U S Iraq Withdrawal Status Of Forces Agreement

The U.S. has been involved in military operations in Iraq since March of 2003. Congress has several tools by which to exercise oversight regarding negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of agreements by the U.S. The agreements with Iraq were negotiated and concluded as executive agreements and entered into force on Jan. 1, 2009, and yet there remain many unanswered questions about the specific terms within the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). This report discusses the historical legal framework governing U.S. military operations in Iraq and then provides a general background as to the content of agreements traditionally considered SOFAs. Also discusses specific aspects of the SOFA.

The U.S. has been involved in military operations in Iraq since March of 2003. The legal framework under which the U.S. has operated includes H.J. Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243), multiple Security Council Resolutions, as well as orders under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The U.N. Security Council extended the mandate for the multinational forces through December 31, 2008. On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres. Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties intention to enter an agreement that would commit the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, arm and train Iraqi security forces, and confront Al Qaeda and other terrorist entities within Iraqi territory. On November 17, 2008, after months of negotiations, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Iraq Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari signed two documents: (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq, and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of America and Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq. The second agreement is commonly referred to as the SOFA between the United States and Iraq and is incorporated by reference into the larger strategic agreement.

President Obama has announced that all U.S. combat operations for the war in Iraq-also called Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-will cease by the end of August 2010. According to the timeline described by Administration officials, the approximately 128,000 U.S. military personnel currently in Iraq would remain there through the Iraqi elections scheduled for January 2010. After that, U.S. forces would decline to no more than 50,000 troops by the end of August 2010. In accordance with the Status of the Forces Agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in November 2008, the remaining 50,000 U.S. troops must leave the country by the end of December 2011. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that to comply with that timeline, the Administration will need to withdraw military personnel from Iraq in two stages: one between the Iraqi election and August 2010, when almost 80,000 U.S. troops would be removed over a period of seven months, and the other before the end of calendar year 2011, when 50,000 troops will need to be withdrawn. CBO estimated two broad categories of costs under the Administration's plan and under several alternatives. Some of those costs-which the Department of Defense (DoD) calls operations costs-including incremental military personnel costs attributable to the war in Iraq and costs for fuel, transportation, and maintenance of equipment in Iraq, would decrease proportionately with the number of service members in the country. Such costs, therefore, would be essentially zero by fiscal year 2013 when, under the Administration's plan, no U.S. forces would remain in Iraq. CBO estimated other costs, for activities that DoD labels "equipment reconstitution," that would not decrease proportionately with the number of troops: costs to repair equipment that is used in the war and returned to the United States and costs to replace equipment lost in the conduct of the war. CBO estimates that costs for operations and equipment reconstitution under the Administration's plan would total $51 billion in 2010 and would decline to $3 billion by 2013.

The U.S. has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. This report discusses these agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. The U.S. is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs. Includes a list of current agreements.

This innovative book provides an overview and critical assessment of the current avenues and remedies available to victims seeking recourse from private military and security companies (PMSCs) for human rights violations.

Ending the U.S. war in Iraq required redeploying 100,000 military and civilian personnel; handing off responsibility for 431 activities to the Iraqi government, U.S. embassy, USCENTCOM, or other U.S. government entities; and moving or transferring ownership of over a million pieces of property in accordance with U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book examines the planning and execution of this transition.

From the Washington Admin. to the present, Congress and the Pres. have enacted 11 separate formal DoW against foreign nations in five different wars. This report provides historical background on the enactment of DoW and authorizations for the use of force and analyzes their legal effects under internat. and U.S. domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. The report includes an extensive listing and summary of statutes that are triggered by a DoW, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. Also includes a summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a DoW or authorization for the use of force and to measures under the War Powers Resolution. This is a print on demand report.

Iraq and the US face a critical transition during the period through 2011 and beyond. There is still a war to finish, but this is only part of the challenge both countries face. No one can be certain whether Iraq can achieve a stable level of political accommodation to deal with its internal problems. Iran seeks to expand it's influence, and Turkey will not tolerate a sanctuary for hostile Kurdish movements like the PKK. Arab support for Iraq remains weak, and Iraq's Arab neighbors fear both Shi'ite dominance and what that could mean in terms of Iran's role in Syria and Lebanon as well as Iraq. Even if it moves forward towards stability and political accommodation and largely ends the insurgency, it will be extremely difficult for Iraq to develop all of the security capabilities it needs for even the counterinsurgency mission before the full US withdrawal scheduled to take place by the end of 2011. This could force the US to hand over responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces before these forces are fully able to do the job. It could also force the US to withdraw prematurely the US trainers and partner units that the IRS needs to secure the country and defend it from any threat from it's neighbors. ... Dealing with these issues will be a critical priority for the US for at least half a decade to come.