Untying The Afghan Knot

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the Afghanistan crisis began almost immediately after the Soviet Union's military intervention in that country in December 1979. Untying the Afghan Knot offers the first detailed account of the diplomatic process set in motion by that intervention and culminating in the April 1988 Geneva Accords--a milestone in multilateralism and United Nations (UN) peacemaking. Riaz M. Khan, a senior Pakistani diplomat, participated actively in all meetings on Afghanistan in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and in all of the Geneva negotiating rounds (1882-1988). Drawing upon his personal experience, official documents, scholarly literature, and press accounts, he provides a unique insider's view of these precedent-setting negotiations, which were often shrouded in secrecy and misperceptions. Khan examines the interests, positions, and behind-the-scenes maneuverings of the major players--Afghan governments and resistance groups, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and UN mediators--and assesses the impact of military and political developments inside Afghanistan and elsewhere, including the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev. Khan's authoritative account of these critical diplomatic initiatives sheds important light on the internal dynamics of the multilateral Afghanistan negotiations.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the Afghanistan crisis began almost immediately after the Soviet Union's military intervention in that country in December 1979. Untying the Afghan Knot offers the first detailed account of the diplomatic process set in motion by that intervention and culminating in the April 1988 Geneva Accords--a milestone in multilateralism and United Nations (UN) peacemaking. Riaz M. Khan, a senior Pakistani diplomat, participated actively in all meetings on Afghanistan in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and in all of the Geneva negotiating rounds (1882-1988). Drawing upon his personal experience, official documents, scholarly literature, and press accounts, he provides a unique insider's view of these precedent-setting negotiations, which were often shrouded in secrecy and misperceptions. Khan examines the interests, positions, and behind-the-scenes maneuverings of the major players--Afghan governments and resistance groups, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and UN mediators--and assesses the impact of military and political developments inside Afghanistan and elsewhere, including the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev. Khan's authoritative account of these critical diplomatic initiatives sheds important light on the internal dynamics of the multilateral Afghanistan negotiations.

Few people are more respected or better positioned to speak on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan than M. Hassan Kakar. A professor at Kabul University and scholar of Afghanistan affairs at the time of the 1978 coup d'état, Kakar vividly describes the events surrounding the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the encounter between the military superpower and the poorly armed Afghans. The events that followed are carefully detailed, with eyewitness accounts and authoritative documentation that provide an unparalleled view of this historical moment. Because of his prominence Kakar was at first treated with deference by the Marxist government and was not imprisoned, although he openly criticized the regime. When he was put behind bars the outcry from scholars all over the world possibly saved his life. In prison for five years, he continued collecting information, much of it from prominent Afghans of varying political persuasions who were themselves prisoners. Kakar brings firsthand knowledge and a historian's sensibility to his account of the invasion and its aftermath. This is both a personal document and a historical one—Kakar lived through the events he describes, and his concern for human rights rather than party politics infuses his writing. As Afghans and the rest of the world try to make sense of Afghanistan's recent past, Kakar's voice will be one of those most listened to.

Hilali provides an excellent study into the US-Pakistan partnership under the Reagan administration. The book explores the causes of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghanistan war and the United States' support to prevent Soviet adventurism. It shows that Pakistan was the principal channel through which assistance was provided to Afghan freedom fighters; it also provided access to its military bases to use against the Soviet Union. The study looks at the consequences of the war on Pakistan and explains how it became enmeshed within its domestic politics. Furthermore, it evaluates the role of Pakistan as a key partner in the global coalition against terrorism and discusses how General Pervez Musharraf brought about Pakistan's development towards a progressive, moderate and democratic society. Ideally suited to courses on foreign policy.

This book is a compilation of articles by over two dozen Indian specialists on India s relations with Russia and Russia Today, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is a unique exercise. This study is first of its kind which makes an objective estimate of both India s relations with Russia and changes in Russia during 90 s in the last century.

The conflict in Afghanistan looms large in the collective consciousness of Americans. What has the United States achieved, and how will it withdraw without sacrificing those gains? The Soviet Union confronted these same questions in the 1980s, and Artemy Kalinovsky’s history of the USSR’s nine-year struggle to extricate itself from Afghanistan and bring its troops home provides a sobering perspective on exit options in the region. What makes Kalinovsky’s intense account both timely and important is its focus not on motives for initiating the conflict but on the factors that prevented the Soviet leadership from ending a demoralizing war. Why did the USSR linger for so long, given that key elites recognized the blunder of the mission shortly after the initial deployment? Newly available archival material, supplemented by interviews with major actors, allows Kalinovsky to reconstruct the fierce debates among Soviet diplomats, KGB officials, the Red Army, and top Politburo figures. The fear that withdrawal would diminish the USSR’s status as leader of the Third World is palpable in these disagreements, as are the competing interests of Afghan factions and the Soviet Union’s superpower rival in the West. This book challenges many widely held views about the actual costs of the conflict to the Soviet leadership, and its findings illuminate the Cold War context of a military engagement that went very wrong, for much too long.

The first comprehensive account of this roller coaster relationship, this book is a companion volume to Kux's Estranged Democracies, recently called "the definitive history of Pakistani-American relationsin the New York Times.

This book surveys the main conflicts and insurgencies in recent Middle East history, focusing mainly on the period since the 1980s and taking a historical-analytical approach.