Truth Meaning Justification And Reality

This collection concentrates on vital themes from Michael Dummett, one of the most influential and creative analytic philosophers of our time. The contributors, who include some of Dummett's distinguished former students, critically reflect on various concerns of Dummett's ground-breaking work in philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mathematics and logic. The essays direct towards aspects of Dummett's pioneering work in the history of analytical philosophy, particularly his interpretations of the works of Frege and of Wittgenstein, which in conjunction with Dummett’s own highly original ideas on truth and meaning have shaped decisive contemporary debates concerning notably the distinction between realism and anti-realism. Further, the volume includes a cheerfully serious excursion into popular philosophy by Dummett himself and reveals less known facets of Dummett's many-sided work and activities such as his political philosophy of immigration and asylum, and beyond that, his untiring and warm-hearted campaign for racial justice and humanity. Contributors: Michael Dummett, Eva Picardi, Crispin Wright, Timothy Williamson, Ian Rumfitt, Daniel Isaacson, Dag Prawitz, Dale Jacquette, Alex Burri, Michael Frauchiger.

This series assembles high-quality volumes from different domains of analytical philosophy. Here, "analytical philosophy" is broadly conceived in terms of a common methodological orientation towards clear formulation and sound argumentation; it is not defined by any philosophical position or school of thought. The series is edited on behalf of the Lauener Foundation for Analytical Philosophy.

Why is real-world experience vital to a mature appreciation of any philosophical system? Why is the search for objective truth a trickier proposition than it seems at first glance? American psychologist and philosopher WILLIAM JAMES (18421910), brother of novelist Henry James, was a groundbreaking researcher at Harvard University, author of such works as Principles of Psychology (1890) and The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (1902), and one of the most influential academics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Here, in a series of essays first published in book form in 1909, and considered a sequel to his series of lectures collected in Pragmatism (also available from Cosimo), James explores these questions as he discusses: [ the function of cognition [ humanism and truth [ the relation between knower and known [ the essence of humanism [ the meaning of the word truth [ the absolute and strenuous life [ and more.

Defending a realism about truth, Fumerton (philosophy, U. of Iowa) argues that the most plausible version of realism is the correspondence theory of truth, and that only by including in one's ontology the critical relation of correspondence between truth bearers and truth makers can one avoid an implausible metaphysics of possibilia in a realist analysis of falsehood. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

In this critical introduction to contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth Pascal Engel provides clear and authoritative exposition of recent and current ideas while providing original perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. This book begins with a presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts - before examining so-called minimalist and deflationist conceptions that deny truth can be anything more than a thin concept holding no metaphysical weight. The debates between those who favour substantive conceptions of the classical kind and those who advocate minimalist and deflationist conceptions are explored. Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking as some upholders of radical deflationist views have claimed. Questions about truth and realism are examined and the author shows how the realism/anti-realism debate remains a genuine, meaningful issue for a theory of truth and has not been undermined by deflationist views. Even if a metaphysical substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, Engel concludes, truth can keep a central role within our thinking, as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices, in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.

In this short, lucid, rich book Michael Dummett sets out his views about some of the deepest questions in philosophy. The fundamental question of metaphysics is: what does reality consist of? To answer this, Dummett holds, it is necessary to say what kinds of fact obtain, and what constitutes their holding good. Facts correspond with true propositions, or true thoughts: when we know which propositions, or thoughts, in general, are true, we shall know what facts there are in general. Dummett considers the relation between metaphysics, our conception of the constitution of reality, and semantics, the theory that explains how statements are determined as true or as false in terms of their composition out of their constituent expressions. He investigates the two concepts on which the bridge that connects semantics to metaphysics rests, meaning and truth, and the role of justification in a theory of meaning. He then examines the special semantic and metaphysical issues that arise with relation to time and tense. On this basis Dummett puts forward his controversial view of reality as indeterminate: there may be no fact of the matter about whether an object does or does not have a given property. We have to relinquish our deep-held realist understanding of language, the illusion that we know what it is for any proposition that we can frame to be true independently of our having any means of recognizing its truth, and accept that truth depends on our capacity to apprehend it. Dummett concludes with a chapter about God.

THE pivotal part of my book named Pragmatism is its account of the relation called 'truth' which may obtain between an idea (opinion, belief, statement, or what not) and its object. 'Truth, ' I there say, 'is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. Pragmatists and intellectualists both accept this definition as a matter of course. -- William James

In the post-positivist era in which Cartesian epistemology must be overcome we require a normative criterion of truth. Without it rationality of our beliefs and justifiability of our political acts are in question. This study seeks an epistemological criterion of truth that is attentive to the sociopolitical conditions that determine meaning