The Waning Of Major War

This book is a systematic effort by leading international scholars to map the trends in major-power warfare and explore whether it is waxing or waning. The main point of departure is that major-power war as a historical institution is in decline. This does not mean, though, that wars between states are in general disappearing. While there is some convergence in the conclusions by individual authors, they are by no means unanimous about the trend. The articles explore different causes and correlates of the declining trend in major-power warfare, including the impact of the international structure, nuclear weapons, international law, multilateral institutions, sovereignty and value changes.

Experts consider how the lessons of World War I can help prevent U.S.–China conflict. A century ago, Europe's diplomats mismanaged the crisis triggered by the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and the continent plunged into World War I, which killed millions, toppled dynasties, and destroyed empires. Today, as the hundredth anniversary of the Great War prompts renewed debate about the war's causes, scholars and policy experts are also considering the parallels between the present international system and the world of 1914. Are China and the United States fated to follow in the footsteps of previous great power rivals? Will today's alliances drag countries into tomorrow's wars? Can leaders manage power relationships peacefully? Or will East Asia's territorial and maritime disputes trigger a larger conflict, just as rivalries in the Balkans did in 1914? In The Next Great War?, experts reconsider the causes of World War I and explore whether the great powers of the twenty-first century can avoid the mistakes of Europe's statesmen in 1914 and prevent another catastrophic conflict. They find differences as well as similarities between today's world and the world of 1914—but conclude that only a deep understanding of those differences and early action to bring great powers together will likely enable the United States and China to avoid a great war. Contributors Alan Alexandroff, Graham Allison, Richard N. Cooper, Charles S. Maier, Steven E. Miller, Joseph S. Nye Jr., T. G. Otte, David K. Richards, Richard N. Rosecrance, Kevin Rudd, Jack Snyder, Etel Solingen, Arthur A. Stein, Stephen Van Evera

The incredible story of the unlikeliest battle of World War II, when a small group of American soldiers joined forces with German soldiers to fight off fanatical SS troops May, 1945. Hitler is dead, the Third Reich is little more than smoking rubble, and no GI wants to be the last man killed in action against the Nazis. The Last Battle tells the nearly unbelievable story of the unlikeliest battle of the war, when a small group of American tankers, led by Captain Lee, joined forces with German soldiers to fight off fanatical SS troops seeking to capture Castle Itter and execute the stronghold's VIP prisoners. It is a tale of unlikely allies, startling bravery, jittery suspense, and desperate combat between implacable enemies.

This book critically examines elements of America-First nationalism, neo-conservatism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, environmental theories, and social constructionism by way of developing an “alternative realist” approach to the study of the origins of major power war. The author critiques concepts of “polarity” and “sovereign” decision making and diplomacy before developing the concept of “highly uneven polycentrism.” The book then develops a unique comparative historical approach that seeks to compare and contrast the pre-World War I, pre-World War II, and Cold War eras with the contemporary post-Cold War period. It is argued that the US, as it remains the leading global hegemon, must fully engage in multilateral diplomacy with major friends and rivals alike in the establishment of differing forms of power sharing and joint sovereignty accords—in order to prevent the global system from polarizing into two contending alliances more reminiscent of both the pre-World War I and pre-World War II periods than the “new Cold War.”

This book presents a collection of new and updated essays on what has come to be known as the territorial explanation of war. The book argues that a key both to peace and to war lies in understanding the role territory plays as a source of conflict and inter-group violence. Of all the issues that spark conflict, territorial disputes have the highest probability of escalating to war. War, however, is hardly inevitable; much depends on how territorial issues are handled. More importantly, settling territorial disputes and establishing mutually recognized boundaries can produce long periods of peace between neighbors, even if other salient issues arise. While territory is not the only cause of war and wars arise from other issues, territory is one of the main causes of war, and learning how to manage it, can, in principle, eliminate an entire class of wars. This book will be of great interest to all students of war and conflict studies, causes of war and peace, international security and strategic studies. John A. Vasquez is Thomas B. Mackie Scholar in International Relations at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He is author of The Steps to War (2008) (with Paul Senese) and The War Puzzle Revisited (2009). He has been president of the Peace Science Society (International) and the International Studies Association. Marie T. Henehan is Director of Internships and Lecturer, Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. She is author of Foreign Policy and Congress: An International Relations Perspective and co-editor of The Scientific Study of Peace and War.

Jonathan Fennell captures for the first time the true wartime experience of the ordinary soldiers from across the empire who made up the British and Commonwealth armies. He analyses why the great battles were won and lost and how the men that fought went on to change the world.

This book collects the key essays, together with updating notes and commentary, of Professor John Mueller on war and the role of ideas and opinions. Mueller has maintained that war (and peace) are, in essence, merely ideas, and that war has waned as the notion that 'peace' is a decidedly good idea has gained currency. The first part of the book extends this argument, noting that as ideas have spread, war is losing out not only in the developed world, but now in the developing one, and that even civil war is in marked decline. It also assesses and critiques theories arguing that this phenomenon is caused by the rising acceptance of democracy and/or capitalism. The second part argues that the Cold War was at base a clash of ideas that were seen to be threatening, not of arms balances, domestic systems, geography, or international structure. It also maintains that there has been a considerable tendency to exaggerate security threats—currently, in particular, the one presented by international terrorism—and to see them in excessively military terms. The third section deals with the role public opinion plays in foreign policy, and argues that many earlier conclusions about opinion during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, including especially ones concerning the importance of casualties in determining popular support for war, apply to more recent military ventures in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It also assesses the difficulties leaders and idea entrepreneurs often encounter when they try to manage or manipulate public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of international relations, security studies, foreign policy and international history.