The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project Answering The Critics

Abstract: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, reporting estimates of six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries between 1996 and 2005, have become widely used among policymakers and academics. They have also attracted some explicit written criticisms. In this short paper the authors synthesize 11 critiques offered by four recent papers. They then refute them as either conceptually incorrect or empirically unsubstantiated.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators, reporting estimates of six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries between 1996 and 2005, have become widely used among policymakers and academics. They have also attracted some explicit written criticisms. In this short paper the authors synthesize 11 critiques offered by four recent papers. They then refute them as either conceptually incorrect or empirically unsubstantiated.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators, reporting estimates of six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries between 1996 and 2005, have become widely used among policymakers and academics. They have also attracted some explicit written criticisms. In this short paper the authors synthesize 11 critiques offered by four recent papers. They then refute them as either conceptually incorrect or empirically unsubstantiated.

Andrew Taylor provides an overview of the origins, evolution, and impact of state failure since the 1990s. Avoiding quickly outdated country-based case studies, he focuses on failure as a process rather than an event, putting contemporary usage in a wider historical context.

The concept of governance has gained greater attention from scholars and international organizations as a foundation for growth, particularly to lift developing countries from dire situations and bring more prosperity to the developed world. However, according to the World Bank, Yemen is considered one of the most poorly governed countries in the world. This poor evaluation motivated this study into the challenges to good governance in Yemen and the author’s desire to demonstrate the importance of governance in addressing Yemen’s current critical situation. Despite the extensive literature published on governance, works on Yemen are rare, and there is barely any academic work on governance challenges. This relatively small body of literature encouraged me to examine in depth the obstacles to governance in Yemen. This study builds a theoretical framework to examine the difficulties of establishing good governance in Yemen by exploring the critical social and institutional challenges vital for good governance. This dissertation poses the following question: What are the challenges to good governance in Yemen, and why and how do they hamper good governance in Yemen? To address this research question, I adopted a qualitative interpretive approach. This analysis is based on information gathered from a variety of sources, including mainly semi-structured formal and informal interviews, observations, governance and government materials, such as international reports, governance manuals, websites, social media posts, and related videos, among others. The findings expose nine dimensions and 21 constructed themes, which scrutinize how and why governance is hampered in Yemen. Overall, this study introduces numbers of contributions to the governance literature by identifying social and institutional challenges and showing how they influence good governance and state-building in the Yemen context. More specifically, this Ph.D. contributes to identifying and discussing the issues that have been ignored in governance literature, such as religion, tribes, supremacy, and the Qat phenomenon, all of which applying the case of Yemen. Finally, the study makes some recommendations for stakeholders to consider, particularly for post-conflict time to aid in post-war reconstruction. This moment is an opportunity to build a state by addressing the current governance challenges, and some suggestions include a transitional phase, the introduction of constitutional and legal reforms, with youth and local community engagement.

Scholars, policymakers, aid donors, and aid recipients acknowledge the importance of good governance for development. This understanding has spurred an intense interest in more refined, nuanced, and policy-relevant indicators of governance. In this paper we review progress to date in the area of measuring governance, using a simple framework of analysis focusing on two key questions: (i) what do we measure? and, (ii) whose views do we rely on? For the former question, we distinguish between indicators measuring formal laws or rules 'on the books', and indicators that measure the practical application or outcomes of these rules 'on the ground', calling attention to the strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities between them. For the latter question, we distinguish between experts and survey respondents on whose views governance assessments are based, again highlighting their advantages, disadvantages, and complementarities. We also review the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators. We conclude with some simple principles to guide the refinement of existing governance indicators and the development of future indicators. We emphasize the need to: transparently disclose and account for the margins of error in all indicators; draw from a diversity of indicators and exploit complementarities among them; submit all indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny; and, in light of the lessons of over a decade of existing indicators, to be realistic in the expectations of future indicators.

Argues that new democracies face consolidation challenges due to campaign finance corruption and the unwillingness of politicians to reform rule of law enforcement. Mainstream theories assert that democracy cures corruption. In market economies, however, elections are expensive and parties, with ever-thinning memberships, cannot legally acquire the necessary campaign funds. In order to secure electoral funds, a large number of politicians misappropriate public funds. Due to the illicit character of these transactions, high officials with conflicts of interest prefer to leave anticorruption enforcement mechanisms unreformed and reserve the right to intervene in the judicial process, with dire consequences for the rule of law. In No Rule of Law, No Democracy, Cristina Nicolescu-Waggonner demonstrates that when corrupt politicians are in power—true of nearly all new democracies—they will protect their office and fail to implement rule of law reforms. Consequently, these polities never reach a point where democracy could and would cure corruption. This dysfunction is tested in one hundred cases over sixteen years with significant results. In the case of the Czech Republic, for example, which is regarded as a consolidated democracy, there is systematic corruption, misappropriation of state funds, an unreformed judiciary, and arbitrary application of law. The only solution is a powerful, independent, well-funded anticorruption agency. Romania, one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, established, at the European Union’s request, powerful anticorruption bodies and punished corrupt leaders, which created the predictability of enforcement. It is the certainty of punishment that curtails corruption and establishes true rule of law. Cristina Nicolescu-Waggonner is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Pomona College.

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