This Can T Be Legal

"F Minus is a strip short on life lessons, precious moments, and pearls of wisdom. It tackles life's serious issues, pins them to the ground, and steals their lunch money. Then it feels a little bit guilty and gives some of it back. 'I draw my material from my experiences at a wide array of failed careers,' says Carrillo. 'Over time, I have worked as a pizza cook, Web site designer, dancing costumed character, portrait artist, insurance drone, waiter, custom framer, camel ride attendant at the zoo, and the guy at the airport that waves orange wands at the airplanes. As varied as these jobs were, eventually I had the profound realization that they all had two important things in common: each offered a wealth of comedic inspiration and there was always a creepy guy named Larry.' Life isn't fair. But it sure is funny in F Minus."--Amazon.com.

John Gardner was one of the most prolific, widely read, and influential scholars working in philosophy of law. This book celebrates, explores, and develops themes of his work during his sixteen years as Professor of Jurisprudence at University of Oxford. Written by a team of contributors whose own work has been influenced by Gardner's and with whom he has worked closely, this book engages with many of the concepts, themes, and issues that were central to his philosophical work and outlook. It expands on his arguments, offers original rebuttals to some, and draws connections with parallel and emerging fields that have been influenced by his work. This is the first book-length treatment covering the entire range of his scholarship, and will serve as a handbook of sorts, for those scholars seeking to engage Gardner's work and make connections across the wide range of topics on which he has written. In particular, the volume comprises discussions of duties to try and succeed in relation to Hume's maxim that 'ought implies can'; the role of continuity, conservatism, and corrective justice in private law, the interrelations between wrongdoing, blame, punishment, and the justification of criminal law, justifications, excuses, and responsibility, the distinctiveness of the wrongs of rape and discrimination, as well as general jurisprudence and how it may, or may not, illuminate the questions of normativity and the nature of constitutions. The volume also engages with further concepts and questions addressed through the prism of Gardner's work, include Indigenous rights and law, Equity, corporate responsibility and the possibility of state crimes, and the nature, structure, and phenomenology of virtue. Together, the papers collected in this volume pay homage to the breadth of John Gardner's legal philosophy. The conversations begun, or continued, in this volume will continue to inform the contributors' future work, and thus increase the likelihood that John's body of work will have an ever greater influence on the future of legal philosophy.

Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach presents a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the substantive criminal law of two major jurisdictions: the United States and Germany. Presupposing no familiarity with either U.S. or German criminal law, the book will provide criminal law scholars and students with a rich comparative understanding of criminal law's foundations and central doctrines. All foreign-language sources have been translated into English; cases and materials are accompanied by heavily cross-referenced introductions and notes that place them within the framework of each country's criminal law system and highlight issues ripe for comparative analysis. Divided into three parts, the book covers foundational issues - such as constitutional limits on the criminal law - before tackling the major features of the general part of the criminal law and a selection of offences in the special part. Throughout, readers are exposed to alternative approaches to familiar problems in criminal law, and as a result will have a chance to see a given country's criminal law doctrine, on specific issues and in general, from the critical distance of comparative analysis.

This book elaborates and defends the idea of law without the state. Animated by a vision of peaceful, voluntary cooperation as a social ideal and building on a careful account of non-aggression, it features a clear explanation of why the state is illegitimate, dangerous and unnecessary. It proposes an understanding of how law enforcement in a stateless society could be legitimate and what the optimal substance of law without the state might be, suggests ways in which a stateless legal order could foster the growth of a culture of freedom, and situates the project it elaborates in relation to leftist, anti-capitalist and socialist traditions.

A book on legal philosophy, necessarily, focuses attention on law. In addition to this focus, An Introduction to an African Legal Philosophy focuses attention on philosophy. The link between law and philosophy is brought into relief, which is done through an African context. An attempt is made to spell out what is African about legal philosophy without being cut off of African legal philosophy from non-African legal philosophy. The book draws attention to the view that a basic component of African legal philosophy consists of an investigation of what it is to be an African, and because an African is a human being among other human beings, the investigation is about what it is to be a human being. Ubuntuism is an African-derived word that captures this mode of being human. Moreover, because human beings are cultural beings, African cultural context guides the investigation. Inescapably, it is claimed that, every legal philosophy is embedded in a culture. African legal philosophy is not an exception. It is deeply rooted in African culture –a culture that is today shaped, in part, by a European colonialist culture. One feature that will strike one as one reads the book is that the book approaches African legal philosophy as a means of decolonization of African culture. African legal philosophy can accomplish this intelligently and effectively if it is itself decolonized. In doing this it contrasts sharply with mainstream Western legal philosophy.