Uncertain Dynamical Systems A Differential Game Approach

Includes sections on: Sliding mode control with switching command devices. Hyperplane design and CAD of variable structure control systems. Variable structure controllers for robots. The hyperstability approach to VSCS design. Nonlinear continuous feedback for robust tracking. Control of uncertain systems with neglected dynamics. Control of infinite dimensional plants.

This book is based on the Third Kingston Conference on Differential Games and Control Theory held at the University of Rhode Island June 5-8, 1978. It deals with deterministic systems and stochastic systems, and is helpful for the researchers in applied mathematics.

New Trends in Dynamic System Theory and Economics contains selected papers presented at a two-week seminar on New Trends in Dynamic System Theory and Economics held at the International Center for Mechanical Sciences in Udine, Italy, on September 12-23, 1977. Contributors discuss recent trends in the application of dynamic system theory in economic analysis, paying particular attention to information patterns and uncertainty, optimal control theory and its application, and disequilibrium analysis. This book is divided into three sections and consists of 20 chapters. Decision problems of agents with different or imperfect information or under uncertainty are first discussed. This section gives a detailed analysis of the properties of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic games under several different information patterns. Consideration is also given to microdecision problems of individual agents, macroeconomic stabilization of an uncertain dynamic economy, and the uncertainty of parameter values. The chapters that follow focus on recent advances in optimal control theory and application of control theory. Disequilibrium analysis of a macroeconomic model is presented, along with the dynamics of disequilibria of a macroeconomic model with flexible wages and prices. A generalization of Pareto optimality is used to discuss the connection between the optimality and stability problems in a general setting. The last three chapters explore ""modern"" approaches to tâtonnement processes. This book will be of interest to students and practitioners of applied mathematics and econometrics.

This multi-authored volume presents selected papers from the Eighth Workshop on Dynamics and Control. Many of the papers represent significant advances in this area of research, and cover the development of control methods, including the control of dynamical systems subject to mixed constraints on both the control and state variables, and the development of a control design method for flexible manipulators with mismatched uncertainties. Advances in dynamic systems are presented, particularly in game-theoretic approaches and also the applications of dynamic systems methodology to social and environmental problems, for example, the concept of virtual biospheres in modeling climate change in terms of dynamical systems.

This book contains a selection of the papers presented at the symposium on "Decision processes in Economics" which was held in Modena (Italy) on 9-10 October 1989. It coincided with the annual meeting of the italian group on Game Theory; the group is formed by economists, mathematicians, engineers and social scientists. One of the targets of the Meeting, and therefore of the book, is to create an opportunity for having together papers by scientists with an "optimal control" education and papers by theorists on refinement of equilibrium, on repeted games and other topics. These two modes of working on Games are quite different but we think that a unitary approch to Games can be given and this book is an attempt in this direction. Another important and updated issue which is emphisized in the book is the discussion of computation and efficiency of numerical methods in Games. Stochastic differential games are treated in the papers by Basar, Haurie -and Deissemberg. Basar considers a stochastic model of a conflict situation between the monetary policy maker (go vernment) and the responding agent (private sector). Because of asymmetry in the (stochastic) information available the Nash and the Stackelberg games become non standard stochastic diffe rential games. After the discussion of the conditions leading to a solution he provides a numerical example for the proposed game. Haurie considers a game where the observed state changes according to a stochastic jump process.