United Kingdom Financial Sector Assessment Program Systemic Stress And Climate Related Financial Risks Implications For Balance Sheet Resilience

The FSAP started in an important macro-financial phase right after the second Covid wave and a third lockdown. The balance sheet resilience of major institutional sectors was at the center of policy considerations. Against this backdrop, the FSAP analyzed the pandemic’s potential “scarring” of banks, insurers, corporates, and households balance sheets, focusing on the interplay of macro-financial/structural conditions and financial vulnerabilities.

This paper discusses how Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) stress test assesses the resilience of the banking sector as a whole rather than the capital adequacy of individual institutions. The FSAP approach to stress testing is essentially macroprudential: it focuses on resilience of the broader financial system to adverse macro-financial conditions rather than on resilience of individual banks to specific shocks. This test ensures consistency in macroeconomic scenarios and metrics across firms to facilitate the assessment of the banking system as a whole. The stress test analysis is intended to help country authorities to identify key sources of systemic risk in the banking sector and inform macroprudential policies to enhance its resilience to absorb shocks.

This paper assesses the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom as a whole, not that of individual institutions. Since the last Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), the U.K. financial system has put the legacy of the crisis behind it and has become stronger and more resilient. This FSAP found the system to be much stronger and thus better able to serve the real economy. Like all systems, the U.K. financial system is exposed to risks. Its position as a global hub exposes the U.K. financial system to global risks. In addition, the uncertainties associated with the possibility of British exit from the EU weigh heavily on the outlook.

The U.K. financial sector is globally systemic, open, and complex. It has weathered the COVID-19 pandemic fittingly, thanks to the post-GFC reforms, a proactive macroprudential stance, and an effective multipronged response to maintain financial stability. Brexit uncertainties are being handled appropriately as the U.K. and EU authorities and the financial industry collaborate to prevent undesirable financial stability outcomes. The endpoint of the pandemic remains unclear, as does the actual impact on the financial system once support measures wane. At this juncture, therefore, financial stability conditions in the United Kingdom are being shaped by three key considerations: (i) the evolving U.K.-EU relationship on financial services; (ii) securing a sustainable and robust post-pandemic economic recovery; and (iii) successfully managing ongoing structural transitions.

The United Kingdom’s macroprudential policy framework has proven its effectiveness. After the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09, the United Kingdom assigned the Bank of England (BOE) a clear financial stability mandate, created a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) to set macroprudential policy, and shifted to a “twin peaks” model of financial oversight. The 2016 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) concluded that the new framework appeared appropriate for effectively conducting macroprudential policy. However, the framework was then relatively new. The 2021 FSAP represents an opportunity to review its performance in building systemic resilience through the financial cycle, including the market volatility resulting from the Brexit vote and the COVID-19 pandemic.

This paper summarizes the assessment of interconnectedness and systemic risk undertaken for the U.K. financial system as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program. It consists of three parts, focusing on the following: (1) motivation for monitoring cross-sector interconnectedness as part of the financial system’s resilience assessment, (2) description of selected empirical methods that may be employed to analyze interconnectedness, and (3) an illustrative analysis conducted, based on a definition of the financial system that incorporates U.K. banking and life insurance sectors. The assessment of financial system resilience should account for the evolution of interconnectedness between firms and sectors.

This publication serves as a roadmap for exploring and managing climate risk in the U.S. financial system. It is the first major climate publication by a U.S. financial regulator. The central message is that U.S. financial regulators must recognize that climate change poses serious emerging risks to the U.S. financial system, and they should move urgently and decisively to measure, understand, and address these risks. Achieving this goal calls for strengthening regulators’ capabilities, expertise, and data and tools to better monitor, analyze, and quantify climate risks. It calls for working closely with the private sector to ensure that financial institutions and market participants do the same. And it calls for policy and regulatory choices that are flexible, open-ended, and adaptable to new information about climate change and its risks, based on close and iterative dialogue with the private sector. At the same time, the financial community should not simply be reactive—it should provide solutions. Regulators should recognize that the financial system can itself be a catalyst for investments that accelerate economic resilience and the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. Financial innovations, in the form of new financial products, services, and technologies, can help the U.S. economy better manage climate risk and help channel more capital into technologies essential for the transition. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5247742

The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) carried out a focused review of the non-banks in the United Kingdom and systemic liquidity. It reviewed five areas: (i) The overall NBFI system, its links to banks and the rest of the world; (ii) NBFI direct lending to the U.K. economy; (iii) Sterling investment funds (OEFs, AIFs, and MMFs); (iv) CCPs; and (v) Systemic liquidity. The NBFIs are defined as all non-deposit-taking corporations, listed in Figure 1, and with the following limited coverage: Pension Funds and Insurance Companies are covered to the extend they lend to the economy and interact with CCPs; Investment funds only to the extent of Sterling Funds; and broker-dealers only to the extent they interact with CCPs. Regulatory aspects of NBFIs are covered in a parallel Technical Note (TN).