U S Military Operations

In U.S. Military Operations: Law, Policy, and Practice, a distinguished group of military experts comprehensively analyze how the law is applied during military operations on and off the battlefield. Subject matter experts offer a unique insiders perspective on how the law is actually implemented in a wide swath of military activities, such as how the law of war applies in the context of multi-state coalition forces, and whether non-governmental organizations involved in quasi-military operations are subject to the same law. The book goes on to consider whether U.S. Constitutional 4th Amendment protections apply to the military's cyber-defense measures, how the law guides targeting decisions, and whether United Nations mandates constitute binding rules of international humanitarian law. Other areas of focus include how the United States interacts with the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding its international legal obligations, and how courts should approach civil claims based on war-related torts. This book also answers questions regarding how the law of armed conflict applies to such extra-conflict acts as intercepting pirates and providing humanitarian relief to civilians in occupied territory.

In Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, author Micah Zenko presents a new concept to capture and illuminate the phenomenon: "Discrete Military Operations."

A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.

This book reviews the history of the United States-Liberia relations from the early 1820s to 2015, with particular attention paid to the role of the US armed forces. Contrary to most literature on the genesis and development of Liberia, this book demonstrates how US military power has been the primary influence shaping Liberia's history. This includes the role played by the US military in the founding of Liberia, the protection of the country during the European formal colonial era, multiple covert operations in securing US-friendly administrations in Liberia, and direct military interventions when necessary to secure American interests in the region.

"Contains the technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism ... The main document is Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, American public support for U.S. military operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-231-A, 2004 [i.e. 2005]"--P. iii.

In this work, a distinguished group of military experts analyze how the law applies, and is applied, during military operations on and off the battlefield. The editors focus on how the law is operationalized, or actually implemented, in a wide swath of military activities.

A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.