United States Army Special Operations In World War 2

Illustrated with 11 maps and 35 Illustrations From the plains of Europe to the jungles of the Pacific, the U.S. Army in World War II employed a variety of commando and guerrilla operations to harass the Axis armies, gather intelligence, and support the more conventional Allied military efforts. During the Allied invasion of northern France on D-day, elite American infantry scaled the sheer cliffs of the Normandy coast, while smaller combat teams and partisans struck deep behind German lines, attacking enemy troop concentrations and disrupting their communications. On the other side of the globe, U.S. soldiers led guerrillas against Japanese patrols in the jungles of the Philippines and pushed through uncharted paths in the rugged mountains of northern Burma to strike at the enemy rear. Special operations such as these provided some of the most stirring adventure stories of the war, with innumerable legends growing from the exploits of Darby’s and Rudder’s Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, the Jedburghs, the guerrillas of the Philippines, and the Kachins of northern Burma. Despite the public and historical attention paid to the exploits of American special operations forces in World War II, their significance remains a matter of dispute. Both during and after the conflict, many officers argued that such endeavors contributed little in a war won primarily by conventional combat units. They perceived little, if any, place for such units in official Army doctrine. Yet others have contended that a broader, more intelligent use of special operations would have hastened the triumph of Allied arms during World War II. In their eyes, the experience gained by the U.S. Army in the field during the war was important and foreshadowed the shape of future military operations.

U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II fills a gap in the Army's record of its overseas activities. As David W. Hogan so clearly states, a variety of commando and guerrilla operations were conducted on the plains of Europe and in the jungles of the Pacific to harass the Axis armies, to gather intelligence, and to support the more conventional Allied military efforts, yet their significance was a matter of dispute. Hogan examines the critical issues underlying special operations and shows how American leaders employed commandos-rangers in Army parlance-and guerrillas extensively, if not systematically, during the war. An important overview of the Army's past experience, the study contains useful lessons at a time of keen interest in the critical role being played by special operation forces in meeting today's contingencies.

From the plains of Europe to the jungles of the Pacific, the U.S. Army in World War II employed a variety of commando & guerrilla operations to harass the Axis armies, gather intelligence, & support the more conventional Allied military efforts. Special operations provided some of the most stirring adventure stories of the war. This volume discusses commando & guerrilla activities & the gathering of intelligence by partisans & special military units in WW II. Chapters: special operations in the Mediterranean; special operations in the European Theater; special operations in the Pacific; & special operations in the China-Burma-India Theater. Bibliography. Photos & maps.

A brief history of secret British and American World War II organizations, their training, tools, successes, and their legacy. Winston Churchill famously instructed the head of the Special Operations Executive to “Set Europe ablaze!” Agents of both the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services underwent rigorous training before making their way, undetected, into occupied Europe to do just that. Working alone or in small cells, often cooperating with local resistance groups, agents undertook missions behind enemy lines involving sabotage, subversion, organizing resistance groups and intelligence-gathering. SOE’s first notable success was the destruction of a power station in France, stopping work at a vital U-boat base. Later operations included the assassination of Himmler’s deputy Reinhard Heyrich and ending the Nazi atomic bomb program by destroying the heavy water plant at Vemork, Norway. OSS operatives established anti-Nazi resistance groups across Europe, and managed to smuggle operatives into Nazi Germany, including running one of the war’s most important spies, German diplomat Fritz Kolbe. All missions were incredibly dangerous and many agents were captured, tortured, and ultimately killed—the life expectancy of an SOE wireless operator in occupied France was just six weeks. In this short history, historian James Stejskal examines why these agencies were established, the training regime and ingenious tools developed to enable agents to undertake their missions, their operational successes, and their legacy.

Paddock also includes new sections on American psychological warfare in the Pacific, the Army Rangers, the 1st Special Service Force, and American-led guerrillas in the Philippines."--BOOK JACKET.

Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952, the year the Armys special warfare center was established. While the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent U. S. experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many army leaders, trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psychological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Armys wartime arsenal, but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Armys adoption of unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a single operation the techniques of both types of warfare. Colonel Paddocks extensively documented work traces a portion of a brief episode in our Nations military hisotyr, but an instructive one. For the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the subsequent evolution of the Armys special warefare capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change. John S. Pustay Lieutenant General, United States Air Force President, National Defense University