Theory Of Human Action

This book articulates an original scheme for the conceptualization of action. Beginning with a new approach to the individuation of acts, it delineates the relationships between basic and non-basic acts and uses these relationships in the definition of ability and intentional action. The author exhibits the central role of wants and beliefs in the causation of acts and in the analysis of the concept of action. Professor Goldman suggests answers to fundamental questions about acts, and develops a set of ideas and principles that can be used in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, ethics, and other fields, including the behavioral sciences. Originally published in 1977. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Leading figures working in the philosophy of action debate foundational issues relating to the causal theory of action. The causal theory of action (CTA) is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout

Economics originated as a branch of the humane studies that was concerned with trying to understand how some societies flourish while others stagnate, and also how once-flourishing societies could come to stagnate. Over the major part of the 20th century, however, economists mostly turned away from these humane and societal concerns by importing mechanistic ideas from 19th century physics. This book seeks to show how that original humane and social focus can be renewed. The many particular topics the book examines can be traced to two central ideas. Firstly, that economic theory, like physics, requires two distinct theoretical frameworks. One treats qualities that are invariant across time and place; this is the domain of equilibrium theory. The other treats the internal generation of change in societies through entrepreneurial action that continually transforms the ecology of enterprises that constitutes a society. Secondly, economic theory is treated as a genuine social science and not a science of rationality writ large. The book also explores ways in which life in society is understood differently once economics is treated as a social science. The book is much of the hyper-formality that comprises economic theory these days fails to make reasonable contact with reality. It will be of interest to sociologists, political scientists, and researchers in law, public policy, Austrian economics, evolutionary economics, institutional economics and political economy.

This book presents a unified and systematic philosophical account of human actions and their explanation, and it does it in the spirit of scientific realism. In addition, various other related topics, such as psychological concept formation and the nature of mental events and states, are dis cussed. This is due to the fact that the key problems in the philosophy of psychology are interconnected to a high degree. This interwovenness has affected the discussion of these problems in that often the same topic is discussed in several contexts in the book. I hope the reader does not find this too frustrating. The theory of action developed in this book, especially in its latter half, is a causalist one. In a sense it can be regarded as an explication and refin~ment of a typical common sense view of actions and the mental episodes causally responsible for them. It has, of course, not been possible to discuss all the relevant philosophical problems in great detail, even if I have regarded it as necessary to give a brief treatment of relatively many problems. Rather, I have concentrated on some key issues and hope that future research will help to clarify the rest.

Cover -- Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Dedication Page -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Rational Animals and their Actions -- A. The Socratic Tradition in the Theory of Human Action -- B. Should the Socratic Tradition be Jettisoned as Folk Psychology? -- C. Plan for an Investigation of Human Action on Socratic Lines -- Chapter 2 Actions as Individual Events -- Chapter 3 Orexis and Doxa -- Chapter 4 Propositional Attitudes: Frege's Semantics Revised -- Chapter 5 Choosing and Doing -- Chapter 6 Intending -- Chapter 7 Rationalizing and Explaining -- Chapter 8 Will and Intellect -- Chapter 9 Agency -- Chapter 10 Freedom of Choice -- Bibliography -- Index

Mortal man does not know how the universe and all that it contains may appear to a superhuman intelligence. Perhaps such an exalted mind is in a position to elaborate a coherent and comprehensive monistic interpretation of all phenomena. Man—up to now, at least—has always gone lamentably amiss in his attempts to bridge the gulf that he sees yawning between mind and matter, between the rider and the horse, between the mason and the stone. It would be preposterous to view this failure as a sufficient demonstration of the soundness of a dualistic philosophy. All that we can infer from it is that science—at least for the time being—must adopt a dualistic approach, less as a philosophical explanation than as a methodological device. Methodological dualism refrains from any proposition concerning essences and metaphysical constructs. It merely takes into account the fact that we do not know how external events—physical, chemical, and physiological—affect human thoughts, ideas, and judgments of value. This ignorance splits the realm of knowledge into two separate fields, the realm of external events, commonly called nature, and the realm of human thought and action. Older ages looked upon the issue from a moral or religious point of view. Materialist monism was rejected as incompatible with the Christian dualism of the Creator and the creation, and of the immortal soul and the mortal body. Determinism was rejected as incompatible with the fundamental principles of morality as well as with the penal code. Most of what was advanced in these controversies to support the respective dogmas was unessential and is irrelevant from the methodological point of view of our day. The determinists did little more than repeat their thesis again and again, without trying to substantiate it. The indeterminists denied their adversaries’ statements but were unable to strike at their weak points. The long debates were not very helpful.