The War On Terror And The Growth Of Executive Power

The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington prompted a "global war on terror" that led to a significant shift in the balance of executive-legislative power in the United States towards the executive at the expense of the Congress. In this volume, seasoned scholars examine the extent to which terrorist threats and counter-terrorism policies led uniformly to the growth of executive or Government power at the expense of legislatures and parliaments in other political systems, including those of Australia, Britain, Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, and Russia. The contributors question whether the "crises" created by 9/11 and subsequent attacks, led inexorably to executive strengthening at the expense of legislatures and parliaments. The research reported finds that democratic forces served to mitigate changes to the balance of legislative and executive power to varying degrees in different political systems. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of Comparative Government Politics and International Politics.

Thirty years after the Church Committee unearthed COINTELPRO and other instances of illicit executive behavior on the domestic and international fronts, the Bush administration has elevated the flaws identified by the committee into first principles of government. Through a constellation of non-public laws and opaque, unaccountable institutions, the current administration has created a “secret presidency” run by classified presidential decisions and orders about national security. A hyperactive Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice is intent on eliminating checks on presidential power and testing that power’s limits. Decisions are routinely executed at senior levels within the civilian administration without input from Congress or the federal courts, let alone our international allies. Secret NSA spying at home is the most recent of these. Harsh treatment of detainees, “extraordinary renditions,” secret foreign prisons, and the newly minted enemy combatant designation have also undermined our values. The resulting policies have harmed counterterrorism efforts and produced few tangible results. With a partisan Congress predictably reluctant to censure a politically aligned president, it is all the more important for citizens themselves to demand disclosure, oversight, and restraint of sweeping claims of executive power. This book is the first step.

This book features a lively debate between two prominent scholars—Michael A. Genovese and David Gray Adler—on the critical issue of whether the Constitution, written in the 18th Century, remains adequate to the national security challenges of our time. The question of the scope of the president’s constitutional authority—if any—to initiate war on behalf of the American people, long the subject of heated debate in the corridors of power and the groves of academe, has become an issue of surpassing importance for a nation confronted by existential threats in an Age of Terrorism. This question should be thoroughly reviewed and debated by members of Congress, and considered by all Americans before they are asked to go to war. If the constitutional allocation of powers on matters of war and peace is outdated, what changes should be made? Is there a need to increase presidential power? What role should Congress play in the war on terror?

The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington prompted a "global war on terror" that led to a significant shift in the balance of executive-legislative power in the United States towards the executive at the expense of the Congress. In this volume, seasoned scholars examine the extent to which terrorist threats and counter-terrorism policies led uniformly to the growth of executive or Government power at the expense of legislatures and parliaments in other political systems, including those of Australia, Britain, Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, and Russia. The contributors question whether the "crises" created by 9/11 and subsequent attacks, led inexorably to executive strengthening at the expense of legislatures and parliaments. The research reported finds that democratic forces served to mitigate changes to the balance of legislative and executive power to varying degrees in different political systems. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of Comparative Government Politics and International Politics.

Presidential Power, Rhetoric, and the Terror Wars: The Sovereign Presidency argues that the War on Terror provided an opportunity to fundamentally change the presidency. Alexander Hiland analyzes the documents used to exercise presidential powers, including executive orders, signing statements, and presidential policy directives. Treating these documents as genres of speech-act that are ideologically motivated, Hiland provides a rhetorical criticism that illuminates the values and political convictions at play in these documents. This book reveals how both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama wielded the personal power of the office to dramatically expand the power of the executive branch. During the War on Terror, the presidency shifted from an imperial form that avoided checks and balances, to a sovereign presidency where the executive branch had the ability to decide whether those checks and balances existed. As a result, Hiland argues that this shift to the sovereign presidency enabled the violation of human rights, myriad policy mistakes, and the degradation of democracy within the United States.

How has 9/11 and George W. Bush's self-declared 'war' on terror changed American government and US foreign policy? This is the central question addressed in the nine original essays in this book. Following an introduction by the editors, in which they survey issues and debates raised by America's 'War' on Terrorism and its consequences for US government and politics, foreign policy, and for American foreign relations, the contributions to this volume_from British and American scholars_explain the implications of the post-9/11 mobilization and reconfiguration of US foreign and internal security policies. Issues addressed in the book include: the growth of presidential power, executive branch reconfiguration and the managerial presidency, the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the changing role of the US in the international order, the impact of the 'war' on terrorism on the US military, intelligence failure and the changed role of US intelligence, renewed tension in US-European relations, and Bush's alliance with Tony Blair's government in the United Kingdom. Taken together, the essays represent an original and timely assessment of the domestic and international repercussions of George W. Bush's responses to the terrorist attacks September 11, 2001.

The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror examines the constitutional relationship between Congress and the President in the post-September 11 world, arguing that Congress should exercise its legitimate authority in guiding United States policy. While many commentators have focused on the extent of the President's national security and foreign affairs authority, both domestically and abroad, this title focuses on the constitutional authority of Congress to serve as a check on executive power. As a national consensus has developed around the notion that the Bush administration made grave errors in its policy decisions, a reminder of the leading role that Congress can play in those decisions is particularly appropriate. Unlike scholarly work devoted either to detailing or criticizing the Bush administration's policy decisions, this accessible and balanced book focuses on the policies themselves, and on the way in which Congress can influence those policies for the better. The authors further offer specific and useful recommendations for legislative measures that may correct existing policy deficiencies and promote sounder decision-making in the area of national security and foreign affairs.

Despite rhetorical differences, the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama have both claimed broadly unrestrained presidential power in matters of military force, surveillance, and the state secrets privilege.