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies collects excellent social science work on transaction cost economics, taking stock of its status, charting its future development, and fostering its renewal and evolution.

New institutional economics (NIE) is a powerful tool for understanding real world phenomena. This Advanced Introduction explores NIE’s answers to fundamental questions about the organization, growth and development of economies, such as why are some countries rich and others poor? Why are activities organized as firms or markets or through alternative organizational solutions? When are shared resources overexploited?

In modern economies a substantial proportion of resources is increasingly allocated to transaction costs. An improvement in the definition of transaction costs to include both the information role and efficiency role requires an integration of the approaches of positive economics and normative economics. In The Economics of Transaction Costs P.K.Rao provides a comprehensive analytical treatment of the subject and suggests a few directions for formal economic models.

This book contains the papers that were presented in 1994 at the conference "Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond" organized by GRASP at the Tinbergen Institute in Rotterdam. It is generally recognized that transaction cost economics (TCE) is at the heart of the new theory of the firm. It is a well established research program with a well developed theoretical framework and good results in empirical testing. However, critics consider the approach too limited to understand the essential characteristics of such complex organizations like firms. Critics plea convincingly for the need to go beyond the original TCE framework and to develop a more pluralistic approach towards issues of economic organization. The new theory of the firm can only be further developed when scholars are willing to debate the issues in an open-minded, academic way. I thank the participants of the conference very much for putting so much effort in writing their papers and for their contribution to an open and stimulating discussion. It is my wish that this book contributes to the further deve lopment of the theory of the firm and that it helps us to a better understan ding of the complexities of economic organization. I would like to thank the following organizations for their support: the Tinbergen Institute, the "Vereniging Trust Fonds" of the Erasmus University, the Faculty of Economics of the Erasmus University, and GRASP (Group for Research and Advice in Strategic management and Industrial Policy).

This second edition assesses some of the major refinements, extensions, and useful applications that have developed in neoinstitutionalist thought in recent years. More attention is given to the overlap between the New Institutional Economics and developments in economic history and political science. In addition to updated references, new material includes analysis of parallel developments in the field of economic sociology and its attacks on representatives of the NIE as well as an explanation of the institution-as-an-equilibrium-of-game approach. Already an international best seller, Institutions and Economic Theory is essential reading for economists and students attracted to the NIE approach. Scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance. A useful glossary for students is included. Eirik Furubotn is Honorary Professor of Economics, Co-Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany and Research Fellow, Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University. Rudolph Richter is Professor Emeritus of Economics and Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany.