Thomas Seebohm On The Foundations Of The Sciences

This book explores the work of Thomas Seebohm (1934-2014), a leading phenomenologist and hermeneuticist. It features papers that offer a critical and constructive dialogue about Seebohm’s analyses and their implications for the sciences. The net result is an in-depth study and a helpful overview of Seebohm’s general approach and his specific views on various areas of modern science. The contributors focus especially upon his final text, History as a Science and the System of the Sciences. They view this as the culmination and summary of his historical and phenomenological investigations into the foundations, nature, and limits of modern sciences. This includes not just history but the Geisteswissenschaften more generally, along with the social and natural sciences as well. The essays in this volume reflect that range. This volume presents insightful discussions about the nature and legitimacy of the human sciences as sciences and the unique character of the social sciences. It will be of interest not just as a matter of historical scholarship, but also and above all as an important contribution to phenomenology and to the philosophy of science and the sciences as such. It deserves attention by scholars from any philosophical tradition interested in thinking about the foundations of their disciplines and a philosophy of science that includes, but is not limited to, the natural sciences.

This book explores the work of Thomas Seebohm (1934-2014), a leading phenomenologist and hermeneuticist. It features papers that offer a critical and constructive dialogue about Seebohm's analyses and their implications for the sciences. The net result is an in-depth study and a helpful overview of Seebohm's general approach and his specific views on various areas of modern science. The contributors focus especially upon his final text, History as a Science and the System of the Sciences. They view this as the culmination and summary of his historical and phenomenological investigations into the foundations, nature, and limits of modern sciences. This includes not just history but the Geisteswissenschaften more generally, along with the social and natural sciences as well. The essays in this volume reflect that range. This volume presents insightful discussions about the nature and legitimacy of the human sciences as sciences and the unique character of the social sciences. It will be of interest not just as a matter of historical scholarship, but also and above all as an important contribution to phenomenology and to the philosophy of science and the sciences as such. It deserves attention by scholars from any philosophical tradition interested in thinking about the foundations of their disciplines and a philosophy of science that includes, but is not limited to, the natural sciences.

This volume goes beyond presently available phenomenological analyses based on the structures and constitution of the lifeworld. It shows how the science of history is the mediator between the human and the natural sciences. It demonstrates that the distinction between interpretation and explanation does not imply a strict separation of the natural and the human sciences. Finally, it shows that the natural sciences and technology are inseparable, but that technology is one-sidedly founded in pre-scientific encounters with reality in the lifeworld. In positivism the natural sciences are sciences because they offer causal explanations testable in experiments and the humanities are human sciences only if they use methods of the natural sciences. For epistemologists following Dilthey, the human sciences presuppose interpretation and the human and natural sciences must be separated. There is phenomenology interested in psychology and the social sciences that distinguish the natural and the human sciences, but little can be found about the historical human sciences. This volume fills the gap by presenting analyses of the material foundations of the "understanding" of expressions of other persons, and of primordial recollections and expectations founding explicit expectations and predictions in the lifeworld. Next, it shows, on the basis of history as applying philological methods in interpretations of sources, the role of a universal spatio-temporal framework for reconstructions and causal explanations of "what has really happened".

This book starts with a representation of Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a foundational theory of science. The following essays elucidate the main features of the phenomenological method as worked out by Husserl in the course of the development of his philosophy - starting from merely 'descriptive' and going on to 'transcendental' and 'constitutive' phenomenology - in order to get access to the foundations of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular. Further essays deal with the Husserlian foundations of natural science, and the relations between phenomenology and psychology, as well as those between phenomenology and history. This second revised and enlarged edition - the first appeared in 1987 and was edited by Lee Hardy - contains two further essays: one deals with Husserl's never abandoned idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science and his further claim to restore phenomenological philosophy as 'First Philosophy', and the other one on the problem of crisis of the Western culture Husserl was concerned with during several periods of his life, demonstrates the actuality of his phenomenology even for philosophy of science in our times.

This book offers fresh perspective on the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of physics which opens new avenues for discussion among physicists, "standard" philosophers of physics and philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Much has been written on the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19th and early 20th century, and on the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. This book is about the under-explored role of phenomenology in the development and the philosophical interpretation of 20th century physics. Part 1 examines questions about the origins and value of phenomenological approaches to physics. Does the work of classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger contain elements of systematic value to both the practice and our philosophical understanding of physics? How did classical phenomenology influence “standard” philosophy of science in the Anglo-American and other traditions? Part 2 probes questions on the role of phenomenology in the philosophies of physics and science: - Can phenomenology help to solve “Wigner’s puzzle”, the problem of the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in describing, explaining and predicting empirical phenomena? - Does phenomenology allow better understanding of the principle of gauge invariance at the core of the standard model of contemporary particle physics? - Does the phenomenological notion of “Lifeworld” stand in opposition to the “scientific metaphysics” movement, or is there potential for dialogue? Part 3 examines the measurement problem. Is the solution outlined by Fritz London and Edmond Bauer merely a re-statement of von Neumann’s view, or should it be regarded as a distinctively phenomenological take on the measurement problem? Is phenomenology a serious contender in continuing discussions of foundational questions of quantum mechanics? Can other interpretational frameworks such as quantum Bayesianism benefit from implementing phenomenological notions such as constitution or horizonal intentionality?

This book introduces a new category, in-between, that will have a far-reaching impact on classic ways of thinking. Husserl's description of consciousness and Whitehead's criticism of the prejudice of simple location are two starting points. Relativity theory's radical changes in the conception of space and time also motivate some of the lines of thought. The initial two chapters are devoted to preparatory analysis. The first presents an argument against visual reasoning; the second compares the role of relations to the role of terms. The balance of the volume discusses in-between in general, then its role in linguistics, history, ethics, and aesthetics, and finally in intersubjectivity and the faculties of the mind. Co-published with the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is viewed as one of the technological advances that will reshape modern societies and their relations. While the design and deployment of systems that continually adapt hold the promise of far-reaching, positive change, they simultaneously pose significant risks, especially to already vulnerable people. This work explores the meaning of AI, and the important role of critical understanding and its phenomenological foundation in shaping its ongoing advances. The values, power, and magic of reason are central to this discussion. Critical theory has used historical hindsight to explain the patterns of power that shape our intellectual, political, economic, and social worlds, and the discourse on AI that surrounds these worlds. The authors also delve into niche topics in philosophy such as transcendental self-awareness, post-humanism, and concepts of space-time and computer logic. By embedding a critical phenomenological orientation within their technical practices, AI communities can develop foresight and tactics that can better align research and technology development with established ethical principles — centering vulnerable people who continue to bear the brunt of the negative impacts of innovation and scientific progress. The creation of a critical–technical practice of AI will lead to a permanent revolution in social, scientific, and political communities. The years ahead will usher in a wave of new scientific breakthroughs and technologies driven by AI research, making it incumbent upon AI communities to strengthen the social contract through ethical foresight, a capability which only phenomenology can deliver, ultimately supporting future technologies that enable greater well-being, with the goal of delivering practical truths. A Critical Understanding of Artificial Intelligence: A Phenomenological Foundation is an essential read for anyone interested in the complex debate and phenomenology surrounding AI and its growing role in our society.

Joseph 1. Kockelmans Pennsylvania State University In July of 1999, Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Seebohm turned 65 years old, and thus en tered mandatory retirement. His friends, colleagues, and former students thought that it would be fitting to celebrate the event of his retirement with a volume of essays in his honor, in order to render homage to a great human being, an outstanding and dedicated teacher, a highly regarded philosopher and scholar, but above all a dear friend and colleague. When the editors thought about a unifying theme for the anthology, they finally settled on the research interests of Professor Seebohm; in their view the vast do main of his competence and interests would leave all participants the freedom to select a topic of their own choice that would nonetheless lie within this large realm as well as within the area of their own research interests. Professor Seebohm's research interests encompass work in Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, German Idealism (Kant in particular), History of Philosophy, Phi losophy of the formal sciences (of Logic in particular), Philosophy of History, Methodology and Philosophy of the Human Sciences, (including Psychology and Sociology), History of 19th Century British Empiricism (Mill), American Pragma tism, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Practical Philosophy, the devel opment of the history of philosophy in Eastern Europe, especially in the Middle Ages, but also in the nineteenth century.