The Voter S Dilemma And Democratic Accountability

"Presents evidence that under certain widespread structural conditions, democratic accountability falls prey to the same N-person prisoner's dilemma that plagues any other decentralized attempt to procure collective goods. Examines four prominent democracies: postwar and contemporary Brazil and pre-Chavez and contemporary Venezuela"--Provided by publisher.

Much of public opinion research over the past several decades suggests that the American voters are woefully uninformed about politics and thus unable to fulfill their democratic obligations. Arguing that this perception is faulty, Vincent Hutchings shows that, under the right political conditions, voters are surprisingly well informed on the issues that they care about and use their knowledge to hold politicians accountable. Though Hutchings is not the first political scientist to contend that the American public is more politically engaged than it is often given credit for, previous scholarship--which has typically examined individual and environmental factors in isolation--has produced only limited evidence of an attentive electorate. Analyzing broad survey data as well as the content of numerous Senate and gubernatorial campaigns involving such issues as race, labor, abortion, and defense, Hutchings demonstrates that voters are politically engaged when politicians and the media discuss the issues that the voters perceive as important. Hutchings finds that the media--while far from ideal--do provide the populace with information regarding the responsiveness of elected representatives and that groups of voters do monitor this information when "their" issues receive attention. Thus, while the electorate may be generally uninformed about and uninterested in public policy, a complex interaction of individual motivation, group identification, and political circumstance leads citizens concerned about particular issues to obtain knowledge about their political leaders and use that information at the ballot box.

A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries.

Economic voting is a phenomenon that political scientists and economists can hardly overlook. There is ample evidence for a strong link between economic conditions and government popularity. However, not everything is that simple and this edited collection focuses on 'the comparative puzzle' of economic voting. Economic Voting emphasises the importance of comparative research design and argues that the psychology of the economic voter model needs to be developed further.

Why our belief in government by the people is unrealistic—and what we can do about it Democracy for Realists assails the romantic folk-theory at the heart of contemporary thinking about democratic politics and government, and offers a provocative alternative view grounded in the actual human nature of democratic citizens. Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels deploy a wealth of social-scientific evidence, including ingenious original analyses of topics ranging from abortion politics and budget deficits to the Great Depression and shark attacks, to show that the familiar ideal of thoughtful citizens steering the ship of state from the voting booth is fundamentally misguided. They demonstrate that voters—even those who are well informed and politically engaged—mostly choose parties and candidates on the basis of social identities and partisan loyalties, not political issues. They also show that voters adjust their policy views and even their perceptions of basic matters of fact to match those loyalties. When parties are roughly evenly matched, elections often turn on irrelevant or misleading considerations such as economic spurts or downturns beyond the incumbents' control; the outcomes are essentially random. Thus, voters do not control the course of public policy, even indirectly. Achen and Bartels argue that democratic theory needs to be founded on identity groups and political parties, not on the preferences of individual voters. Now with new analysis of the 2016 elections, Democracy for Realists provides a powerful challenge to conventional thinking, pointing the way toward a fundamentally different understanding of the realities and potential of democratic government.

In the United States and Britain, capitalists organized in opposition to clientelism and demanded programmatic parties and institutional reforms.

Few political concepts are as emblematic of our era as democratic accountability. In a time of political and economic turmoil, in which global forces have destabilized conventional relations of political authority, democratic accountability has come to symbolize both what is absent and what is desired in our polity. Situated at the intersection of democratic theory and international studies, Accountability and Democracy provides an in-depth critical analysis of accountability. Through an engagement with several key democratic traditions, both ancient and modern, the book paints a rich picture of democratic accountability as a multi-dimensional concept harboring competing imperatives and diverse instantiations. Contrary to dominant views that emphasize discipline and control, Craig Borowiak offers an original and refreshing view of democratic accountability as a source of mutuality, participation, and political transformation. He both creatively engages conventional electoral models of accountability and moves beyond them by situating democratic accountability within more deliberative, participatory and agonistic contexts. Provocatively, the book also challenges deep-seated understandings of democratic accountability as an expression of popular sovereignty. Borowiak instead argues that accountable governance is incompatible with all claims to ultimate authority, regardless of whether they refer to the demos, the state, or cosmopolitan public law. Rather than conceiving of democratic accountability as a way to legitimize a secure and sovereign political order, the book contends that destabilization and democratic insurgence are indispensable and often neglected facets of democratic accountability practices. For contemporary scholars, practitioners and activists grappling with the challenge of building democratic legitimacy into world politics, the book urges greater reflexivity and nuance in how democratic accountability is evoked and implemented. It offers insights into the myriad ways democratic accountability has been thwarted in the past, while also cultivating a sense of expanded possibility for how it might be conceived for the present.

How much influence do citizens have to control the government? What guides voters at election time? Why do governments survive? How do institutions modify the power of the people over politicians? The book combines academic analytical rigor with comparative analysis to identify how much information voters must have to select a politician for office, or for holding a government accountable; whether parties in power can help voters to control their governments; how different institutional arrangements influence voters' control; why politicians choose particular electoral systems; and what economic and social conditions may undermine not only governments, but democracy. Arguments are backed by vast macro and micro empirical evidence. There are cross-country comparisons and survey analyses of many countries. In every case there has been an attempt to integrate analytical arguments and empirical research. The goal is to shed new light on perplexing questions of positive democratic theory.