Understanding Financial Crises

What causes a financial crisis? Can crises be anticipated or even avoided? Should governments & international institutions intervene? Based on ten years of research, the authors develop a theoretical approach to analyzing financial crises & use the latest economic theories to begin to understand the causes & consequences.

Incorporating a broad range of economic approaches, Understanding Financial Crises explores the merits of various arguments and theories which have been used to explain the causes of financial crises. The book explores eight of these different explanations: underconsumption, debt accumulation, financialization, income inequality, financial fragility, tendency of rate of profit to fall, human behavior, and global imbalances. The introduction provides a brief overview of each argument along with a comparison of their relative merits. Each chapter then introduces one of the arguments, explores a historical case, and focuses on the insights that can be gleaned into the global crisis in 2007–2008. The book draws on insights from various schools of thought including post-Keynesian economics, Marxist economics, behavioral economics, neoclassical economics, and more, to provide a pluralist overview of the causes of economic crises in general and the Great Recession in particular. This book marks a significant contribution to the literature on economic and financial crises, political economy and heterodox economics. It is well suited to academicians, practitioners, and financial analysts working within the relevant fields.

The lingering effects of the economic crisis are still visible—this shows a clear need to improve our understanding of financial crises. This book surveys a wide range of crises, including banking, balance of payments, and sovereign debt crises. It begins with an overview of the various types of crises and introduces a comprehensive database of crises. Broad lessons on crisis prevention and management, as well as the short-term economic effects of crises, recessions, and recoveries, are discussed.

Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. Gary B. Gorton, a prominent expert on financial crises, argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. Misunderstanding Financial Crises offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, Gorton shows how financial crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, Gorton writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises, to the "Panic of 2007-2008," Gorton ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-too-fail--all to illustrate the true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all was well. Gorton also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future threat of financial disaster.

This book develops a new theoretical approach to the explanation of systemic financial crises in industrial and emerging market countries. In contrast to standard models, the present cyclical approach is consistent with the following three stylized facts. Firstly, systemic financial crises are a recurrent phenomenon generally accompanied by excessive boom-bust cycles. Secondly, the frequency of financial crisis cycles is very irregular. Thirdly, most financial crisis cycles are initiated by positive shocks to profit expectations which induce an unsustainable build-up of financial fragility driven by irrational exuberance. The present approach is based on a sophisticated balancesheet structure with many assets, as well as on an expectation formation scheme which combines the rational expectations hypothesis with Keynes' Beauty Contest Theory.

This book is a survey and critique of the major theories of financial crises. The first edition built a model of crisis from an analysis of postwar financial crises in the US through the mid-1980s. The second edition continues the story from 1985 and covers the stock market crash of 1987, the collapse of the Savings and Loan industry, the severe problems of US commercial banks, and the increasing risks posed by junk bonds. A new chapter analyses the causes of increasing financial instability in the 1980s. The book's extensive charts and tables are fully revised and updated to present the latest evidence. The first edition has gained wide interest as a supplemental text.

In a series of disarmingly simple arguments financial market analyst George Cooper challenges the core principles of today's economic orthodoxy and explains how we have created an economy that is inherently unstable and crisis prone. With great skill, he examines the very foundations of today's economic philosophy and adds a compelling analysis of the forces behind economic crisis. His goal is nothing less than preventing the seemingly endless procession of damaging boom-bust cycles, unsustainable economic bubbles, crippling credit crunches, and debilitating inflation. His direct, conscientious, and honest approach will captivate any reader and is an invaluable aid in understanding today's economy.

City governments are going bankrupt. Even the ones that aren’t are often stuck in financial chaos. It is easy to blame pensions, poor leadership, or a bad economy. But the problems go much deeper. With decades of experience in local government, author Mark Moses showcases the inside world of the city decision-making process that has spawned these crises. It becomes clear: City governments are maxing out their budgets because they are trying to maximize services. This book, likely the most ambitious attempt by someone who has worked in government to radically examine the delivery of municipal services since 'Reinventing Government' was published more than 25 years ago, explores why city governments pursue an open-ended mission and why bailouts and trendy budgeting processes will be, at best, only temporary solutions. Of interest to current and future city council members, regional and state government officials, those covering city government, financial analysts, city management, and individuals and organizations interested in influencing city policy, this book argues that cities won’t thrive until city hall is disrupted.