Unknowability

The realities of mankind's cognitive situation are such that our knowledge of the world's ways is bound to be imperfect. None the less, the theory of unknowability—agnoseology as some have called it—is a rather underdeveloped branch of philosophy. In this philosophically rich and groundbreaking work, Nicholas Rescher aims to remedy this. As the heart of the discussion is an examination of what Rescher identifies as the four prime reasons for the impracticability of cognitive access to certain facts about the world: developmental inpredictability, verificational surdity, ontological detail, and predicative vagrancy. Rescher provides a detailed and illuminating account of the role of each of these factors in limiting human knowledge, giving us an overall picture of the practical and theoretical limits to our capacity to know our world.

This book, one of the earliest by Christos Yannaras, was first published in 1967 and has become a contemporary classic. Yannaras begins by outlining Heidegger's analysis of the fate of western metaphysics, which ends, he argues, in a nihilistic atheism. Yannaras's response is largely to accept Heidegger's analysis, but to argue that, although it applies to the western tradition of what Heidegger calls "onto theology" (which regards God as a 'being', even if the highest), it does not take account of the Orthodox tradition of apophatic theology, of which Dionysius the Areopagite is a pre-eminent example. A God 'beyond being' escapes the criticism of Heidegger, and provides an alternative to Heidegger's nihilistic conclusion.

On the Borders of Being and Knowing begins with Greeks distinguishing "being" from "something" and proceeds to the late Scholastic doctrine of "supertranscendental being," which embraces both.

The realities of mankind's cognitive situation are such that our knowledge of the world's ways is bound to be imperfect. None the less, the theory of unknowability--agnoseology as some have called it--is a rather underdeveloped branch of philosophy. In this philosophically rich and groundbreaking work, Nicholas Rescher aims to remedy this. As the heart of the discussion is an examination of what Rescher identifies as the four prime reasons for the impracticability of cognitive access to certain facts about the world: developmental inpredictability, verificational surdity, ontological detail, and predicative vagrancy. Rescher provides a detailed and illuminating account of the role of each of these factors in limiting human knowledge, giving us an overall picture of the practical and theoretical limits to our capacity to know our world.

This fresh, comprehensive study of ancient Greek atheism aims to dismantle the current consensus that atheism was ‘unthinkable’ in ancient Greece, demonstrating instead that atheism was not only thinkable but inextricably embedded in the Greek religious environment. Through careful analysis of a wide range of source material provided in modern English translation, and drawing on philosophy, theology, sociology, and other disciplines, Ford unpicks a two and a half thousand-year history of marginalisation, clearing the way for a new analysis. He lays out in clear terms the nature and form of ancient Greek atheism as the ancient Greeks conceived of it, through a series of themes and lenses. Topics such as religious socialisation, the interaction of atheist philosophy and theology, identity formation through alterity, and the use of atheism in scapegoating are considered not only in broad terms, using a synthesis of modern scholarship to mark out an overview in line with modern consensus, but also by drawing on the unique perspective of ancient atheism Ford is able to provide innovative theories about a range of subjects. Atheism at the Agora is of interest to students and scholars in Classics, particularly Greek religion and culture, as well as those studying atheism in other historical and contemporary areas, religious studies, philosophy, and theology.

This handbook presents the conceptions and principles central to every aspect of Hegel’s systematic philosophy. In twenty-eight thematically linked chapters by leading international experts, The Palgrave Hegel Handbook provides reliable, scholarly overviews of each subject, illuminates the main issues and debates, and details concisely the considered views of each contributor. Recent scholarship challenges traditional, largely anti-Kantian, readings of Hegel, focusing instead on Hegel’s appropriation of Kantian epistemology to reconcile idealism with the rejection of foundationalism, coherentism and skepticism. Focused like Kant on showing how fundamental unities underlie the profusion of apparently independent events, Hegel argued that reality is rationally structured, so that its systematic structure is manifest to our properly informed thought. Accordingly, this handbook re-assesses Hegel’s philosophical aims, methods and achievements, and re-evaluates many aspects of Hegel’s enduring philosophical contributions, ranging from metaphysics, epistemology, and dialectic, to moral and political philosophy and philosophy of history. Each chapter, and The Palgrave Hegel Handbook as a whole, provides an informed, authoritative understanding of each aspect of Hegel’s philosophy.

This book presents a new view of the relation between metaphysics and the theory of meaning, broadly construed. Christopher Peacocke develops a general claim that metaphysics is always involved, either as explanatorily prior, or in a no-priority relationship, to the theory of meaning and content. Meaning and intentional content are never explanatorily prior to the metaphysics. He aims to show, in successive chapters of The Primacy of Metaphysics, how the general view holds for magnitudes, time, the self, and abstract objects. For each of these cases, the metaphysics of the entities involved is explanatorily prior to an account of the nature of our language and thought about them. Peacocke makes original contributions to the metaphysics of these topics, and offers consequential new treatments of analogue computation and representation. In the final chapter, he argues that his approach generates a new account of the limits of intelligibility, and locates his account in relation to other treatments of this classical conundrum.

Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought. The challenge is one of reconciling our conception of truth in an area with the means by which we think we come to know truth about that area. Meeting the challenge may require a revision of our conception of truth in that area; or a revision of our theory of knowledge for that area; or a revision in our conception of the relations between the two. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession. It formulates a set of constraints and a general form of solution for a wide range of topics. He goes on to propose specific solutions within this general form for a series of classically problematic subjects: the past; metaphysical necessity; the intentional contents of our own mental states; the self; and freedom of the will. Being Known will interest anyone concerned with those individual topics, as well as those concerned more generally with meaning and understanding, metaphysics and epistemology, and their interrelations.