Unemployment Insurance Temporary Layoffs And Recall Expectations

This paper shows the importance of explicitly accounting for the possibility of recalls when analyzing the determinants of unemployment spell durations and the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment outcomes in the United States. These issues are examined using a unique sample of UI recipients from Missouri and Pennsylvania covering unemployment spells in the 1979- 1981 period. We find that those expecting recall who are not recalled tend to have quite long unemployment spells. Furthermore, ex-ante temporary layoff spells (the spells of individuals' who initially expect to be recalled) may account for over 60 percent of the unemployment of UI recipients and appear to account for much more unemployment than ex-post temporary layoff spells (spells actually ending in recall). We estimate a competing risks model in which the finding of a new job and recall are treated as alternate routes of leaving unemployment. Our results using this approach show that the recall and new job exit probabilities have quite different time patterns and are often affected in opposite ways by explanatory variables. We also find that the probability of leaving unemployment (both through recalls and new job finding) increases greatly around the time that UI benefits lapse.

Recalls (also known as ‘temporary layoffs’) are used as employment strategy in the German labor market for handling fluctuations in the need of labor. Susanne Edler presents research that reveals that employment relations after recalls are less protected by labor market regulations and more exposed to the competitive market processes than continuously employed workers that grant wage premiums (rents) due to their higher shielding from the competitive labor market. However, compared to other discontinuous employment relations temporary layoffs can be the better alternative since employers as well as employees make use of their transaction-specific investments in human capital and thereby generate ‘composite rents.’

The deep recession and slow recovery of the Canadian economy in the 1980s and the lengthy recession of the early 1990s raised serious questions about economic policy making. The steady worsening of Canadian unemployment rates led some economists to doubt the traditional view that the national economy is by nature self-correcting and to endorse the concept of hysteresis - the idea that the unemployment rate may display no tendency to return to an unchanging natural rate. Such hysteresis would have important and far-reaching implications for economic policy, particularly monetary policy. Jones provides an overview of leading theories of hysteresis and examines international and Canadian evidence from both microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives. He extends the econometric analysis of hysteresis at both the micro and macro levels and concludes that while there is some evidence of dependence in Canada, the overall picture is not one of hysteresis.